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Editorial Note
Th e ﬁ rst part of this publication includes conference proceedings from the 
conference held in Prague in May 2009, including the speakers’ contributions 
and selected parts of Q&A sessions. Th e structure of this part follows the 
conference programme. Th e conference panels’ titles copy the four policy areas 
that the joint EU-US working groups were dealing with in the project framework. 
Th e second part consists of the four updated policy papers.
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Part I – Conference Proceedings
Welcoming remarks
Erfried Adam, Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
As we are approaching the end of the Czech EU presidency, transatlantic 
relations seem to be an especially appropriate and timely topic. Let me make 
a few general remarks on the German perspective in transatlantic relations. 
Th e conference title reads “Transatlantic Relations 2009  – A  Chance for 
a Fresh Start?” In Germany this question would be answered with a clear “yes”. 
Probably even a “yes, we can!” But even without the so-called “Obama-factor”, 
there is a  long and stable transatlantic relationship between Germany and 
the United States, bound by a robust friendship based on shared experience, 
values and interests. Th e Czech Republic is regarded as a country with strong 
transatlantic links and orientation. In this regard, I  see some quite striking 
similarities to Germany, motivated by both historical and recent events and 
experience. Germany has strong aﬃ  nities to the US. My generation sees the 
end of the Second World War on the 8t or 9t of May 1945 as a  liberation. 
President Richard von Weizsäcker gave the right interpretation in the great 
speech on the 40t anniversary in 1985... “After more than twenty years, one 
can state with certainty that the basic note remains unchanged: the US are 
still viewed as the main liberator.” In the post-war period, the United States 
immediately provided political support and economic assistance to West 
Germany by means of the Marshall Plan. Without United States as guarantor 
of freedom in the decades of the Cold War, Germany would have not been 
able to regain its national unity as a free nation. And much like in the Czech 
Republic, American culture keeps on being attractive to Germans in many 
ways. Th is is a link that should not be underestimated. 
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But neither should it be overlooked that such a ﬁ rm and strong relation-
ship also went through periods of disagreement and bitterness. Let me refer 
to my generation again: it had quite serious problems with the Vietnam 
War 40 years ago, as well as doubts concerning certain open or hidden US 
activities in various regions, such as Latin America or Southern Africa. Th e 
diﬀ erent lines of thinking also developed after the end of the Cold War, now 
20 years ago. But it all changed after 9/11 – the 11th of September, 2001 was 
a milestone. Germans and the all Western world felt emotionally closer to 
the Americans than ever before. Chancellor Schroeder expressed unlimited 
solidarity to the US; however, soon he took a  ﬁ rm stand against the war 
in Iraq, accompanied by other European partners, mostly from Western 
Europe. Th e war caused a deep split between the “old” and the “new Europe” 
(as Donald Rumsfeld named the two parts at that time), as well as negative 
response from a great part of the European public. Th e support for the US 
in most countries was shrinking, as reﬂ ected by opinion polls. Instead of 
being regarded as a partner in problem solving, the US was seen as a risk 
by many Europeans. However, the European perception and attitude has 
changed since; we now have to concentrate on realistic ways of seeing the 
future of transatlantic relations. 
It has been emphasized again and again that the US will remain Germany’s 
most important partner outside the European Union. Membership in the 
European Union is the unquestionable pillar of German politics; Germany’s 
position remains deeply integrated in the European Union policies. Only 
through the membership in the European Union has Germany been able to 
become a respected member of the International Community again, having 
developed into a country committed to democracy and human rights. How-
ever, the transatlantic relations are of essential importance for both Germany 
and the European Union. In his speech at Harvard University in April last 
year, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that no other 
relationships in the world rest on such a solid foundation. Th e US and the EU 
are crucial partners. For the past 60 years the transatlantic relationships have 
helped transforming the world. American relationships with Europe more 
than with any other part of the world enabled both partners to achieve goals 
that neither of them could have achieved on their own. When Europe and 
the US work unanimously, they form the core of any eﬀ ective global coalition; 
when they disagree, no global coalition is likely to be eﬀ ective. According to 
Mr. Stenmeier, it is vital that the EU start being more eﬀ ective, for example 
trough the Lisbon treaty, which could lead to more multilateral relations with 
the US. German foreign minister also wants to broaden the range of issues 
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addressed by the transatlantic partnership: among other things, the agenda 
should include climate protection, energy and food security. 
At an informal meeting last year, during the French EU presidency, the Euro-
pean Union foreign ministers discussed the future of the European-American 
relations; the French minister stated at the meeting that the transatlantic 
partnership is indispensable in addressing issues and tackling international 
crises facing the world. Th e transatlantic partnership must encompass new 
steps forward in numerous issues, including our relations to Russia. Joint 
action is also necessary in regard to the main foreign policy issues of the 
present day: Afghanistan, the situation in Pakistan, the Iran nuclear program 
and the Middle East conﬂ ict. Th e classical security methods should also take 
into account three major issues that will aﬀ ect the future: climate protection 
and the energy security, disarmament and arms control and the creation of 
a global partnership of shared responsibility. 
It seems that the mutual relationships have improved on both sides since 
the new US administration came into oﬃ  ce earlier this year; however, there 
are still diﬀ erences that should not be neglected and that need to be discussed. 
It seems especially appropriate to do so here, in the Czech Republic – let us 
remember the Prague speech of President Obama, proposing the world free 
of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal; this is something that binds both 
sides together.
David Král, Director, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
It is no public secret to say that in Europe there were huge expectations 
attached to the upcoming change of the US administration in favour of the 
democratic candidate. We did not know who that candidate would be, but 
in any case we expected that there might be an interesting change in Euro-
American relations after somewhat troubled period during the eight-year 
George W. Bush administration. We also expected the agenda might slightly 
change, as the previous period was marked by the emphasis on security, or 
even, securitization – let just think about 9/11 and, later on, about Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In retrospective, we can see that such a change really occurred, 
although it was partly caused by other reasons than the new US administration; 
who could expect back in 2007 that the major determinant of the transatlantic 
relations would be the economic crisis which really started as a ﬁ nancial crisis 
in the last year and turned into a full-ﬂ edged global economic crisis.
Nevertheless, we still think that it is important to focus not only on the 
economic crisis – that is, hopefully, a short-term phenomenon – but also on 
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a number of other issues on the table. Th ere is little doubt that energy and cli-
mate change have popped up as a top issue. Th e new US administration shows 
that the US is now taking the climate change more seriously; moreover, there 
is a big commitment on the horizon: the global climate summit in Copenhagen 
at the end of this year where the European Union is hoping to get the US as 
well as some other countries onboard. Another issue of utmost importance 
is trade, particularly in times of the economic crisis, marked with calls for 
protectionism both in the European Union and in the US. It is an important 
issue that we have to address, questioning the commitment of our transatlantic 
partner to the liberalization of the world trade. Democracy is perhaps an issue 
which was understood diﬀ erently by the previous US administration and the 
EU when the worldwide spreading of democracy became one of the mottos 
of the previous US administration. Nevertheless, this issue is one of the areas 
where the EU and the US should work together more closely because the 
transatlantic area remains the area of shared values based on the values of 
democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law. 
And last but not least, the European neighbourhood. Th is is certainly an 
area of extremely strategic importance for both the EU and the US where 
we have seen also a very dramatic development over the last year, not least 
because of the declaration of independence of Kosovo, putting the Balkans and 
its the stability once again in the centre of the attention of both transatlantic 
partners, or the Georgian-Russian conﬂ ict in August 2008, and more recently, 
the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia in January and February 2008. Th e 
four topics that we are dealing with today are somehow interconnected; for 
instance, one cannot discuss the European neighbourhood without discussing 
the energy issues and the issue of energy security because this is becoming 
such an important variable in European thinking about how to structure the 
relations with the neighbours. Th e same applies for democracy or trade.
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Transatlantic trade: How to sustain the vibrant 
Transatlantic market at the times of economic crisis?
Chair: Lukáš Pachta, Research Fellow, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Rapporteur: Jean-Philippe Gervais, Associate Professor, 
North Carolina State University
Discussants: Jens Van Scherpenberg, Non-resident Senior Fellow, German 
institute for international and security aﬀ airs (SWP) 
Karim Lesina, Executive Director, EMEA Government Aﬀ airs AT&T, Chair of the 
digital economic committee of the American Chamber at the EU in Brussels
Lukáš Pachta
It is a great pleasure to chair the ﬁ rst panel which deals with transatlantic 
trade and its changing nature and role. Th ese issues are especially topical 
now, during the current economic crisis; trade is a very important factor of 
economic stimulation and it could function as eﬀ ective glue of the transat-
lantic relations, although it certainly brings many disputes. Th ere are high 
European expectations for the new administration in Washington in terms 
of foreign policies and security. But on the other hand, in trade area the 
disputes are likely to remain as they are now, being driven by more pragmatic 
reasons. When talking about transatlantic trade, we talk about hundreds of 
billions of Euros every year in exchange of goods and services – obviously, 
a very dynamic, vibrant area. Th ere are also speciﬁ c trade relations; trade is 
a very complex issue including agriculture, development, intellectual property 
rights and numerous other areas. Th e panel will attempt to tackle as many 
of those as possible. 
Jean-Philippe Gervais
I  must acknowledge Professor Jean-Christophe Bureau’s leadership in 
writing up the policy paper that you have in your possession. Let me do my 
best to summarize the work we have done. I am going to talk ﬁ rst about the 
points of convergence and divergence in the EU–US trade relationships, and 
conclude with some recommendations. 
For starters, it is important to emphasize the openness – both the EU and 
the US share a strong commitment to the trade; both economies have huge 
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trade deﬁ cits. Th e EU is the second most important destination market for 
the US exports. Th e US is also the second most important supplier to the EU. 
Of course, it does not work the other way around because the US has special 
trade relationships with Canada and Mexico. But still, the bilateral relations 
are important, as both the EU and the US are very much open to trade.
Th ere are certain blocks to trade – and agriculture, which is my ﬁ eld of 
expertise, is often considered as one of such blocks. Th e EU and the US have 
agreed upon the three pillars of agriculture: the market access, the export 
competition and the domestic support issues; they also agreed on more 
speciﬁ c issues like tropical products and preferences. Agriculture is a highly 
sensitive issue and used to be a major block; a progress was made on that 
front which is good news. 
Another point of convergence is the willingness to cooperate on security 
and safety, the transatlantic economic council being an illustrative example. 
I admit that it has minimal trade responsibilities on what we see as a block 
towards more integrated or better transatlantic trade relationships. 
Th e EU and the US also share the enthusiasm towards bio-energy; since 
developing bio-energies has so many links to the energy market and traditional 
commodity market, especially agriculture, it’s important to deal with these issues. 
And the EU and the US have a  fair amount of bilateral agreements with 
minimum limited importance; but some agreements still do not seem to work 
the way they should – for example, there is agreement on wine trade that the 
US has recognized but the EU is still not happy about it because some US 
ﬁ rms do not respect certain obligations from the agreement. Or take the open 
sky agreement as another example: the EU feels there is a quite a degree of 
asymmetry in this agreement and so on. So, some bilateral agreements are of 
minor importance, such as the agreement on how to compute import duties 
on rice; however, they show that the EU and the US can get together and come 
up with agreements that will be respected. 
On to the points of divergence  – when you have a  very strong trade 
partnership, it’s normal to have trade disagreements. Th ey are usually highly 
publicized because the lobbies are aﬀ ected by such a  trade disagreement 
and are very vocal, making their points known. But again, you have to put 
everything in two perspectives and two contexts.
When we ﬁ rst started writing the (policy) paper, we summarized the trade 
policies of the US, emphasizing multilateralism with the system of prefer-
ences as well as bilateral agreements with a system of preferences to developing 
economies. Th e EU is very much engaged in multilateralism while the US used 
to focus on bilateral relations; however, it has shifted somehow. Th e EU kicked 
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oﬀ  the free trade negotiations with Canada and already has an agreement with 
Mexico, negotiating a preferential trade agreement with Andean countries; so 
there’s a clear shift although the EU is still oﬃ  cially engaged in multilateral trade 
relations. Th e visit of the US trade representative to Geneva a few weeks ago 
where he strongly emphasized that EU was committed to have an open door 
policies, is quite important for one reason: we still have a fuel crisis; the global 
economy downturn is slower than that of commodity prices. In any case, the US 
and the EU have some of the lowest trade barriers to trade in the world. We can 
compare some of the tariﬀ s that are imposed on certain sectors. On that point 
US failed to match the degree of decoupling that the EU has implemented in 
recent years; and today the last US steps in this respect were quite disappointing 
both for the EU and from a worldwide perspective. A major point to solve is 
the fuel crises because it’s still important for food importing countries in Africa. 
Finally, on the points of divergence, there are speciﬁ c issues that are all men-
tioned in the paper, such as intellectual properties, pharmaceuticals, government 
procurement, and custom administration and so on. Th ere are many diﬀ erent 
standards and Non Tariﬀ  Barriers (NTBs) to trade. An interesting study was 
commissioned by the EU, and the preliminary results show that, focusing on 
food again, the tariﬀ s for processed food on EU exports to the US are about 3. 
If you look at the tariﬀ s on US exports to the EU, they are about 16. Th e study 
worked with ﬁ rms from the EU and the US ﬁ rms, asking them what’s the tariﬀ  
equivalent of the non tariﬀ  barriers standards they are facing when trading 
with the other economy; the result was that the average tariﬀ  equivalent of the 
non tariﬀ  barrier in the US was 76 and the average non tariﬀ  barrier in the 
EU market for US exports was 53. Clearly, if the US and EU manage to deal 
with those problems, there is actually quite a bit of potential to increase trade 
between the two economies and raising economic growth. 
On to the recommendations – our ﬁ rst recommendation was basically to 
re-engage in WTO negotiation. Perhaps is a bit early to tell but the US has 
done that to some extent; and the EU is not clear in this respect. I consider 
the Doha round as a last possibility to prevent protectionist measures; there 
is a room for countries to lower the trade barriers, tariﬀ s etc. – some of the 
countries apply a tariﬀ  that is lower than what they have committed to in the 
WTO; if they want, they can actually raise the tariﬀ . Actually, a WTO study 
conﬁ rmed that some countries have already started to do so. Historically, if 
you look at economic slowdowns and downturns, you always have countries 
that go back to protectionist roots. 
Th e WTO negotiations are quite important, as well as reforming domestic 
agricultural subsidies so that the EU and the US ﬁ nancial perspective converge 
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in 2012–2013. It has major implications in term of food crisis. Th ere are 
many linkages between commodity market and energy market; therefore, it’s 
important for the US and the EU to exercise leadership there. 
Th e WTO agenda ended now, even if the EU say we are going to re-engage; 
we have to come up with new ways; and the US and some other countries, 
e.g. Canada, are actually proposing a new way forward. Th e director general 
of WTO has said we would need a dual approach: the US/Canada approach 
and the traditional approach to free trade. So we need to explore new ways 
to come up with a deal. 
As to bilateral regulatory corporation: there is quite a bit to do there and 
if the US and the EU agree on something, they will probably say that at the 
worldwide level because there are so many standards and tariﬀ  barriers there. 
More neutral mutual recognition is perhaps the only practical solution. 
Simply put, the US and EU trade relations are actually not bad. Th e US and 
the EU have enjoyed strong trade relationships; most of the work that remains 
to be done is at the regulatory level. All eﬀ orts should be concentrated in 
a multilateral trade environment. Both economies need to think what they 
want for the future. Do they want to address decisions as part of a rules-based 
multilateral system, or enjoy some degree of ﬂ exibility that requires corpora-
tion, which might mean the need for more institutions? Th ere are several ideas 
in the (policy) paper that are explored from our perspective. 
Jens Scherpenberg
Th e excellent policy paper that Jean-Philippe Gervais presented strikes 
rather ambivalent notes on transatlantic economic relations. Looking back 
at my own arguments on transatlantic relations in my writings through the 
last 20 years, I realize that I have shifted several times between a positive 
and a  skeptical perspective and this inconsistency of judgment is not my 
own but it is really the subject fault. With EU and US economic relations it 
is perhaps much like with the EU itself; one feels rather depressed by how 
empty the glass still is. However, looking at the current state from a  long 
term prospective will make one appreciate how much has been already 
achieved. With the very widely distributed publications on the primacy of 
the transatlantic economy, Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan have made 
a tremendous eﬀ ort to show how full the glass of economic integration within 
the transatlantic market already is. Th ey certainly contributed to bring up the 
case for furthering institution integration of the transatlantic market place, 
a political goal that has been around essentially as long as the cold war is 
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over. Most of the institutions had almost fallen into oblivion during the ﬁ rst 
administration of George W. Bush which was not a most favourable one for 
transatlantic relations in general. 
During Germany’s EU presidency in the ﬁ rst half of 2007, Angela Merkel 
attempted to re-launch this integration process. At the US-EU summit meet-
ing in April 2007 a new framework agreement for Transatlantic Economic 
Integration was signed which at the same time was supposed to lower the 
former rather ambitious integration goals and to raise the political proﬁ le 
of the integration process by creating a  high-level Transatlantic Economic 
Council. But then came the election year in the US, overlapped by the dramatic 
worsening of the ﬁ nancial crisis and not much has happened.
Before commenting on the details of transatlantic economic relations and 
conﬂ icts, I would like to brieﬂ y address some of the aspects of what I call the 
“continental drifting apart” scenario. I put forward three keywords: continental 
drift – economic nationalism – regulatory convergence that seem to describe 
the spectrum of problems and opportunities. 
When Hamilton and Quinlan underscore the primacy of the transatlantic 
economy, they do so by picking the data that best suit their argument. Th is is 
a very legitimate trick for any economist indeed. I will do the same and pick 
another set of data that sheds a diﬀ erent light on transatlantic trade by asking 
whether it still matters compared to other trade relationships and where the 
dynamics is in US and EU foreign trade.
Let’s ﬁ rst look at the US. Th e most dynamic trade relationship for the US 
is with China – no surprise, whereas trade with the EU has been stagnant at 
best, but slowly decreasing over the years. And even the share of trade with 
the NAFTA, with Canada and Mexico, has been receding recently. 
For EU trade, we see that after a brief relapse towards the turn of the century, 
EU trade with the US has since steadily declined to values indeed not yet seen, 
whereas EU trade with China has almost reached the same level as trade with US. 
In 1990 the trade with China was 20 per cent of transatlantic trade for both sides, 
for the EU as well for the US. Th e relations had doubled for both to some 40 
percent in 2000, and it has doubled again since then to reach slightly less than 80 
per cent of transatlantic trade for both the US- and the EU-China trade in 2008. 
Th ese data might support the argument of a continental drift between the US 
and Europe, with Europe shifting the weight of its economic relations further 
East, and the US drifting further West, towards the other side of the Paciﬁ c. 
Th is continental drift scenario is supported to some extent by the diﬀ erent 
regional integration policies of both actors Jean-Phillipe Gervais referred to. It 
seems that each side is pursuing its own regional integration policies that are 
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not integrated, which might pose a problem. But there is the other side of the 
coin, too – the shifting continental drifting. Obviously the lack of dynamics 
of economic integration among the Atlantic economies seems to be a major 
potential source for growth, and it is a major source of growth politicians have 
failed to tap. To put it more positively, regulatory convergence really oﬀ ers 
a source of growth to be mobilized. 
What are the reasons of this lack of political will that has characterized the 
whole transatlantic economic integration and liberalization dialogue since it 
started in the early 1990s? Th is brings me to my second keyword: economic 
nationalism, or protectionism. Obviously, US–EU relations in the ﬁ eld of trade 
policy, and more widely of policies governing bilateral economic relations, have 
been burdened for many years by an underlying sense of strategic rivalry and 
resentment. Th e US dislikes EU free-riding behaviour – proﬁ ting from American 
global security policy while doing business regardless of US security and com-
mercial interests. Th e Europeans feel resentment about US preponderance and 
lack of coordination in foreign security, against which the balance of power in 
the economic relations seems to oﬀ er some leverage. Th is underlying strategic 
rivalry more or less strongly aﬀ ects some of the trade and regulatory conﬂ icts 
that currently burden the transatlantic economic relationship. 
Th ere are some major economic and trade conﬂ icts that are costly and politi-
cally and strategically most sensitive ones and thus the most diﬃ  cult to solve but 
there is a way out of the dispute. Taking the container security as an example; 
that was a huge and rather signiﬁ cant problem right until recently; there was 
security measure in the US saying that 100 screening of imported containers 
needs to be achieved, which was obviously a huge burden on trade with the 
US. Now it seems there has been some warning that this is a goal that is simply 
not possible to achieve so there is a relaxation on that goal, and we are out of 
that conﬂ ict immediately. Th at’s a good sign. As for ﬁ nancial market regulation, 
the ﬁ nancial crisis has deﬁ nitely helped in moving towards convergence, and 
we are moving away from the huge divergence that we had had before the 
ﬁ nancial market crisis has started; and we seem to be well on the way to solve 
that regulatory conﬂ ict too. 
Also the competition policy used to be big problem. Right now, we are in 
the middle of solving the Intel conﬂ ict as the European Commission imposed 
the biggest penalty ever implemented on any company in competition. And 
what did the US? Th ey said that the EU might be right and they should perhaps 
follow the suit. Remember the problems regarding Microsoft during the Bush 
administration; it was turning into a highly politicized conﬂ ict. But we have 
none of that right now, and, once again, that’s a positive sign. 
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Economic nationalism is a subject the ﬁ nancial crisis has brought up, giving 
rise to additional public resentments and protectionist pressures, such as the 
“Buy American” clauses in the recent US stimulus program. It is perhaps just the 
tip of the iceberg of a growing tendency on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as 
in other countries, of trying to make sure that from any publicly funded stimulus 
measures beneﬁ t only domestic ﬁ rms and jobs. Th at is a  real protectionist 
danger emerging from the ﬁ nancial crisis; but it is still a lurking danger, it has 
not fully emerged yet. On the other hand, the current ﬁ nancial and economic 
crisis has clearly discredited the strongly market-oriented, almost ideological 
economic policies of the Bush administration, whose last adherents seem to 
have barricaded in a certain strong place towering over this city. Th is change of 
policy paradigms has helped creating a sense of regulatory and economic policy 
convergence which may help in solving current conﬂ icts and achieving a deeper 
integration of the Atlantic economic area. 
Th erefore, I conclude with a rather positive note. Th ere is a certain momen-
tum of convergence, an opportunity to overcome ideological divergence, under 
the new US administration and under the impact of the ﬁ nancial crisis. Th is 
momentum has to be grasped by policy makers. Th ey should know that if they 
do not, the risk is still out there that the balance of US-EU economic and trade 
relations will tip again over further continental drift and economic nationalism, 
deﬁ nitely to the detriment of both sides. 
Karim Lesina
I will focus a  little more on the industry. As for US-EU relations in this 
ﬁ eld, it goes without saying that Europe is a great market and even if we see 
that China is getting more important, we also need to consider the size of 
the market and the quantity of population. In any case, US corporations in 
Europe represent approximately 4 million jobs. Th e Czech Republic is a great 
example of US corporations investing huge amounts of money. Europe is still 
the key market for most of the US industries, and people will continue to 
invest, obviously if the regulatory environment remains positive. I remember 
when we saw the priority of the Czech presidency – “Europe without borders”, 
we loved it; not because we do not want regulations but because focusing on 
better regulations and Europe without borders was a message for promoting 
pan-European investments. 
I’d like to make one point at the defence of the former US administration. 
I work for a US company; even if we know that the visibility has not been 
so high at the European level, a great number of issues have been solved by 
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the past administration, such as issues connected to OECD, ITU, WTO etc. 
One should not discredit all the work that was done by the Bush administra-
tion; even if politically there have been tensions between the two sides of 
the Atlantic. 
I  identiﬁ ed four priorities that we can discuss more; the main aim is to 
develop a true transatlantic market. We are coming from a market that is dif-
ferent from the market that has been highlighted. We are the digital economy 
market, and AT&T is a telecom provider, similar to Telefonica, T-mobile and 
other European companies. We work in a market that has no borders; net-
works have no borders, going around the world. It is an example of the market 
that needs to move forward with common regulatory approach, promoting 
investments, i.e., one that needs better regulations, industry-led standards etc. 
Th e ICT world is a good example of well-employed industry-led standards. 
Th ink only of your mobile phone. Wherever you go, you can call with the 
same mobile. Today, it is taken for granted, but it took almost twenty years 
of work to develop common standards; those markets cannot be regulated 
with national regulations. ICT sectors suﬀ er from the crisis to a lesser degree 
than other ﬁ elds, since they oﬀ er innovation; therefore, the common will for 
promoting industry standards is higher than elsewhere.
One of my main points is the need for developing a common regulatory 
framework between US and EU. Why is it needed? It is already diﬃ  cult to 
have a  common regulatory platform at the European level; the idea is to 
develop common regulatory approaches at the European level, harmonizing 
regulations between the EU and US, and start with our market, with the new 
market because it is much easier, since you don’t have the problem of the 
physical restrictions that you will have in other markets. 
Another point that is quite important is the openness to high-skilled 
immigration. We see it as a problem everywhere, not only here, but in the US 
too. Th erefore, restrictions on immigration are becoming a huge problem for 
a lot of companies. First challenge: ﬁ nding the right people. 
Second challenge: fostering the digital economy. How many governments 
have all the data available online? How many governments use a non-paper 
policy? How many governments are really investing in new technologies to 
boost the economies? In the Obama plan, everybody focused on the 7 bil-
lion that have been given to cover broadband everywhere, but people don’t 
look at the 60 billion that have been put to promote e-health, to promote 
e-transport, e-education. In the US everything is online. And it’s a boost. 
I know it might seem as a petty thing but it is an example of how things 
might work eﬃ  ciently. 
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Th ird point: it is essential to support and get support from institutions that 
are critical to innovation, such as industries, universities, think-tanks. When 
I speak to politicians, they don’t see so much the need of understanding of 
our industry because it is an industry that is doing quite well. Th ere are some 
governments that are pushing for special tax on telecom and the internet 
precisely because it is a sector that is looking well. If we believe that this is the 
sector of the future, we should promote it, instead of taxing it; we should have 
an open approach to innovation and to promotion of investments. 
My fourth point, and the most important one for us, is to ensure the regula-
tion and other government policies: supporting innovation, not retarding it. 
Th e links are becoming more and more important worldwide; EU and US 
should look more at themselves to solve the problems instead of looking more 
at the speciﬁ c small issues. Th ey should look at the bigger framework and to 
identify common policies that they want to promote in the rest of the world. 
Because that would be the biggest challenge to solve things at the WTO level. 
We were very happy with the negotiation and services of the WTO and we 
were trying to promote it, but everything has been blocked again, which is 
always very disappointing. 
Lastly, the new political scene presents a big challenge. We are still waiting 
for the results of the new US administration, but it is already clear the impetus 
they are giving is very positive. At the same time, we will have a new European 
Commission in six month time, we will have a new European Parliament, and 
hopefully, the Lisbon Treaty ratiﬁ ed. 
Th e industries and governments need to understand each other. When we 
look at the Czech government, they totally understand our challenges and they 
are very helpful; the same goes for the Commission. One of the problems is 
when you go to the political level and the local politicians don’t care so much; 
and it is the same in the US where people often concentrate on the national 
market, even in the US congress. Th e debate like this should happen more 
often between the US congressmen, US senators and the EU politicians, as well 
as politicians of single member states. After all, they are the ones who take the 
ﬁ nal decision. Th e political impetus should be given more on the promotion 
of a common regulatory approach to promote innovation, to promote invest-
ments, because in the end, this is what will bring wealth. Openness increases 
wealth, and now it’s really the moment to achieve that. 
Th e way forward is to have pro-investment regulations, which doesn’t 
mean any regulation. Th e regulation is important, but it needs to be a good 
regulation, it needs to be a regulation discussed and decided with industries 
to protect consumers, while promoting investments. 
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Q&A
From the business perspective, there is only one key thing between the EU and 
the US: standards. If the EU and the US do not set the standards, the Chinese 
will, or the Indians or the Brazilians... and then it is going to be very diﬃ  cult 
to sell our products worldwide. Th ere is only one way – we have to create the 
standards together, otherwise somebody else will, and then we will lose access 
to the world markets, access to energy and access to innovation. It’s a call to 
think-tanks and to policy makers creating the standards for today and most 
importantly, tomorrow. 
Jean-Philippe Gervais
I strongly believe that if the US and the EU put themselves to it, they can set 
standards for everyone else. But how do you achieve that? Th e US is perhaps 
not very receptive to more institutions. Th e role of the EU is indispensable in 
this respect. Another way is to go through the rule-based system which the 
US has problems with, because they fear credibility issues, infringement on 
sovereignty in terms of regulations, etc. I think it’s through corporations and 
ﬂ exibility the desired state of things can be achieved; there might be space 
perhaps for another institution or the transatlantic economic council. 
Jens Scherpenberg
Th e standard-setting is a  major issue. It has two dimensions: ﬁ rst, the 
untapped sources of growth; here lies the potential for an enormous strength-
ening of the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. Can it be done? Th e 
single market experience in Europe is really important in these regards because 
the US regulatory tradition is very diﬀ erent...but well, there was a regulatory 
divergence and diﬀ erent traditions in the UK on the one side and France 
on the other side, Italy on the third side, Germany on the fourth side. Th ere 
was no way of thinking that German regulatory institutions would give away 
their regulatory competence to some European institutions or let the French 
participate in something; but then political momentum came that overcame 
those jealousies and that’s the only way to move forward in the transatlantic 
area too. Perhaps the economic crisis will play its part in moving forward. 
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Th ere is no doubt that globalization brings growth, maybe with the exception 
of agriculture trade which we have seen with the food crisis: it has shown that 
agriculture markets are very unstable and volatile after three decades of low 
prices. It has also shown that developing countries depend on the world market 
for stable food which is very dangerous in case of panic protectionism when 
people try to keep food in their own countries to meet the demand of local 
population. Since 1994 when the agreement on agriculture has been signed, 
there has been basically no real positive trickle-down eﬀ ect to population. I am 
not speaking about growth, but about alleviation, and there are many nations 
that still do not beneﬁ t from trade; in 1994, we had 800 million hungry people. 
Today we have about 1 billion hungry people. Don’t we need a shift to ensure 
food security worldwide? 
Jean-Philippe Gervais
Th is question needs a lot of attention. My opinion is that some countries 
are experiencing really negative eﬀ ects of food crisis due to the fact that they 
have high, really high food trade barriers. One easy prescription would be to 
actually lower their trade barriers, instead of raising them. 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start?
Energy and climate change: 
convergence towards Copenhagen?
Chair: James Hunt, Special Envoy for Climate Change, Ministry of Environment
of the Czech Republic
Rapporteur: William Siefken, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic
and International Studies
Discussants: Jiří Schneider, Research Director, Prague Security Studies Institute 
Josef Braml, Resident Fellow, The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 
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James Hunt
A very brief word about the subject – I recognize that there has been a sea 
change, if you like, in the United States administration’s views on climate 
change but the question that struck me was the extent to which that can 
really signal a truly fresh start. Given that, the constraints upon the American 
administration, both legal and political have not entirely disappeared. And my 
question is to what extent that limits our transatlantic and global capacity for 
convergence in Copenhagen and what that might mean in terms of the EU and 
its goal of pursuing a global comprehensive and indeed ambitious agreements 
in Copenhagen, that can – as history would say – not repeat Kyoto and be 
ratiﬁ ed afterwards. 
William Siefken
I was part of the group that worked on the (policy) paper concerning energy 
security and climate change last year. Th e focus of our group was on the issue 
of security; it was not a technical paper on the various issues of energy security 
as we are not experts on climate change. We were looking at these topics as 
issues aﬀ ecting the security of the United Sates and of Europe; security in 
a large sense, security of our societies. 
Th e paper was written last year, during the Bush administration. So even 
though at the end of working on it, we knew that we would have the new 
president, Barack Obama, the fact was that the paper reﬂ ected a great deal of 
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the reality at that time. And if you like, it was so much critical (to put it mildly) 
of the failure on the part of the American government to move forward in 
a range of issues, while quite frankly addressing some issues that we saw as the 
weaknesses on the European Union side. Th ere has been very little change; the 
recommendations are still valid, the descriptions are still accurate. 
Th ere is still no US national policy or consensus as to which national 
energy resources should be exploited. Th ere is no US national energy policy 
addressing any of these issues at this time: nuclear energy, investments in the 
energy sector, what resources should be exploited, there is no carbon pricing 
mechanism, there is no carbon tax. None of these things exist yet in the United 
States. Th e new administration has brought a great deal of national focus to 
these issues, but the new administration has only been in oﬃ  ce for about 4 
months and they have had other issues to worry about, like ﬁ nancial crisis, 
economic crisis, etc. So there really hasn’t been any signiﬁ cant progress up 
until now in addressing any of these issues.
Th e European Union still needs a strategy to deal with its dependence on 
Russian energy supplies. It is simply a fact that the EU as a regional entity is still 
largely dependent on Russia and the states of the EU that were formerly part 
of the Soviet Union or under Soviet domination are still extremely dependent 
on Russian gas. We’ve talked a  lot about Nabucco, we’ve talked a  lot about 
other things, but quite frankly not much has changed. Th ere is still no coherent 
plan from the EU’s part for modernizing the power grid in Europe. One thing 
that could help here is smart grid technology, which is necessary for the really 
eﬀ ective exploitation of renewable energy resources. Little progress has been 
made on the issue of unbundling national energy corpus structures or reduc-
tion of national subsidies. In other words, there is a wealth of opportunities for 
progress in the future cooperation and developing new policies, new programs 
with the United States and the EU. 
However, there have been three very signiﬁ cant developments that have 
taken place this year, which over the long term will bring a  major change. 
Obviously, the most obvious one is the election of Barack Obama as president 
of the United States. Th e second was the Russian decision to cut oﬀ  gas in the 
winter time last winter. And the third, obvious one is the global economic crisis. 
President Obama has deﬁ nitely made the energy security and reduction 
of green house gas emissions a priority of his administration. And while his 
rhetoric, his speeches, his attitude, his programs reﬂ ect a  very signiﬁ cant 
change in US policy, the fact is that bringing those objectives into legislation 
has only just begun. For example the new American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009, which represents the new administration’s approach to energy 
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security and climate change, was just brought out of the committee I last week; 
and is already under a very intense criticism in the United States. It sets targets 
for reducing pollution that are far weaker than scientists say is necessary to 
avoid catastrophic climate change, targets that are further undermined by 
massive loopholes that would allow the most polluting industries to avoid 
any real emission reductions until 2027. Th e bill provides polluting industries 
with hundreds of millions of dollars and free allowances and direct subsidies 
that may slow energy development. Th e bill establishes a cap and trade system, 
but it provides giving away any 5 percent of the carbon permits up until 2026. 
While all of these are legitimate criticisms of this pending legislation, politics 
remains the art of the possible. And this is probably the key point that I would 
like to make in addressing this issue. 
Th ere is a  great deal of enthusiasm and support for president Obama in 
the United States as well as in Europe. But the United States Senate must 
approve treaties. President Clinton signed the Kyoto accord, but the Senate 
never approved it. We don’t want another Kyoto, so the biggest challenge 
facing this administration is to try and ﬁ nd a way that it can negotiate a new 
treaty in Copenhagen that moves forward in addressing these issues of energy 
security and climate change but still has some reasonable explication of getting 
through the United Sates Senate. Th e US political system is diﬀ erent. You have 
party discipline in Europe; we do not have party discipline in the United States. 
Every state in the US has got two senators. And if you look at the vast Ameri-
can heartland between the Rocky Mountains on one side and the Alleghany 
Mountains on the other, those people use coal, and they are going to protect 
their ability to use coal to generate power. And unfortunately, we don’t have any 
eﬀ ective clean coal technology. So, there is the representation of the individual 
economies, resources, businesses, political and economic interests of all of those 
states represented in the Senate. Now all they may love president Obama, the 
fact is there is election next year in the United States, and every member of the 
House of Representatives and one third of the United States Senate will be up 
for election. Th ey will be defending next year how they vote this year. Th is is 
a very real constraint. One of the major concerns we have in the US now is that 
our European friends are going to be a little disappointed by the ability of the 
Obama administration to actually move forward on meeting the president’s 
stated goals, but dealing with the political realities of the United States.
Th e second topic to deal with was the Russian decision to cut oﬀ  gas earlier 
this year. Here in the Czech Republic you have other experiences also where 
there was this technical problem on the pipelines the day after you signed 
the agreement with the United States about the radars. It’s a  remarkable 
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coincidence. But the important thing is that the Russians have made quite 
clear at the recent Russia–EU energy summit that they would never sign the 
energy treaty and they refused to give the EU assurances that there will be no 
further cut-oﬀ s of gas. Th e Russians have said quite bluntly they will defend 
their economic interest and do whatever they can to maximize the leverage 
that they obtain from Europe’s dependency on their oil and gas supplies. Th ey 
defend their economic interests, which is perfectly understandable. And it has 
perhaps driven home to the EU the necessity to begin seriously developing 
alternative resources or alternative energy sources, not to replace Russia as 
a primary energy supplier because they will remain a primary energy supplier, 
but to ﬁ nd alternatives so that the ability of the Russians to exert political and 
economic pressure will be weakened. 
Th e third point is the global economic crisis. As the Chinese say, crisis is 
a terrible thing to waste. It does provide an opportunity for governments and 
for the EU and the Americans, to take a good look at to where and how they 
are going to use the stimulus funding, to change their economics, to reduce 
their dependencies, to diversify, to develop new technologies, to build a new 
low carbon economy.
Th ere is a heated debate about the contribution of human economic activity 
to global warming; some people believe it, some people don’t. But climate 
change is a reality, climate change is happening. We are no longer under several 
thousand feet of ice sitting here in the Czech Republic. Th e fact is that the 
rate of change is signiﬁ cantly increasing and that increase coincides with the 
development of our carbon based economy. If we mess up the climate, we’re 
in deep trouble. So it is in everybody’s interest to deal with it. And it does 
not matter whether you are in Europe or in Asia or in Africa or in the United 
States; globalization has tied us all together. We share a common planet, we 
don’t have any alternatives and if there is a massive change in economic activity 
or in global warming in some other part of the world, it will be felt here. 
Th e ability to deal with climate change is a security issue for Europe, for the 
US and for our society as a whole. Our current economic crisis does give the 
Obama administration in the United States an opportunity to get billions and 
billions of dollars for stimulus package which can be directed towards energy 
diversiﬁ cation. Here in Europe there is also a move towards diversiﬁ cation in 
the use of stimulus. So the world is changing; there is a tremendous oppor-
tunity for convergence between the US and the EU as we move towards the 
Copenhagen summit. Both of us have our problems, both of us have political 
constraints, but there is an increasing realization that we share a  common 
need to deal with these issues. 
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Jiří Schneider
In order to succeed in challenges we face in the area of energy and climate 
change, we need to increase our leverage in ﬁ ghting the climate change, and 
that requires a common approach of both the United States and the EU. 
Besides that, we need to decrease or to address our vulnerabilities. Th ey 
do not only comprise supply, but also distribution, grids and other things. If 
we do not do so, we will be losing in both energy security and climate change. 
Th ere are two areas in which we can do something, separately and together. 
One has to do with policy, the other with technology. In both areas we have 
strengths and weaknesses; we have leverages and vulnerabilities. 
I’m not a  climate change denier, I  am not an opponent of the Lisbon 
treaty either, but I do not expect that after the ratiﬁ cation of Lisbon treaty 
we will be much better oﬀ  when it comes to energy decision-making in 
the European Union because it will remain complex. Th e external part of 
energy security will remain intergovernmental. We will still be dealing with 
the same issues as today: bilateral deals and lack of coherence of individual 
foreign policies, as well as certain activities of private players that have 
foreign policy implications. 
In the EU internal area, there are also challenges; it is basically about 
regulation and competition rules; once again, we have to try to increase our 
leverage in this ﬁ eld. We are by far the biggest market in the world and we 
should aspire to be the biggest and strongest market for energy; as such, we 
have to increase our leverage in dealing with our supplier wherever they are. 
I am not speaking only about Russia. It will be futile to think that by opening 
to competition while being in environment of monopolistic suppliers, which is 
the case, we will increase our leverage and decrease our vulnerabilities. On the 
contrary, we would rather expose ourselves to our vulnerabilities. We should 
simply be able to treat Gazprom or anyone else the same way we treat Intel 
or Microsoft; only that might help.
Th ere is homework in EU decision-making process to be done; not eve-
rything will be solved by the Lisbon Treaty. We should add some informal 
mechanisms bridging the intergovernmental and communitarian decision-
making in the area of energy security, because there are obvious overlaps 
with other policy areas and we should aim at coherent policies. To give you an 
example: agriculture subsidies should not be contradictory to energy security 
and climate change requirements, as they are in subsidizing certain types of 
fuels. Th ere are many areas where we need a coherent decision-making. And 
there are already ideas on how to solve those clashes, ideas that we hinted to 
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in our recommendations, ideas ﬂ oating in the air; those ideas should get on 
the agenda between the United States and European Union.
One of them is to make a similar body like Transatlantic Economic Council 
for energy issues and to address issues together. We have to do our homework 
in the European Union before going into the transatlantic cooperation and 
there should be some elements of improved decision-making. I should give 
a  credit to the Czech presidency (I  mean the ﬁ rst one, not the lame duck 
one) for the conclusions of the March summit because they include some 
real good points in the area of energy security. For example, there is a clear 
recommendation “to decrease the threshold for deciding actions on a common 
level”, European level, which is an important element of recognizing that there 
are some things which we have to address together. 
Th ere is another idea which is somewhat in the air: a code of conduct, prior 
notiﬁ cation of individual member states and private companies or state owned 
companies before they close a deal with an external supplier. However, the 
prior notiﬁ cation is a minimum requirement. I would take a further step: to 
create a body that would be similar to EIA, Environmental Impact Assessment. 
Th is new body could be called ESIA – Energy Security Impact Assessment. We 
should undergo this process, applying it to all new deals done by big companies. 
Besides the only environmental impact, it is also necessary to consider energy 
security impact of such deals. I am sure there would be a big problem for the 
North Stream to undergo this. 
We talked about decision-making, external and internal policy areas and 
coherence with other policies. As an example, I mentioned agriculture. But 
there are other important issues, such as climate or technology. In this respect, 
it seems vital to deepen cooperation across the Atlantic, both in private and 
public sectors, in developing new technologies, especially on the distribution 
and demand sides, not only on the supply side. It would increase eﬃ  ciency and 
decrease our demand. In other words, there are many challenges ahead of us. 
Josef Braml
I will focus more on the energy side; I agree that states especially in Western 
Europe are all concerned about climate etc. Whereas in the US, the debate 
is completely diﬀ erent; it is energy in terms of security, in terms of trade, in 
terms of economics, with less attention to the environment. Th erefore, if we 
want to do transatlantic business, we have to come together on a few of those 
terms. I am very skeptical about Copenhagen. As the Economist put it, we 
are all waiting for a Messiah, waiting for Obama to walk over waters. One 
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thing we don’t know is whether he will take a transatlantic route or whether 
he is taking the Paciﬁ c. Th at is not done yet; he hasn’t really tested the waters.
And there are institutional gravities. Th ere is the US Senate, with its checks 
and balances. Th e debate had already been diﬃ  cult in the House of Representa-
tives and one can expect much more to happen in the Senate. It is quite likely 
that the US won’t play the leadership role in climate change. Th e EU has to 
get its own act together. In this respect, I’d like to focus on energy, external 
relations and the uniﬁ ed energy foreign policy. 
A third important point is we do not really know how to cope with states 
that pursue regional power through energy policies: Iran, North Korea, but also 
OPEC countries when you look at it from the long-term perspective. In our case, 
the eﬀ orts should not come from a single individual state, but from the European 
Union as a whole; we need a multilateral aspect, a broader agenda.
To the ﬁ rst point – transatlantic relations; not only has Obama’s election 
caused excitement but also new leadership. Th at is necessary, because George 
W. Bush didn’t show leadership. He was redoing many important aspects. But 
that alone does not bring hope. It is the real ligament of established interest 
groups. I predicted in my earlier paper the next US president, whoever that 
would be, would lead America to a  change in energy foreign policy. Not 
because he or she – we didn’t know who the person would be at that time – 
would walk over water but because of those real ligaments of institutional 
structure. I’m skeptical about the environmental cap and trade program at this 
point on the short term; I’m more optimistic on the medium term. And we 
are already in the midst of real ligament of energy policies. When you look in 
the American Recovery and Investment Act, there are already 70 billion USD 
that are invested in creating jobs, with the long term goal of making America 
more independent from import. And that’s important to know: in America, 
it’s all about transportation sector because that’s where the US vulnerability 
lies. Th ere are alternative fuels and similar issues on the agenda; that’s where 
we can work together. To do that, we need some regulations, some structures.
Th e second point is cooperation with Russia. I’m less skeptical here; one has 
to view the whole issue through Russia’s eyes, too. Th e whole Energy Charter 
is a  relict of the 1990s when Russia felt weak. Russians do  not want to be 
reminded of that period. Th erefore we should forget about that, concentrat-
ing on new deals, on partnerships, trying to take diﬀ erent directions. Th ere’s 
“divide and conquer” not only with European states but also with individual 
companies and pipeline plans that are of strategic interest. But here lies the 
momentum of the crisis. Russia is vulnerable again; if all prices stay at low 
level, Russia will be in dire straits. When one talks to people close to Russian 
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president Medvedev, they are already worried about regime stability. All Rus-
sian economic reforms aren’t paid for by tax incomes but by external dollars. 
If those don’t ﬂ ow, the regime might not be as stable as it is at the moment. 
Th e Russians are very aware of the vulnerabilities so they welcome investments. 
Here we could ﬁ nd common ground.
We also need Russia to adapt nuclear non-proliferation regime to the new 
situation. If nuclear energy has a part to play, we should also think of the exter-
nal eﬀ ects – in those, we need cooperation with Russia. North Korea is a point, 
but also Iran. In this respect, we have to think diﬀ erently as I understand the 
Obama administration is already doing. And there’s one thing, if Americans 
and Russians talk, maybe that we are not always in the loop. 
Th ere are more important issues right now – Afghanistan and others; in 
any case, it is necessary to get Russia involved in dealing with Iran. Iran is 
a problem, for a number of reasons. We really have to look at this issue strategi-
cally, from a long term perspective. 70 percent of all known oil reserves are in 
OPEC’s hands. We simply have to ﬁ gure out how to cope with that. And here 
I would suggest some sort of mechanism to control prices. Let us not call it 
“a tax” as that term is not very popular in certain parts of the world, but let us 
make sure we have stable signals, making it impossible for oil prices to drop 
as they did now, during the economic crisis. Th ere is a simple reason for that: 
alternative investors need stable signals. Th e mechanism needs to work, but 
it does not, since the fuel market is not a regular market. A multilateral eﬀ ort 
is essential in this sense, because it is impossible to do that on one’s own. Not 
only do we have to bring in the major producers and consumers, but also the 
transit countries, especially China and India. Not only because of climate 
change but also because both China and India, actually all of Asia, are pursuing 
new mercantilist or nationalistic approaches in securing energy. And that’s not 
good. We have to ﬁ gure a way out, especially when you see now what’s going 
on now in China and Brazil. 
As for trade policy, we need to ﬁ gure out new rules, harmonizing interests 
of oil and gas exporters and those of producers of renewable energies. Th ere 
have to be new rules because the current WTO competences do not really 
cover new bio fuels and others. Th ere are interesting debates of future, going 
on right now: of standards, and norms; obviously, there is a huge market 
potential. But for this, we need to homogenize not only our national policies; 
we need structures. We need Mr. Energy so that we are still capable to talk 
to America.
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Susanne Dröge
We’ve heard a lot about politics and demands and what they should look 
like. I will highlight some economic issues – energy policy won’t work without 
private companies engaging in production and technology, and bringing 
technology and energy to consumers and changing the structures to low-
carbon economy.
Th e international playing ﬁ eld will change whether we like it or not, because 
even without climate policy constraint, we will see a  shift in global energy 
demand and supply. We can’t help it, we have to adjust and deal with it, because 
we are talking about the EU and the US as major importers and consumers. 
Starting with the EU – dealing with external relations and external energy 
supply relations, the private companies face a number of challenges, and it’s 
not just Russia. Th e engagement of companies that are state owned is increas-
ing and we cannot do  much about it. For instance, helping companies to 
engage in exploitation of resources is a very important political task. But how 
do you do it? You cannot do it at the EU level because there are no European 
companies yet and we have diﬀ erent resources. We are talking about oil, gas, 
and coal. And they are completely diﬀ erent, so if you want to lift energy policy 
to the European level, you would ﬁ rst need a common interest in oil, in gas, 
and in coal. And we do not have that. For instance, in Poland 90 percent of 
primary energy comes from coal. In France, 80 percent of electricity comes 
from nuclear power. And Germany has a high share of gas, mostly coming 
from Russia. So how do you merge all these interests?
In the US, you have at least one big country that has by deﬁ nition an 
interest in sorting out external energy relations because of a common energy 
mix. Europe could achieve this common energy mix by integrating the energy 
market. But that’s an internal challenge; we have not integrated our energy 
markets yet. And we can’t do it by using energy policy. We need to use com-
petition policy and probably climate policy and climate policy in Europe really 
sets the targets for energy policy – it set a target of 20 percent of renewable 
resources in the energy mix EU-wide. We want to increase our eﬃ  ciency of 
energy use by 20 percent. Th at’s setting a target for energy policy. It’s coming 
through the back door when we can’t integrate through the front door. 
What is Copenhagen going to deliver? As I’m actually working a  lot on 
climate change issues, I see two common interests here. Th e ﬁ rst interest is 
putting a  price on carbon. Th e EU did that already and although I  see the 
trouble the US has in getting the 60 votes in the Senate, there is a big chance 
that this will happen. As soon as you have a cap, it delivers emission reductions, 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
even though it is not enough and the allowances are handed out for free. Th e 
American public will wake up, because every consumer has a right on emis-
sions. And if these rights, these assets are given for free to companies, this 
is a shift of assets in the economy that will not be tolerated forever. Th e ﬁ rst 
big step for the international scene, climate change and for private investors 
is putting a price on carbon. And if the US succeeds, this will have a major 
international impact. 
Th e second interest is decarbonisation; decarbonisation means going down 
from emissions based on hydrocarbons, coal, oil, and gas. Th ere are mainly 
two technological challenges here: producing coal without emitting CO2 – you 
can’t do that, so you have to handle the emissions directly which means you 
have to separate the emissions when they come up; that is carbon capture 
and sequestration. Th e US has already some research in place; and China is 
heavily interested because they see a chance to make their coal cleaner because 
of other problems relating to coal – mainly environmental ones. Th e second 
challenge is renewable energy and the grid upgrading. In Europe, a new energy 
grid, a restoration is needed; the US system is even worse. We need to bring 
in oﬀ shore wind parks, or solar energy from Africa into our grid; on top of 
that, we need an intelligent grid that handles demand at the same time. Europe 
shares that interest with the US.
A remark on the US – I’m not too pessimistic when it comes to what the 
US could deliver, because from the legal point of view, the rulings and the 
decisions made by the Environmental Protection Agency will play out in the 
future. If the national system cannot deliver the precise reductions that are 
needed, the EPA could step in by national law, because now the US too has 
recognized the damages to the health of American people. 
Q&A
I am afraid you are neglecting an essential problem in relationships with Russia. 
It is dangerous to provoke the bear, don’t you think?
Jiří Schneider
My point of departure is: Russia is trying to increase its leverage as a pro-
ducer of energy. We have to increase our leverage as a consumer of energy. 
Th is is clear. We need some rules; and if Energy Charter will not provide us 
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with such rules, we need something else. But we should stick to a rule that we 
should aim at buying energy at our borders. And that would help enormously. 
I know that we have to create an energy market and there is enormous pressure 
against that. But there is no other way; if we do not create an energy market, 
then we’re going to lose. And then, economic crisis; I am not sure about the 
impact of economic crisis on energy consumption and production. I’m really 
not sure what would happen. We’ve witnessed enormous decrease of prices 
after a peak, so what will happen? Let’s take it as an opportunity to change our 
behaviour. And even politicians should acknowledge that there is a chance for 
that. So I have a slogan for America politicians: “no representation without 
hydrocarbon taxation.”
William Siefken 
We talk about Europe’s dependency on Russia for oil and gas. Actually, due 
to economic slowdown, that dependency is decreasing. Th e Russians have had 
some very serious issues because of that. Gazprom for the ﬁ rst time is actually 
losing money this year. Th e big safety belt that the Russian government had 
built up based on past proﬁ ts is very quickly disappearing as they are trying to 
deal with their own economic eﬀ ects. I don’t have the ﬁ nancial understanding 
to get into some lengthy discussion of the impact of the ﬁ nancial crisis here 
but I can say with certainty that it is changing the situation. Th is presents an 
opportunity for us to develop a low carbon economy. Now I would also think 
it would have some impact on Russia. 
Susanne Dröge 
In crisis the prices go down, of course; we all know that this is happening 
and it has revenues side that has been mentioned and that’s deep trouble for 
the suppliers. Not so much for us as consumers. And this is especially a prob-
lem for those countries that hand out cash or cheap subsidies in order to keep 
social unrest at bay. Let’s say some Arabian countries that need the revenues 
because they don’t have redistribution in their system; so the participation of 
the average, of the population is not there. If the prices of oil fall, they will be 
in deep trouble in a very short time, which is a political risk. But in the end, 
it also has an economic risk, because low oil prices mean less investment in 
new exploration. We already have a big investment gap at the global level, not 
only in Russia but also in Saudi Arabia and other countries that have oil. And 
the price hike was an incentive for investment in alternative oil; oil sands, oil 
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tars; however, this is not very eﬃ  cient. Nevertheless, the investment goes into 
secure regions. So what we will see is another economic upturn and a short 
supply, meaning rising prices. We have to keep up the signal from a political 
point of view, telling consumers to listen, explaining them that this is a short 
term. If prices fall, we will have high prices soon. And if you manage to keep 
up this price pressure, you will also ﬁ nd that there is adjustment. If you tell 
everybody, well, now relax, prices go up and down, this will not happen. 
Mr. Braml mentioned the Energy Charter, saying it was over and we should just 
give it up; do you expect a new document to be signed? What do you expect to 
be the content of the EU–Russia negotiations?
Josef Braml
I don’t believe in the documents that aren’t worth the paper they were writ-
ten on, like the Energy Charter. Th e market will take care of such things. Once 
you play “divide and conquer”, you have a problem. You look for alternatives. 
One is alternative energy if we get our grid together in Europe. Th at’s more of 
a domestic issue of energy companies. Th ere would be alternatives available, 
in each of our countries. You could do the trick with alternative energy, with 
solar, with wind. And if the pressure from outside is there and the problems 
become higher, you will push more on those alternatives. Due to their own 
major domestic problems, Russia will be heavily interested in eﬃ  ciency 
measures. Technology could be the key in Russia, once again, because Russia 
needs to export. It’s not as asymmetric as it sometimes seems. It’s a symmetric 
relationship; I don’t buy that option of Asian alternatives. I mean Russia also 
needs consumers. And they may have their own interests, both having stable, 
reliable relationships. Th ose are individual contracts, as well as ways and 
means to reduce the own domestic need for energy.
Ms. Dröge mentioned CCS technologies. Do you see that as a long-term solution 
or only as a bridging technology? And if you see it as a long-term solution, how 
do you deal with the risk that the carbon might not stay there but might go to 
the atmosphere at once?
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Susanne Dröge
Well, the point is, of course, I do not believe that it’s a good solution in the 
end. But every year, the 75 of our increase in carbon emission comes from 
China and Chinese coal, so if you want to target the issue, you better target 
coal combustion; the real challenge is to ﬁ nd out how to make storage secure. 
Th is is not settled yet. Because I think CO₂ needs about 100 years to chemically 
react with its environment in order to be stored safely. But exactly to ﬁ nd out 
about how to do this in a good way, in a secure way, is the challenge from 
research and development point of view. And we know that Norway and also 
Arab states pump back CO₂ to the ground to stabilize the ground. So it’s already 
happening and we need to rely on what we know. But I’m not favouring to do it 
tomorrow because I think there are too many risks associated with it. It’s an 
inter-temporary solution and we can’t rely on this forever because it’s a lot of 
CO₂ that needs to be stored.
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Vladimír Bartovic
Th is panel will address the question whether or not it is possible to reach 
consensus on democracy between the EU and the United States, although we 
still don’t have consensus inside the EU. EU is not a coherent political actor; 
there are diﬀ erent stakes and interests. Th ere is a cleavage in democracy sup-
port between the new and old EU member states. Th e majority of the old EU 
members put emphasis on good governance, rule of law, transparency and 
so on. On the other hand, the new EU member states perceive democracy 
promotion diﬀ erently, especially due to their historical experience; they rather 
focus on pluralism, freedom of speech, human rights and democracy itself. 
Anna Michalski
An important basic starting point to make is that after two decades of 
progress in democracy promotion worldwide, democracy now seems to 
be backsliding. It’s been called a  backlash; this backlash has an impact on 
a number of democracy promoters’ activities. 
Th e economic and social successes in autocratic countries, China in particu-
lar, seem to have broken the link, which has been made in the past between 
socioeconomic advancement and democracy. Moreover, the war on terror of 
the previous US administration unfortunately seemed to link democratization 
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and democracy promotion to a policy of regime change; something that has 
been deplored by many who are active in this ﬁ eld. However, we feel that we 
might be approaching a turning point; and the new US administration might 
play an important role in this respect. Furthermore, two important European 
institutions are about to change their leadership – the European Parliament 
and the European Commission; the incoming leaderships of these institutions 
can be also of crucial importance.
Finally, there is the Lisbon treaty; if ratiﬁ ed, the High Representative for 
CFSP will be strengthened, which could help the EU to reach better coordina-
tion of currently incoherent policies, such as policies on international trade, 
foreign policy, development policy and humanitarian aid. 
Our paper also analyzes the role of the US as a policy promoter. Democracy 
is a fundamental principle of the US state construction, a principle to follow. 
Th ere are several examples of very successful US democracy promotion, for 
instance in Germany and in Japan after the World War II. Unfortunately, there 
are also more recent examples that haven’t been so appreciated. 
It is necessary to point out that the US  – through its society and its 
economic model  – has a  great appeal to people all over the world, thus 
gaining leverage on the international scene. Th e strong belief in democracy 
as a fundamental value in the American society gives it a strength; but such 
a deep-seated tenet does not absolve it from promoting causes that are seen 
as legitimate and in accordance with its stated values.
Th e experience of the Bush administration in Iraq convinced many that the 
forced regime change cannot go hand in hand with democracy promotion. 
Th is gives rise to an idea of dichotomy between the realist and the normative 
foreign policies; lately there has been consensus that this is actually a forced 
dichotomy. Foreign policy interests are there to be pursued – and they are 
pursued by the US and the EU as actors and by other countries as well. Th e 
challenge of today for the EU and the US is to change perceived associations 
between American military interventions and regime change and democracy 
promotion practices and policies. 
Th e US is the world’s most resourceful foreign policy actor, both in terms 
of ﬁ nancing an economic cloud and at the same terms a political cloud and 
therefore it’s very important that the American administration continue to 
devote political and ﬁ nancial resources to democracy promotion.
Th e EU, on the other hand, is often called an atypical foreign policy actor; 
that notion is obviously linked to the fact that it decides on foreign policy in 
a consensual style among 27 member states. With enlargement in 2004 and 
2007, the EU has become increasingly less shy to state that it has a foreign policy 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
and foreign policy interests on the global scene. And it has tried to beef up its 
capabilities. We see that very clearly in the Lisbon treaty, which will strengthen 
the oﬃ  ce of the high representative, and, perhaps even more importantly, it 
would create an EU External Action Service. Th e EU has been referring to itself 
as a normative actor, because of the values and principles that are written in its 
primary law and that would be somewhat strengthened by the Lisbon treaty but 
not in a signiﬁ cant way. In spite of these values and principles, the EU member 
states have often not been able to agree among themselves. Instead of following 
or pursuing speciﬁ c interests, the EU has been announcing lofty goals and then 
has been quite unable to realize them in practice. Th e challenge for the EU, on 
the one hand, is to build relations with third countries that are true to these 
values and norms, because they are very important; but on the other hand, 
the EU has to concentrate on foreign policy, resting on consensus among the 
member states and the member state’s interests. 
EU has been quite successful in promoting democracy in the enlargement 
context but it has been much less successful in promoting it in other contexts. 
It has included democracy clause in all international agreements with the third 
countries since the 1990s. But this has not been particularly successful and it 
has also precluded agreement with profoundly democratic countries like New 
Zealand that will not sign a treaty with the EU with such a clause included.
Th e challenge for the EU is to functionalize the democracy conditionality 
that has been made to work in the enlargement context in other contexts as 
well. One of the test cases for this will be the Eastern Partnership that the EU 
has launched with six countries now to the east of the current border of the 
EU. And ﬁ nally, the EU obviously needs to improve its internal cohesiveness 
and coherence as an actor. Together with the member states, it is the world’s 
largest donor but its policies are not always eﬀ ective and sometimes there are 
discrepancies between the EU’s and the member states’ policies on the ground.
Th ere was a talk about the democracy consensus; there is an urge to create 
democracy consensus among the EU member states in the way that there is 
development consensus – a  fundamental agreement about how democracy 
promotion is to be carried out. But that has not yet come into being and 
the hopes are quite high that maybe Swedish EU presidency could reach an 
agreement; however, that is yet to be seen. 
Th e recommendations the group addressed both to the EU and the US are 
as follows. Both actors could gain from cooperation from this area. And the 
way for them to ﬁ nd cooperation would be to pursue debates about a common 
narrative concerning democracy promotion; explaining what it is about and 
what it should achieve. It could also try to achieve a kind of understanding 
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about how to deal with undemocratic states, even in the context of competition 
for strategic resources as we’ve seen in the past. 
Finally, an obvious point that is very important to make is that despite 
economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, both actors should pursue policies towards 
third countries within the larger development envelope, promote democracy 
and make that condition for further development aid. 
John Glenn
I will talk a little bit about where things are in the United States today with the 
new administration coming in, as the Obama administration deﬁ ned its foreign 
policy goals. You can hear voices on both sides of the Atlantic saying what we’ve 
learned over the past eight years is that we cannot ‘export democracy’, but we 
have to be more modest in our foreign policies. Richard House from the Council 
on Foreign Relations says: “America does not have the ability to transform the 
world; we should go slow and focus on building its prerequisites, the checks and 
balances of a civil society and constitutionalism, instead of rushing elections or 
imposing political change through force.” To my ear, while this is all relatively 
reasonable, it reacts to the Bush administration policies by obscuring decades 
of European and American experience at the ﬁ eld of democracy promotion that 
have relied not on the use of force, nor have they focused primarily on elections.
I never tire of reminding folks that not only do we share common values 
of democracy, but that two of our primary democracy promotion institutions, 
the National Democratic Institute and the International Republic Institute 
were explicitly modelled on the German political party foundations, such as 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Th is year, in particular, there is a certain sort of 
relevance to this question because it’s 20 years since the fall of communism 
in Central and Eastern Europe. And it provides a nice opportunity to review 
the lessons learned in the post-communist world that suggest that United 
States and Europe should not retreat from the support for democratic reform 
abroad, but rather redeﬁ ne the place of democracy promotion in a revitalized 
transatlantic agenda.
While the fall of the Berlin wall remains an image of an ecstatic Europe 
reunited at the end of the 20th century, the lessons learned over the last 20 
years are often poorly understood and are more complex. Did the west export 
democracy to Eastern Europe? My answer is no. Numerous organizations 
provided help, resources, expertise, and technology to diﬀ erent countries with 
diﬀ erent results over time. Because there was no blueprint for change and we 
cannot forget that reform is almost always primarily driven from within. 
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If you look at this region, it’s clear that the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe overthrew communist regime in 1989 and eventually joined 
the NATO and the European Union. Th e countries of the western Balkans 
fell into violence and continue to rebuild fragile institutions whereas the 
countries of the former Soviet Union have seen backlash, and backsliding 
towards democracy.
Diﬀ erences in the post communist world illustrate that while external 
eﬀ orts can play a critical moral role in supporting democrats under authori-
tarian regimes, they are rarely decisive in the fall of those regimes. Th ey can 
provide help to emerging democracies in reforming institutions, building 
civil societies; but even then, new democracies are fragile and vulnerable to 
back ﬁ ghting as well as external pressures.
One of the interesting things about the moment we’re in is that lessons like 
these are not new to those who have been active in democracy promotion. 
Yet it seems that it’s a time when we need to relearn them again when we 
are in the midst of foreign policy debates about the future of the democracy 
promotion in the wake of the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. I think backsliding among these new democracies, which Ana 
has identiﬁ ed, and rising of authoritarianism, has led some to warn about 
the so-called “democratic pessimism.” Th ey could lead policy makers to pull 
back from their support for democracy abroad.
Initial sings from the Obama administration have raised some ques-
tions when secretary of state Hilary Clinton went to China and declared 
on her ﬁ rst trip abroad that she did not want human rights to get in the 
way of partnership between the United States and China. And at the same 
time, there appears to be growing hesitation and even opposition to the 
EU enlargement and NATO enlargement, within its member countries as 
debates of enlargement fatigue. Now, while many observers have noted the 
apparent reluctance of the Obama administration, and indeed president 
Obama himself, to use the word “democracy” in political speeches. I  felt 
that it was important to take a look at his proposed budget. In that budget, 
it makes a commitment to double US foreign assistance to help “the weakest 
states reduce poverty, combat global health threats, develop markets, govern 
peacefully, and expand democracy worldwide.” 
Th e new administration needs to continue the process; a  process that 
has begun already of distancing democracy promotion from regime change 
and to articulate its place among competing foreign policy priorities such 
as energy security, combating terrorism, preventing nuclear proliferation, 
and international trade.
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Th e president of Freedom House Jennifer Windsor had a nice expression 
about ﬁ ve years ago on peace, which – as she repeated after Charles Dickens – 
is the best of times and the worst of times for democracy promotion. 
Th e lessons from post-communism compel the proponents of democracy 
promotion, among whom I  count myself, to be modest, recognizing that 
democracy is never exported, but always driven from within and frequently 
fragile, subject to backsliding. Post-conﬂ ict situations and rising of authoritari-
anism pose challenges, with risk of corruption, ineﬃ  ciency, ineﬀ ectiveness. For 
democracy promotion to resume its place within the foreign policy debates, it 
needs to have a candid conversation about the experiences we’ve had in parts 
of the world that have shown to be the real challenges.
Admittedly in the world of public policy we can’t look back to the last 20 
years and say it would have been diﬀ erent if we’ve done nothing, or done 
something diﬀ erent. It’s not a  scientiﬁ c test, but I  think that the reinforcing 
role that international eﬀ orts have played in Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
western Balkans, in parts of the former Soviet Union show that given the right 
conditions, democracy promotion eﬀ orts can provide resources and expertise. 
I think it belongs on the transatlantic agenda as well, as one of the key success 
stories in recent years, besides the EU enlargement. Now concerns about the 
rhetoric of the Bush administration so-called freedom agenda in the Middle East 
have lead many to emphasize diﬀ erences in democracy promotion between the 
United States and Europe.
A closer look shows these distinctions are exaggerated. When you look in the 
ﬁ eld of what American and European democracy promotion organizations are 
doing in places like Ukraine, places like Georgia, and parts of the Middle East, you 
can see they are usually doing very similar things, helping to build new institutions, 
to support civil society groups and independent media. Th is is how it works in 
this region where similar programs are initiated by Americans and Europeans. 
However, we must not forget about the backlash that Ana identiﬁ ed in the former 
Soviet Union and in China, where things like the rise of Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization has aﬀ ected American and European non-governmental organiza-
tions alike, with British and German organizations having diﬃ  cult time in Russia 
as well as American organizations in many places. Some of the most dynamic 
eﬀ orts in recent years in this ﬁ eld have been undertaken by new member states of 
the EU and NATO as they share their experiences of democratic transformation 
with other regimes and they bring a kind of credibility to their experiences and 
their knowledge of what it’s like to go through these transformations.
Yet at the same time I feel that for this discussion to be balanced, we have 
to recognize that the western Balkans and former Soviet Union highlight the 
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limits of democracy promotion, the protracted diﬃ  culties of post-conﬂ ict 
situations and the potential for backlash by powerful states. And these are 
certainly challenges that continue to confront policy makers. 
Igor Blaževič
I would describe myself as the foot soldier of the democracy assistance; 
my organization is mainly operating in Burma, Cuba, Belarus and countries 
of that type, providing assistance to family members of the prisoners, as well 
as providing assistance to registered organizations that face huge diﬃ  culties 
from the local authorities, and are often capable of functioning due to foreign 
support. 
So you should not be surprised if there is certain level of skepticism on 
my part, regarding the window of opportunity right now, or certain level of 
frustration in my presentation, as it is coming as a voice of the besieged, of 
the oppressed human rights defenders in countries that I have mentioned.
I  fully agree with what John has said; we should not retreat, and by “we” 
I mean the US administration and the EU member states. Th ere are negative 
factors inﬂ uencing this; some of them have been mentioned: the mistakes of 
the Bush administration, the economic crisis etc. One can feel a pessimistic 
overreaction in the air; I think that’s wrong; it should not happen. Th is is simply 
the moment to raise responsibility, the moment for Europe to take a  lead. 
I think that at this moment, the EU member states are in a better position and 
more obliged to become the trendsetter in democracy assistance, precisely 
because of the obstacles the Obama administration has to face because of the 
Bush legacy. It will take some time before the Obama administration really 
regains self-conﬁ dence and courage to be more outspoken on democracy and 
human rights issues; at the moment, however, this is creating a void. 
And that void will be ﬁ lled by the opponents of democracy, if the European 
Union does not act the right way, if it does not take a lead. And taking a lead 
means a couple of things. On the one hand, it is extremely important to forge the 
internal European political consensus on democracy. But knowing how things 
go on in Europe, it will take time; it involves a lot of internal debates that do not 
really help outside the EU and do not inspire anybody outside the EU anyway. 
In any case, it’s extremely critical that we put already existing mechanisms in 
the EU in very persistent and courageous assistance to dissidents in China, to 
lawyers and journalists in Russia, to bloggers in Iraq, and so on and so forth.
We have mechanisms, we have funds and we can do it; and we can do it 
without seriously endangering and hindering our diplomatic engagement 
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with the governments of China, Russia etc. Moreover, Europe is now better 
equipped to do that than the United States.
Another thing (and this is another point in which I strongly agree with what 
John has mentioned and what is in the policy paper) is that we do need some 
intellectual homework to do; we need to rethink the democracy assistance 
programs which have been going on for 25 years. And we need to deﬁ ne a new 
frame that will be positive and optimistic, while also being modest, persistent; 
on top of that, it should be bipartisan across the party lines and it should work 
simultaneously on all three levels when it comes to the target groups. It should 
empower the grass roots; it should build institutions and rule of law. But it 
should not entirely give up the trust in elections. Elections do matter, despite 
the widespread fear caused by the election victory of Hamas in Palestine or the 
violence in Kenya etc. But in spite of all these dangers, connected with elections 
in a  fragile society, we should not give up on elections because they are the 
crucial mechanism of the building up and strengthening of democracy.
At the moment, there is a  signiﬁ cant drive toward multilateralism and 
working through the multilateral organizations; that also means a  drive in 
dealing in constructive terms with well-entrenched regimes that are hostile 
to democracy, both domestically and internationally. And while this drive is 
already a commonly accepted policy for the EU member states that have been 
always more inclined to it, it is obvious that the US is now strongly shifting 
in that direction too; that’s really an important shift. When we are talking 
and constructively engaging with undemocratic regimes, at the same time 
we should openly, clearly speak out our values, we should be outspoken in 
naming things that are wrong, and we should really stick to our aid programs, 
to our democratic rules. We should not dismantle that part of our identity, of 
our values, and of our existing programs just because we need and we have 
decided to engage constructively with the governments around the world, just 
because we need consensus and cooperation in terms of nuclear proliferation, 
consensus when it comes to tackling the economic crisis, global warming, etc. 
Another thing, there is a lot of talk about how we should undo the Bush 
legacy. Th ere is one thing that the European Union and its member states 
should and could do: they should accept a certain number of the Guantanamo 
detainees. Th at would be a major breakthrough in assisting Obama in undo-
ing the Bush legacy, that is, if Obama continues trying to ﬁ nd a solution to 
dismantle Guantanamo. And there is a strong obligation on think-tanks and 
human rights groups that have so strongly criticized Bush for Guantanamo 
now to help the policy makers and the European Union to pursue and help 
vis-à-vis public to make the hard decision.
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Another issue I would really like to see solved is quick, eﬀ ective, coordinated 
diplomatic eﬀ ort of the European Union and the United States on Burma, 
because there is a window of opportunity; when it comes to democracy, we 
need a small success story in today’s doomed time – a small victory – and if 
we can’t pursue China to move along with us in ﬁ nding a certain solution for 
Burma, then how can we expect to convince China to move on anything else? It 
would be most unfortunate if we lost the momentum of trying to do something 
serious in Burma, with such a clear, sympathetic case like Aung San Suu Kyi.
I’d have another recommendation, probably as provocative as the one 
concerning accepting the Guantanamo detainees. After the European Union 
has ratiﬁ ed Lisbon and consolidated our European institutions, we should 
oﬀ er membership to Turkey and Ukraine. Th at would be another major push 
to strengthening democracy assistance. We are justly proud that the European 
Union worked so well in democracy promotion through its enlargement; 
obviously, Turkey and Ukraine are the next places that can decide about the 
state of democracy in the world in the next few years. We don’t need to accept 
Turkey and Ukraine in two or ﬁ ve years, we can do it in ﬁ fteen years but it 
really matters what we will oﬀ er and how we discuss things with them. 
Ernst Kerbusch
I try to concentrate a little bit on what I’ve been doing for 37 years, which 
is about 80 of my working time on democracy promotion as the interna-
tional director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the institution that has also 
played a major role as an example for setting up the US institutions under 
the international endowment, because of the fact that it was Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation after which other German foundations have been founded; it was 
simply a model for the rest of them. However, this is the last time I will speak 
of models in democracy promotion, because this has been tried too often.
Let me ﬁ rst say that in relation to the subjects that we talked about in the 
morning, we are delving into the problem of legitimacies this afternoon. Because 
ﬁ ghting for better forms of trade worldwide under the basic idea of global 
improvement of the situation of mankind etc. is not a question of legitimizing. 
Everybody knows about the need of doing it, but we have seen how diﬃ  cult it is, 
even under the terms of exclusively European and US interests. But in terms of 
democratization, we have a problem; it is not a question of demand and supply 
under the actual circumstances. Th ere is a lot of supply, which is represented 
here and the demand is not so secure. I  see very little oﬃ  cial demand from 
Russian and Chinese sources etc. towards our supply of democracy promotion. 
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In spite of that we are trying to do it, and that makes it so diﬃ  cult. But in order 
to explain how I see that we could improve what we were doing in the past, let 
me ﬁ rst distinguish what the diﬀ erent institutions are doing. 
I see four major democracy promoters nowadays. One is the international 
community, which is the most legitimized because we have the universal 
declaration of human rights and the universal declaration on social and 
economic rights. So the international community has done a huge eﬀ ort in 
selling to all nations of the world what we are discussing here, promoting 
democracy worldwide or at least important ingredients of democracy, human 
rights, etc. But the diﬃ  culties are. I’m not going deeply into that, but it is 
quite clear that even the institutions that the UN has set up until now have 
not brought very much. 
Th e next one are groups of nations. And regrettably, I have to take Europe 
into account here and mention the diﬃ  culty of reaching common European 
foreign policy and transferring it into practical politics, which would be even 
more important part of it. Th is has not worked until now, with very few 
exceptions where interest is strong enough to bring us together; however, 
rest assured that democracy promotion is not one of the exceptions. Th is is 
a problem while we are far from reaching any consensus.
Th e third are the non-governmental organizations. Th ey are, of course, 
mentioned in the paper; but we need to deﬁ ne how they are related to states, 
ﬁ nanced by states; how they depend on national executives, governments etc. 
And ﬁ nally, the last group of political institutions that’s trying to do  the 
job of democracy promotion worldwide is the institutions that are closely 
related to political parties, which means that their work is ideology-based. I’m 
using that term to make it very clear that there is a deep diﬀ erence between 
such institutions and their counterparts that try to bring about the values of 
democracy independent of the political philosophies of the institutions in 
the countries where they work. Th e political foundations in Germany have 
always been intensely coordinating their work with political institutions in 
the countries where they work. We have been doing that since the early 1960s. 
We have had a long experience in that work. I’m not speaking about political 
parties that we cooperate with in those countries. I’m now speaking about the 
political foundations in Germany altogether, not only of the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, because that is a common philosophy that we defend. 
We have been working with institutions, with organizations that share 
our values. I’m going back to the word ideology again. When we started our 
work, there were no parties available as our partners. So we had to cooperate 
with other institutions, human rights organizations here and there, women’s 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
organizations here and there, trade union organizations etc. And that was 
the type of cooperation that we searched for in order to get our partners ﬁ ght 
for their own rights and ﬁ ght for their chances in their own societies. So we 
have never tried to transfer any German model to somewhere else. But the 
idea was to transfer the will for freedom into those countries, into the heads 
of their leaders as well as into the heads of rank and ﬁ le members of the 
organizations that we have been working with. Not a model, not a German 
one, not a European one, not a Western democratic model, but the values 
ideologically based on social democracy in our case, on Christian democracy 
in the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Germany, etc.
What is the diﬀ erence of our approach and the approach of other institu-
tions, especially those that are basically defending techniques of democracy 
as their promotional eﬀ ort? Th e diﬀ erence is that we go into the countries we 
work for and try to convince our partners, our political friends to do what in 
a democratic framework would lead to more democracy in a country. More 
democracy means more participation, more pluralism, more rule of law and 
all the political freedoms that one can stand for. It does not mean to employ 
the German electoral system, the American electoral system, any type of 
constitution from somewhere else; just build something in which the political, 
the ideology is the base for what you stand for and try to strive for in your 
own country. Th at’s where we try to help them and where we have been quite 
successful, at least in some cases. 
Q&A
Th e democracy promotion is very much a Western concept, meaning both the 
United States and the European Union acknowledge the importance of building 
democracy across the world, but just perhaps in recent years we have faced 
additional challenges. Perhaps it’s not so visible in this particular ﬁ eld, but 
there’s an obvious rise of the new powers, of the so called sovereign democracies, 
especially China and Russia; for a long time, it was a commonly shared opinion 
that democracy promotion is linked with development. It was a way to convince 
the countries that were not democratic to adopt certain models in exchange for 
development or material aid. But now, if you look at the Chinese policy in Africa, 
for instance, the Chinese are actually coming in and they don’t actually demand 
anything else. Do you think this poses us with some additional challenges? 
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Igor Blaževič
Th e fact whether China and Russia pose additional challenges is one of the 
reasons for my pessimism. Th e European Union has been really committed 
for a number of years to development assistance connected with millennium 
goals. Bush has done it too, although it’s not been promoted well; however, he 
has achieved really signiﬁ cant improvements when it comes to the funding. 
Obama is speaking it up, raising it up ﬁ nancially and probably on the level 
of diplomacy and the rhetoric as well. So there is a real overlapping interest 
between the United States administration and the European Union to push 
strongly particularly in Africa in direction of the strengthening democracy but 
also really improving the development of the region. At the same time, you 
have China in the local playground, signiﬁ cantly undermining the European 
and the United States’ eﬀ orts because non-democratic or corrupt governments 
in Africa will deal with China and it will be easier for them to do so with China; 
that way, they may safely stay in power. 
Anna Michalski
With globalization, we unset forces, not only economic forces but also 
political shifts; some would call it a  paradigm shift. In my opinion, that 
paradigm shift came in parallel to globalization and shift in economic power. 
Th e fact that we talk about a multipolar world as a globalized world is very 
signiﬁ cant and it has an impact on how we can formulate democracy promo-
tion as a concept, as a policy that should be persuaded and should be put on 
table by important actors, the EU member states and the USA. In this context, 
it is very important to have some intellectual thinking to get to a new narrative, 
so we know how to deal with democracy promotion in a multipolar world. 
Obviously, multipolarity has to do with rights of new actors; couple of years 
ago, we were very concerned with China and Russia, and in some respects 
Russia is more alarming but China is more important. In this regard, I like the 
idea of Burma trying to score a success. You call it a small victory in Burma; 
I think it’s very important both for what it is in itself, but also to engage China 
in that process and maybe open up for something else than confrontation. 
Maybe have China to take responsibility in ways we haven’t seen before. 
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John Glenn
Th e challenge here is we simply must be clear here about what we mean 
by democracy. Because it sounds simply like we must be speaking about the 
Western concept. I want to mention solemnly one of the most interesting pieces 
by the Nobel-winning economist Armartya Sen called “Why Are Th ere No 
Famines in Democracy?” in which he looks at democracy as a system in which 
information feedback loops are more possible in situations between the rulers 
and the ruled, the governors and the governed that allow there to be that sort 
of basic adaptations as projects that go on. Th at’s one of the most interesting 
non-values based per se arguments about usefulness of democracy in a very 
broad sense. Now, in the development ﬁ eld, I sometimes feel like we run a risk 
of seeing development and democracy as alternatives to each other. And the 
reason why that’s unfortunate is in part because it obscures within the develop-
ment debate. Th ere’s been a move away from this exclusive focus on poverty 
reduction and on recognition that a political context in which development aid 
is made matters without a system that relies on things like transparency, good 
governance and the rule of law. Much of development aid goes in the pockets of 
corrupt leaders and doesn’t get at all to the goal on which the development aid 
is made; this is a movement within US AID in United States, that’s a movement 
in department for international development in Britain, that’s a movement in 
Swedish Ministry of foreign aﬀ airs, a movement happening on both sides of the 
Atlantic, suggesting these ﬁ elds are a little bit closer then possible. 
Ernst Kerbusch
Th e Western approach is to be allowed to say what you want to say and to 
be allowed where you want to go. And this is something that we not only stand 
for; that is also something that we try to sell to some extent and that we often 
succeed in. Let me refer to the example of our cooperation with Russia and 
China. It is true that China actually is an impediment of what we are doing 
in Africa now, and maybe next year in Latin America, and maybe next year in 
other Asian countries as well. But this is for the time being. We have hundreds 
of thousands of Chinese students studying abroad and I’m absolutely sure that 
it is urgently necessary to even improve on that record. Th e more Chinese that 
come to the United States, that come to Europe, that come to Japan, that come 
to Australia and go back to China, the better, for they see with their own eyes 
that freedom works for them; and the same goes to Russia.
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Tomáš Weiss
I don’t really want to introduce the (policy) paper for two reasons: ﬁ rst, you 
have it in your folder, so you could read it yourself without having to listen 
to me, and second, I wasn’t too included in writing that paper so I don’t feel 
very comfortable in presenting somebody else’s work. Nevertheless, I would 
like to take up the topic and take up few thoughts and the basic focus of the 
paper and brieﬂ y develop my own thoughts on that. Th e paper is an attempt 
to deﬁ ne points of convergence and divergence between the US and the EU 
eastern neighborhood in Eastern Europe. I would argue that there are many 
points of convergence and divergence you ﬁ nd in the paper that are quite valid. 
As a few people here today already mentioned, the paper was written at the 
end of the last year, so many things might be a bit outdated, especially due 
to the new US administration; but unfortunately, a lot of them are still very 
valid, and seem to be valid for months to come. I would argue that the main 
problem of the EU and US cooperation in the eastern neighborhood is the 
diﬀ erent strategic importance of this area for the two partners. I would like 
to develop this thought on the three broad topics and three basic issues that 
are presented in the paper. Th ese are the relations with Russia, relations with 
Turkey and the approach to the Western Balkans. 
I  would start with the Western Balkans where the strategic importance 
to some extent is closer to each other. For the US the main concern in the 
Western Balkans is deﬁ nitely stability. Th e US doesn’t really have any signiﬁ cant 
strategic interest in Western Balkans, except for not endangering the stability 
of the EU. For the EU, the stability of the Western Balkans is obviously of the 
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utmost importance as well, but we have a few issues that blur the picture a bit 
more. Th e ﬁ rst one is the question of enlargement: what to do with the Western 
Balkans? Are we able to swallow it? Are they able to be part of the EU? Th e 
second question is obviously about organized crime. To what extent can we 
deal with our internal security which is somehow connected with the weak 
states in Western Balkans? Th ese are issues that do not really play a signiﬁ cant 
role in the US approach to Western Balkans. However, the EU must be much 
more interested in what’s going on in that area. But still, this is a problem that 
may be solved; this is the easiest one to deal with. Th e other two, namely the 
relations with Russia and Turkey, are a bit diﬀ erent. 
Th ere is a common interest of the US and the EU on Turkey: making the EU-
NATO relationship work. Th e role of Turkey is crucial here; without Turkey, 
the NATO and the EU cooperation, which is very important for both partners 
as well as for the US, simply cannot work. Now, the rest of the two partners’ 
interests are slightly diﬀ erent. For the US, Turkey is important because of the 
stability of the region, but not so much of the Balkans, or the Mediterranean, 
but obviously of the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey is crucial for the US 
for its possible assistance in dealing with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict, 
and also with the Muslim world in general. Turkey is the Muslim ally of the 
US. We have actually seen that just recently at the last NATO summit which 
ended with Obama’s trip to Turkey just after the European trip, the EU trip, 
let’s say. For the EU, Turkey is crucial as well but slightly diﬀ erently. It’s crucial 
because of energy, the energy corridors, the southern corridor that we have 
now, under the Czech presidency, signed, very pompously; we’ll see what 
happens with that. And obviously the crucial question with Turkey is the 
enlargement. Again whether the EU is able to develop any other relationship 
with Turkey except for letting it in; whether the EU will be able to tell Turkey 
that they don’t want it within the EU, or they do want it in the EU...so far we 
are not really sure what the EU wants. Obviously, the strategic importance 
of Turkey is completely diﬀ erent and the approaches of the two are slightly 
diﬀ erent, as we could see already with the new administration and with Obama 
strongly advocating for the Turkish membership in the EU. 
As to relations with Russia, the issue seems very diﬀ erent from the EU and 
the US respective perspectives. We talked a lot about what Russia means for 
the EU: energy, ﬁ rst and foremost, trade, maybe internal security cooperation 
to some extent, and obviously stability in the region, stability in Ukraine, stabil-
ity or, rather, change in Belarus (not so much stability for what they have there) 
and the Caucasus. For the US, the story is completely diﬀ erent: there might be 
talking about the stability in Caucasus, the role of Ukraine and so on, but what 
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is really important for the US is obviously the nuclear disarmament. It is the 
role of Russia with the new negotiations over START, over North Korea, over 
the approach to Iran; and this is a thing that will most probably overshadow 
everything that the new US administration will do vis-à-vis Russia. Th erefore, 
there is potentially a huge challenge for the EU strategic interests. 
Although there are these divergent strategic interests in those three areas, 
still the main problem lies somewhere else: inside the EU. If we talk about the 
EU-US relationships and the EU strategic interests, we are somehow on the 
blue water. If there are any EU strategic interests, who deﬁ nes them under 
more strategic interests of the member states? I would even think that if there 
was a clearly deﬁ ned EU strategic interest, the US would be very happy for 
that, because you can negotiate it, you can ﬁ nd some common ground. If you 
don’t know what the EU actually wants – and the EU doesn’t know what they 
want – than it is very diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd a compromise. 
What is the outlook: we have two issues that are ﬂ ying in the air; and 
I would be a bit skeptical about both of them. Th e ﬁ rst one is the change 
with the new administration  – the problem basically lies with the EU, so 
the change in the US administration cannot make any diﬀ erence; the new 
US administration will not make much diﬀ erence on the EU foreign policy 
either. Simply the strategic interests are still there, as we have already seen, 
and Guantanamo has been already mentioned; it is very diﬃ  cult to provide 
for the change in foreign policy completely. Th e second issue would be more 
coherent in the EU, and there are many people talking about the Lisbon 
treaty providing the coherence for the EU. I would be skeptical on that as 
well. First of all, Lisbon keeps the unanimity, somebody already mentioned 
that here, and it might even complicate the picture because we’ll still have the 
member states and their interests, but then we will have somehow stronger 
representation at the European level. What will be the relationship between 
the 28, to be completely precise? To some extent the picture would be much 
more blurred.
For the EU to some extent the risks and challenges stemming from the 
eastern neighborhood and from the world in general are still too low to 
create a push big enough to make a signiﬁ cant change for the foreign policy 
making; and unless we have a signiﬁ cant change either in giving up foreign 
policy making at the EU level or giving up foreign policy making at the level 
of the member states, we will be stuck somewhere in the middle, not really 
sure where we are heading and being a very unreadable for the US partner, 
to deal with us and to create some kind of convergence in the eastern 
neighborhood as well. 
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Nicolas Jabko
Th e (policy) paper was very well informed, covering the whole issue. I have 
just one general criticism; in my opinion, the EU views and US views are 
sometimes put into an opposition that is too strict. Th e arrival of the Obama 
administration did change something and there is a continuing diﬃ  culty of 
the EU to speak with one voice which means that we have a world which is 
characterized by shades of gray rather than black or white.
I want to devote my comments to the two factors; Obama – the new Obama 
factor, and the topic of EU divisions on the issue of European neighborhood 
policy. And I’d like to provide you with the French perspective, albeit an 
unoﬃ  cial one. 
As to the Obama factor; Barak Obama made it possible for the Europeans 
to cooperate with the US, and this is relatively new. Of course cooperation 
with the US never stopped; it existed during the Bush administration as well. 
Th ere was a lot of cooperation on the ﬁ ght against terrorism, but it was a very 
diﬃ  cult exercise. It was like being friends with the tough guy at school; you 
can’t really avoid being friends with that tough guy because you need the 
protection of the tough guy against other tough guys but sometimes you are 
really embarrassed because the tough guy turns into a bully and you also have 
to pay attention because sometimes the tough guy steps on your toe. Th e 
Europeans cooperated with the Bush administration against terrorism but 
they didn’t do that from conviction; and that was, of course, especially true 
about Iraq and Guantanamo. Under Obama, things are changing, and maybe 
this is a little bit underestimated in the paper because despite the continuity, 
the tough guy is also a nice guy now, and this changes things. You can feel 
good about the friendship that you have with that guy and you can do more 
things with him; in foreign policy, that is called “multilateralism”. Obama is 
much more open to multilateralism than Bush was, and this is especially the 
case on issues which are not directly related to EU neighborhood policies, but 
which are important to Europe, such as global warming or the defense of the 
rule of law, such as the planned closure of Guantanamo. 
Th ere is this sort of communality of view which changes things and which 
means that we can expect that the diﬀ erences between the US and the EU will 
be in general turned down a little bit. Of course diﬀ erences of interest will not 
go away in a happy multilateral world; and in a way, Obama makes things more 
diﬃ  cult because it is harder to say no to him and this was especially clear when 
Obama keenly supported Turkish membership in the EU followed by a very 
embarrassed reaction of both Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy who 
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said that that was something that the Europeans should settle on their own. 
Th ere was clearly a sense of unease about the US taking a stance on the issue 
of Turkish membership. 
In sum, we are no longer living in the world of “with us or against us” which 
was the case with Bush. Nevertheless, things might be even more complicated 
today, because you have someone that the Europeans have to work with as 
they did in the past with the Bush administration, but they also have to show 
good will, and this is something that is relatively new. 
As far as the divisions in the EU are concerned, the fact that the EU should 
speak with one voice doesn’t mean that it will. It’s only natural for diﬀ erent 
EU member states to have diﬀ erent foreign policies, including the issue of the 
European neighborhood policy. Th is is most obvious when it comes to the 
EU neighborhood policy on the topic of Turkey or even Russia because these 
are fundamental issues and countries will want to make sovereign decisions 
on these issues, unless they are forced to an agreement by strong common 
institution which does not exist at the moment. So this is a situation that will 
not go away and the relationships and partnerships with the US have nothing 
to do with it. Th is is really an internal European situation. Th e French favor 
a strong, common foreign security policy, but in practice, the French presi-
dency did not seem to be very multilateral in their approach. Th is is also the 
case of the Turkish candidacy to the EU, where Sarkozy very clearly said in the 
beginning that he really didn’t care about the state of EU negotiations on this 
issue and that he would just oppose it – and he has opposed it; less vocally, as 
it turned out, when he became the president than when he was a candidate 
but he has been eﬀ ective in trying to slow down the negotiations with Turkey. 
When one looks at things a  little more even-handedly and without the 
bitterness one might feel when listening to our president, one has to see that 
his foreign position is still more pro-European than many, because in principle 
he is still in favor of the united foreign policy in the long term. In the short 
term, it remains true that as long as Europe does not have this common foreign 
policy, France will make its own foreign policy decisions in a sovereign way; 
as for Turkey, it is a high policy issue and if you are the French president, you 
simply cannot ignore the national foreign policy concerns of your diplomats 
and the popular discontents; you are aware that you might provoke your 
people if you pursue the issue of Turkish membership against the will of the 
majority of French citizens who are afraid of an uncontrolled enlargement, as 
shown by opinion polls. 
In conclusion, what can be done about the asymmetry between the US and 
the EU? Not much can be done within the current institutional framework. Of 
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course, we could change this framework in the future, but I think that some 
of the recipes that are proposed in the paper, including the strengthening of 
communication, is something that comes back again and again as a recipe for 
making the partnership works better...I don’t think that alone would help the 
EU division and the straightened US-EU partnership. In my opinion, the main 
problem is the institutional setup of the EU. However, there is progress – we 
have people around the table at this point which is better than people ﬁ ghting 
against each other in wars. But we are not in the situation in which one person 
can make foreign policy as the Americans do. And as long as this is not the 
case, there will be a lot of continuing divisions in the internal EU views.
Richard Whitman
Let me tackle the question that was posed for this session, whether there is 
a strategic partnership or diverging interests in regard to the EU and the US 
and the European neighborhood.
I would say that there must be strategic partnership, absolutely, no question 
about that. On the point of diverging interest, the interests are largely con-
verged, as the (policy) paper shows rather nicely; but in a number of important 
areas, they are converged insuﬃ  ciently. Turkey and Russia are a very good 
illustration of that. However, the problem is largely on the European side where 
European member states ﬁ nd it rather diﬃ  cult to converge their policies on 
these two questions. Th e fault is not with the US; and to be honest I am a bit 
reluctant to criticize the US this time because I don’t think a honeymoon is 
an appropriate time to put down your partner. 
I want to elaborate on whether the EU is actually capable of being strategic 
partner. I want to look ﬁ rst to the issue of geopolitics, in particular whether Euro-
peans can do geopolitics. I think we had the geopolitical gene removed in the 20t 
century and as post-imperialists, we ﬁ nd it rather diﬃ  cult to think geopolitically. 
We do have a kind of genetic problem, if you like. In any case, we are strategic 
partner, a grand strategic partner but we do have problems with the means, with 
capacity to deliver in our relationship as a strategic partner to the US.
Can the EU actually do geopolitics? Can it do a grand strategy? One of the 
nice things about the paper is that it doesn’t focus on the European neighbor-
hood policy, but on the European neighborhood. So it focuses on the Western 
Balkans, on Russia and on Turkey, and I think the fact that the European Union 
has decided to cut those up and treat them individually is a problem for the 
EU. It is reﬂ ective partly of the problems we have in thinking geopolitically, 
in thinking geostrategically. 
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When it comes to the neighborhood, we simply don’t have the luxury of not 
thinking about neighborhood because it is actually a pretty bad neighborhood 
to live next door to. Living standards in many of the neighborhood states, 
particularly to the south, but also relatively to the east, are not satisfying – 
they are marked with high levels of corruption and organized crime, and also 
very vulnerable political systems. Th e problem we have at the moment is that 
there is a lack of ability of the EU to actually prioritize. Prioritize is what we 
consider to be the most important issue and what we should tackle within 
the neighborhood. 
Is energy policy ﬁ rst that we should have? Is it the relationship with Russia 
that should condition the way we think the eastern part of our neighbor-
hood? If we look at the way that we’ve deployed our legions and the way 
we are spending our treasure – we are spending relatively most of that in 
the Western Balkans; is that a good place to be spending it? What’s clear if 
you look at what has just being happening over the last 12 months with the 
creation of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership; 
what we constantly do  is ﬁ ddle because we don’t have a  collective agree-
ment about how we should prioritize. We try to please everybody within 
the EU and we also try to please our partners. If you look at the European 
neighborhood policy, it’s what I call sub-optimal-policy. In other words, it’s 
one of the best that one can get from what we got in terms of what the states 
are willing to sign up to, and what instruments we’ve got to deliver on, but 
there are some big gaps in that policy. One such big gap came very clear 
to us last summer – lack of conﬂ ict prevention. One of the real neglects in 
our policy for the neighborhood is the fact that we have not thought about 
the frozen conﬂ ict in any serious way; we haven’t tried to turn them from 
frozen to much more manageable conﬂ icts. Th is is a real neglect on the part 
of our collective policies and it is really tough task to get the EU to resolve 
it. However, I don’t think we made enough serious eﬀ ort. 
So we’ve got a bit of problems on the geopolitics. 
Turning to the means; as for the issue of delivery, I have three questions for 
myself: should the EU really be delivering in the neighborhood? What are we 
actually asking the EU to deliver? How do we measure the successful delivery? 
And we can ask these questions also of the relationships between the EU and 
the US as strategic partners. 
One of the things the EU used to be rather good at, particularly with the 
recent enlargement process, was thinking in the medium and the long term. 
Th ere is a sort of short-termism, within and across the member states of the 
EU that’s obviously functional when we ﬁ nd ourselves in the economic crisis, 
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but it is also a function of the fact that we are not willing to confront the dif-
ﬁ cult choices; we are getting worse working long-term; and we used to pride 
ourselves of being better on the long term than the US was.
How do we measure the successful delivery capacity? In terms of political 
will, which is absolutely central requirement of capacity delivery. Just contrast-
ing the situation in the UK on Turkey, which is almost a pole opposite extreme 
from France, where we have no discussions about Turkish accession from top 
to bottom. And there is a very small constituency of people interested in that, 
which is not a good thing for the UK, and not a good thing for the EU.
Second point on the capacity delivery: the EU has broadly got the right 
instruments, and it has broadly got the right resources. Th e problem is there 
is still this open question of ﬁ nality. What are they for? What are we supposed 
to be driving towards? 
We face a couple of key constrains, in terms of really being a decent strategic 
partnership. Th e ﬁ rst, internal one is the institutional arrangement that we’ve 
currently got within the EU, which isn’t good for addressing some of the chal-
lenges that we face. We have also policies working one against the other; we 
have our policy on internal security that works against the ambition to improve 
our relationships with our neighbors, like visa facilitation as a short term. It 
is really something that the partners want but something they are not getting 
in the way that they hoped they might.
Lastly, we simply don’t junk policies that don’t work. And you can see this 
very clearly. Th ere is a  question about whether the policy we have, needs 
a radical departure. But just think about the Mediterranean as one part of the 
neighborhood. We are going through a whole series of iterations and forms of 
relationships between the EU and the Mediterranean, most recently with the 
Union for the Mediterranean. We simply have not been able to put a close on 
the policies that we have. We cannot rip it up and have a really fundamental 
rethink of the relations, if it isn’t working. And ﬁ nal point, which is one of 
the things I’d like to see in the next report – there are some benchmarks for 
the relationships between the US and the EU, moments in which you really 
evaluate whether the relationship or the policy is actually working. It’d be very 
nice to have a whole series of benchmarks by which we can say: yes, we are 
more convergent in this area or there are some areas in which we are diverging 
and we hadn’t anticipated that there’d be a divergence.
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Thomas Spiller
I am very happy to be here as a private sector representative. First of all, 
SAS program is not the Scandinavian Airline, but a US software company. 
Th e topic of neighborhood is very interesting and I am very glad that the 
Mediterranean regions were mentioned as part of the concept. On the business 
side, if one looks at the map, at our neighbors, Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Syria, Turkey, Balkans, Caucasus and Russia, all of this could become our natural 
extraterritorial market; it could become what Latin America is for Brazil and 
what Canada and Mexico are for the US and what East Asia is for China. Business 
is not waiting for policy makers to take the right step. We are investing in those 
regions, we are buying from them and they are buying from us. 
Th at’s what I can call an arch of opportunities which is naturally surround-
ing Europe from south to north. And there you ﬁ nd a huge market, with a very 
young population, especially in the Mediterranean region, a decent level of 
education in most countries, and especially people who are simply eager to 
have a better life. From Libya to the Balkans, people simply aspire to have a car, 
a fridge, a TV; it’s the same everywhere. I visited Iran not long ago, and it is 
the same there, people want to have a better life, to have DVD players, and to 
join Facebook. People are just people! Th e regime is diﬀ erent, but the citizens 
are not. In terms of business, the huge opportunity is simply based on how 
we walk with policy makers to address the way our relationships are. Here is 
a recommendation for your paper in terms of concrete steps to take in order 
to make these relations between the EU and the US and those countries better. 
Let’s help them to achieve the rule of law, because this is the key for business. 
Transparency is another key issue for business but also for all of us, for all the 
citizens. Another crucial thing is education; our task is to help those countries 
to do a better job in educating their young people, girls in particular. 
Let me make a  point on the last panel on democracy, which was very 
interesting. Without jobs, without future for the kids, without food on the 
table, words like democracy or similar concepts seem quite vague. You need 
to have those terms, you need to have the concepts, but you also need to 
have the means to apply those concepts in the real life, otherwise it might 
become just a  dream. Th at’s where the help and collaboration between 
think-tanks and policy makers in business is very important because we are 
on the ground, we have thousands of employees, local employees and we 
know the local reality.
As to the arch of opportunities that naturally exists around Europe; in this 
respect, the EU and the US have the same interest. Th is is convergence. We 
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have the same interest, be it Siemens, AT&T or any other company – it’s the 
same for us, and it’s about jobs, it’s about people. If we want to maintain the 
same life style at least, pay for retirements, we will have to have immigration 
in Europe; maybe a  diﬀ erent kind of immigration, maybe a  more selective 
immigration, just as the US are trying to get more skilled people; but we 
will need to replace the loss of population. In Italy, the population curve is 
not very positive on the long term; in Russia the situation is even worse. We 
need immigration and this arch for opportunity, from the Mediterranean to 
the Caucasus, may help us if we address its people with the right policy and 
the right tools that might help us to ﬁ ll that gap in Europe. At the same time, 
such a task is kind of political suicide. So, we need to be a little smarter, in 
confronting our citizens’ fears. We need to do it, so let’s try to ﬁ nd the best 
way to do it. We have to engage those countries because the risk is that, due 
to the climate change for instance, with the huge impact in Africa, we will 
see massive displacement of population. I  remember the CIA report from 
two years ago that predicted that millions of people would be moving north 
because of the climate change. Moving north means moving to our countries. 
Going from Africa to the US is more diﬃ  cult; going from Africa to the EU is 
quite easy as we know. Let’s try to be really productive and help those people 
who have bad technology, bad education, bad investments, because that’s our 
own future. Th at would be my second concrete recommendation. 
On Turkey; it’s a huge market. I will not say yes or no to the question of 
their EU membership, but the important thing is that they need to have clar-
ity. EU needs to tell them yes, maybe in 15 years, or no. Let me give you one 
example why: in the business world, we started to see signs which are quite 
worrying for the US companies in Turkey. Turkey started to really implement 
EU regulations into the Turkish legal system, in order to show the EU they’re 
ready to join the EU; and it made life more diﬃ  cult for certain US corpora-
tions. And this is a point that the EU and the US should work together on, 
with a convergence. Business needs clarity, it needs long term transparency. 
Say yes, or no; you know, in 1966 we told them yes, and they never forgot! For 
European companies, this is not only about Turkey; it’s about access to the 
Middle East in the south and all the Turkish speaking countries in the north. 
Th ose are huge markets; those people have oil and gas, and lots of mineral 
resources. Th ere is more to that than just Turkey at stake. 
As for the diﬀ erent EU and US views of Russia, when you talk about energy 
security in Washington, you don’t think of Russia, you think of Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia or Nigeria. We just don’t see the Russian question in the same 
way when it comes to energy security because the supply is not the same. All 
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those things matter to all of us; the rule of law matters in Russia, and there is 
a question mark about that in Russia. We really need to engage with that as well.
When it comes to the Balkans, I was ashamed as a European citizen that 
we couldn’t ﬁ nd a solution by ourselves; that we had to ask the Americans 
to intervene. It happened because we don’t have the right mechanism when 
it comes to defense and security policy. I  don’t have a  crystal ball but if 
things get bad in the Balkans again, I  do  hope that we would be able to 
do something about it and solve the situation before calling on the US army. 
Th at’s my wish, not my company policy of course, because we don’t have one, 
but my citizen’s view. Th e same goes for Afghanistan. Europe needs to assist 
the Americans in Afghanistan and to show some eﬀ ort because the long 
term development of the country is a common interest. From the business 
perspective, we believe that there is huge potential in Afghanistan; therefore, 
it is essential that we adopt more consistent policy between the EU and the 
US. And we’d better do it fast. 
Q&A
I’d like to pick up on Turkey and the questions about what the US position or 
Obama’s views on it are. Th ere is a sort of change when Obama merely expressed 
a view about what would be in the strategic interest of the US, rather than to 
tell the EU what to do. He said it was in the interest of US for Turkey to join 
the EU for stabilizing the region. It seems that it shuts down discussions when 
president Sarkozy says: “Don’t tell us what to do.” Th at’s maybe what he wanted 
to do by giving his view of Turkey, but I would listen to one of the voices in this 
context, that it should be understood in a diﬀ erent way. Will Turkey join the 
EU? Turkey is the candidate country – it is engaged in accession negotiations, 
stop there. I found it frustrating from the outside, listening to the Turkey talk 
as a sort of tennis match. 
Nicolas Jabko
Sarkozy didn’t really shut down the discussion in the way you presented it; 
Obama was expressing the national interest but the national interest of the US 
is not necessarily the national interest of everybody. Obama didn’t present it 
as a national interest of the US that Turkey should become a member of the 
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EU. He said Turkey should become a member of the EU and on this Europeans 
have the right to disagree, just like Obama would have a right to disagree if the 
Europeans push him to incorporate Mexico into the US. EU made the decision 
to initiate negotiation – maybe this was a mistake, but there is still another 
decision to be made as to what the ﬁ nal stage of the negotiation should be, 
even though it looks like it is a little bit on automatic pilot. I think the fact 
that you have a  treaty which is after all a  political decision that everybody 
understands, a treaty for which there is no preset menu, means that, indeed, 
it’s still a debate. And there should be a debate. As to the problem of clarity, and 
the lack of clarity, the problem that we are facing with the decision on Turkey 
is that there are pros and cons. And it’s diﬃ  cult to have a clear view. Th e best 
response that we can give them at this point is “maybe.” It’s not the clear “yes” 
or the clear “no,” even though they say that they need to know. In fact, they 
know that the EU will not give them that answer at this point, because they 
do understand that this disagreement exists in the EU and maybe it is not such 
a big problem as they often say. Turkey has said that they want nothing less 
than membership, and they don’t want a privileged partnership. When giving 
a choice between a privileged partnership or nothing, I bet they would choose 
a privileged partnership, and it would be in their interest to do so. If you look 
at the rhetoric of the Turkish government in the past couple of years, it has 
actually changed, from being maximalist to basically saying, “even if we don’t 
get into the EU in the end, it is still in our interest to respect the Copenhagen 
criteria and to do everything that the EU wants us to do in order to become 
a member state of the EU”. Th ey understand the best interest of Turkey is to 
democratize, to become more prosperous, more open in all kinds of ways, to 
get better governance, and if they don’t get the EU membership in the end, 
they will not necessarily suﬀ er from that. 
We have to calm down a bit when it comes to the issue of Turkey, and not 
consider that as a main, core break issue, considering that you can actually 
have a functioning partnership between Turkey and the EU without danger 
of the collapse of the EU, which was rightly pointed out. 
Richard Whitman
My position on Turkey is pretty much straightforward. Th e decision was 
made. Th at was the moment in which member states really took the view they 
should have had the courage of their conviction. It is really unfortunate that 
we are where we are, because it’s going to have a whole series of unfortunate 
and unattended consequences. 
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What actually do you mean if you say, “Well, there is no EU strategic interest”? 
It was said the EU perhaps lacks the geopolitical gene. It’s clear that EU foreign 
policy decision making process is deﬁ nitely rather slow. And one would want to 
add: I wish the American foreign policy and strategic decision making process 
will be a little bit slower from time to time. Better decisions can come out of that 
than we have seen when it was very fast. Is it a disadvantage or an advantage: 
the way that European foreign policy consensus is reached? First, I would claim 
the EU common foreign policy is not that old, we are still in a learning process 
and we are in a process of strategic consensus building that is well on its way 
but still a glass empty or full—it depends on how you look at it. Second, on the 
lost geopolitical gene, is that a deﬁ ciency or is it evolutionary progress? Is it 
a good or a bad thing to address the geopolitical problems of the international 
relations crisis that the world is facing? Th e third aspect is the lack of ability 
to prioritize. True enough, but if you prioritize well. If you get your priorities 
wrong, it’s a bad thing. 
Tomáš Weiss
I  will start with the EU strategic interest. I  agree that the long decision 
making is not a problem as such. Th e problem is if there is no result in the 
end, and that is, unfortunately, the result of EU policy making on many 
issues. Th e capability to deliver is missing. If I look at it only as a glass half 
empty – to some extent it may be – the question is whether we have enough 
time to develop some kind of glass 3/4 full. Th at would be part of the answer 
for the missing gene for geopolitics, and I would take up Nicolas’s idea of the 
class with the bully, rather with the class of bullies in which you are the only 
intellectual small weak guy. Th at means – it might be that in the end when 
you are an adult – you’ll be the smartest, with the best career, but only if you 
survive the beating.
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Richard Whitman
On the question of the European foreign policy decision making process, 
I actually think on a day to day basis this makes a bit of a paradox. Th e EU is not 
bad in taking foreign policy decisions; this capacity even improved over the last 
decade. Th e problems is, let me borrow here the idea of Lego: Denmark’s great 
contribution to civilization. If you buy it, it comes in a box with a fantastic 
picture on it; but then you look at what happens to kids when they play with 
Lego: they just put the bricks together and make this kind of shape that looks 
like nothing. Th at’s the way we kind of build European foreign policy. We have 
bricks, we have a nice little policy on Burma-Myanmar, a nice little policy on 
Georgia, and the problem is what to adopt in terms of an aggregation of a clear 
sense of what it is that we really want to do with our foreign policy. And that’s 
the case of the point about the gene, whether we reached the highest possible 
evolution as a sort of international political entity. I wish that it were so. Th e 
problem is, 5 years ago we might reassure ourselves with the view we could 
have achieved something. Th e problem is that the Chinese in particular have 
risen up much earlier than we expected, and their thinking is in slightly diﬀ er-
ent terms from ourselves, which means we are not sure whether we have the 
luxury any longer to think in broad terms. We have to recognize the reality of 
the fact that some parts of the world were diﬀ erent in the past. We no longer 
have the opportunity to play around with the freedom that we had in the past 
because we face tough competition and the objectives that we saw in terms of 
development policy for, let’ say, sub-Saharan Africa are now against Chinese 
foreign policy objectives. I am just not sure whether we don’t need some kind 
of genetic transplant, and that’s where the Americans can help us. Because 
they are largely responsible for thinking strategically during the Cold War; we 
outsourced our geostrategic thinking to them.

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Part II – Policy Papers
Transatlantic trade and 
WTO-related issues
(with particular focus on agriculture)
By Jean-Christophe Bureau (Notre Europe), with contributions by 
Jean-Philippe Gervais (North Carolina State University), 
Joe Guinan (German Marshall Fund, Brussels), 
Giovanni Annania (University of Calabria) and Alexandre Gohin (INRA)
A disappointing record
Th e EU-US trade relation has been cloudy during the last decade. Discus-
sions regarding an EU-US free trade area initiated by Commissioner Brittan 
in the 1990s and brieﬂ y revived by Chancellor Merkel in 2007 have only led 
to somewhat symbolic decisions.¹ Even modest trade facilitation agreements, 
such as the 1998 Agreement on mutual recognition of standards, have not 
been fully implemented. Since 2001, the two entities have often appeared 
more as enemies than partners in the Doha negotiations. Since the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) they have had numerous disputes over 
agriculture, steel, aircraft, services, taxation systems and various regulations. 
Other disagreements, not brought to the WTO, have been numerous. Several 
1)  It it a bit unclear how Chancellor Merkel’s call for a EU-US free trade agreement was taken by the US. The proposal was seen 
as Plan B for a failure of multilateral negotiations given that, at the same time, Chancellor Merkel indicated that giving the 
Doha talks a final chance to come up with an agreement was a priority.
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of them have led to a bilateral compromise that is still considered as unpalat-
able by one of the party (e.g. the “open skies” agreement, public procurement 
in the military sector, etc.). 
In the agricultural and food area, many problems persist, even though 
many issues look relatively minor and technical when put in perspective with 
broader transatlantic geopolitical interests. Th e EU clings to high tariﬀ s and 
regulatory restrictions in sectors of importance for US exporters such as meat 
and maize. Both the EU and US agencies de facto ban imports of some other 
party’s agricultural products because of SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) 
regulations. Many issues regarding intellectual property and mutual recogni-
tion of processing techniques remain unsolved. 
Reasons for pessimism
It is still too early to assess how the recent US presidential elections and 
the new conditions for cooperation created by the ﬁ nancial crisis will provide 
a boost to transatlantic relations. However, there have been many reasons for 
pessimism during the recent years. 
Th e global environment was hardly providing the conditions for smoother 
trade relations in the coming years. Protectionist forces seemed to experience 
a redux on both sides of the Atlantic for the last ﬁ ve years. Th e attitude of 
public opinion towards trade had also become increasingly negative in the EU 
as well as the US. Th reats to pull out of major international trade agreement 
by candidate Obama during the primaries seemed to meet strong support. Th e 
US Congress has shown that it was increasingly reluctant to sign trade deals 
and keen to pass protectionist legislation. In some EU countries, words such 
as “free trade” or “globalization” are seen as intrinsically negative in recent 
polls. In the food and agricultural sector, the recent farm bill passed by the 
US Congress is seen as a provocation in the EU. Th e WTO incompatibility of 
this bill was considered is as another symbol of the contempt shown by the 
US for international rules and global governance. Europeans have taken note 
that Senator Obama supported this bill and that it was not a product of the 
Bush administration they usually accuse of unilateral policy. In Europe, this 
US farm bill is also used by pro-farmers lobbies as an excuse for clinging to 
protectionist and interventionist farm policies.
One should not ignore that trade disputes refer to fundamental diﬀ erences 
in the social model. Th is is particularly the case of some recent disputes such as 
those on genetic engineering, hormone treated meat, geographical indications, 
competition policies or environmental issues. Th ey all go well beyond simple 
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trade barriers, and result from diﬀ erent choices regarding public regulations 
by democratically elected bodies. Worryingly, the convergence in social as 
well as economic values between the EU and US, which characterized the post 
World War II period, seems to have has stalled. ² Th e situation in Europe was 
recently qualiﬁ ed as “global backlash against the spread of American ideas 
and customs”. ³ In deep America, the distrust for Europeans seems to have 
increased dramatically, so much that a  trip in Europe of a  US presidential 
candidate led to a decline in his popularity. Th e election of Barack Obama, who 
seems to be hugely popular in European countries, might change things a lot, 
but for the last few years, the image of the US in most of the “old Europe” was 
that of a semi-theocracy destroying the planet by refusing to curb greenhouse 
gases emissions and trashing international agreements on a weekly basis. In the 
same time, Americans were seeing Europe as a breeding ground for terrorism, 
Europeans as free riding their global security at the US taxpayer’s expense, 
while the predictable decline of their economy and their political inaction 
make it safer to expand US law territoriality (hence the Helms-Burton and 
Patriot Act, CIA latitude with EU sovereignty, etc.).⁴ None of this was exactly 
a good background for a trade agreement. 
Finally, the economic and political outlook is gloomy in both entities. Th e 
EU could be heading for a major constitutional crisis. After the blows of suc-
cessive referenda, Euroskeptical governments in several of the new member 
states, Europe could face major destabilization if the British voters elected 
a conservative government, which might be the most Euroskeptical adminis-
tration since 1973. Th is would make it more diﬃ  cult to isolate loose bolts such 
as Ireland and Poland within the Council. In practice, this could lead to “cherry 
picking” bits of the diﬀ erent treaties, even perhaps a dismantling of the Union’s 
core policies while members opting out from major institutions. None of this 
would help international negotiations in trade as in any other area. In the US, 
the incredible capacity for resilience of the American economy should not be 
underestimated. However, given the fundamental economic imbalances that 
have been piling up for decades, the housing and ﬁ nancial crises might this 
2)  See Williams (2007)
3)  This is a conclusion of the German Marshall Fund study (Glenn 2008). The Pew Centre found in 2008 that only 30 percent of 
German citizens have a positive view of the US, down from 78 percent in 2001. The perception that the United States acts 
unilaterally in international policy decisions is now shared by 90 percent in Sweden and France, and 70 percent or more in 
Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia and Spain. 
4)  Interestingly, Chamorel (2007) points out the responsibility of think-tanks in the rising of anti-European attitude in the US, 
referring for example to the December 2002 issue of the American Enterprise Institute Review whose articles read as follows: 
“The European Disease” ; “German-American Requiem”, “Continental Drift”, “Old and the in the Way”, “American won’t listen to 
Europe”s Appeasers”, “The Real Problem is European Elites”, “Goodbye Europe”, “Irritating and Irrelevant”, “Europe Loses its Mind”….
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time have long term consequences on growth and employment at a time where 
inequalities have raised considerably, threatening the social consensus. Th e 
prospect for recession and a long period of stagﬂ ation threatens both the EU 
and the US. Th ese are conditions for populist policies and trade liberalization 
is often one of the ﬁ rst scapegoats.
Some hope
Beyond rhetoric and political deﬁ ance, one must acknowledge that trans-
atlantic relations have never been really “bad” on the trade side. Oﬃ  cials 
participating to meetings under the Transatlantic Business Dialogue like to 
point out that trade between the two entities has kept increasing and that 
“Ninety nine per cent of trade relations between the USA and the European 
Union are totally unproblematic”. Th e Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies points out a  large number of indicators of trade relations that are 
particularly green. ⁵ Trade barriers are already low in industrial products 
and even for major agricultural exports such as US soybean and EU wine 
and spirits. Th e EU is the most important commercial market in the world 
for corporate America. Th e service economies of the EU and US are increas-
ingly intertwined.⁶ Transatlantic investment accounts for the largest share 
of Foreign Direct Investment in each entity. Foreign aﬃ  liate sales have been 
increasing considerably. Europe is also a  key source of capital for the US 
economy. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation has made some progress. So 
has transatlantic research. Overall, transatlantic economic integration has 
signiﬁ cantly increased over the last decade in spite of recent tensions. And 
the EU and the US have made far more eﬀ ective concessions to each other in 
disputes under the WTO than they did under the GATT.
Recent events might even improve the overall atmosphere for a  serene 
EU-US dialogue. Th e recent presidential election was seen as a disapproval of 
the Bush-Cheney administration in Europe, and it has greatly improved the 
image of the US in the European population. Th e President elect Obama has 
been less negative on trade agreements during the ﬁ nal months of the campaign. 
Th e concerted attempts to deal with the ﬁ nancial crises have renewed both the 
idea of a European economic policy, and the cause of transatlantic cooperation. 
In the EU, Eurosceptics have lost battles, Prime Minister Gordon Brown has 
shown leadership and the victory of the Tories in the next election no longer 
5)  See the Chapter by Hamilton and Quinlan in Andrews et al (2006).
6)  See Hamilton and Quilnan (2007).
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seems that certain. Th is meets a growing sense of common interests between 
transatlantic powers in a world were emerging countries are demanding their 
share of inﬂ uence. Th e fact that NATO meets less criticisms, and that even a long 
skeptical country like France seems willing to join is no coincidence. In brief, 
both the idea of European integration and of transatlantic cooperation seem to 
be experiencing a revival. However, one can only show limited optimism about 
transatlantic relations, unless there is a major political will.
Background: EU and US trade policies
The EU trade policy
Th e EU trade policy has been characterized by two main orientations. 
Th e ﬁ rst one has been multilateralism. Th e EU strongly played the card of 
multilateral negotiations. In spite of a  rather conservative position in agri-
cultural negotiations, the WTO has been a cornerstone of EU trade policy: 
For a  decade the Commission had implemented a  de facto moratorium on 
bilateral agreements. Th e other major feature of EU’s trade policy has been 
the ambitious set of preferences granted to developing countries. In this 
area, the EU has long played the card of non-reciprocal preferences, with 
a strong bias towards Member states’ former colonies and Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). Th is has resulted in special tariﬀ s for overseas territories 
and for African-Caribbean and Paciﬁ c countries. Th e EU Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) covers most products and basically all developing and 
transition countries are eligible to tariﬀ  cuts. However, the depth of these cuts 
is often very limited, except for LDCs. Th e “GSP+” which expands the former 
“GSP Drug” regime provides signiﬁ cant concessions to countries that ﬁ ght drug 
traﬃ  cking, or implement ambitious policies in the environmental or human 
rights. In practice, it mostly beneﬁ ts to Central American and Andean states. 
Th e EU uses tariﬀ  concessions to support troubled states in attempt to help 
stabilization (Balkans, Palestinian states). Th e recent Economic Partnership 
Agreements replaced the Cotonou agreement with African Caribbean and 
Paciﬁ c countries on a reciprocal basis, even though liberalization is undertaken 
asymmetrically, with the EC liberalizing at a faster speed. Many diﬀ erent tariﬀ s 
regimes coexist, but few tariﬀ s are actually speciﬁ c to a single country and the 
EU policy has never be genuinely “bilateral”. With the exception of a few micro 
states (Andorra, Faroe islands, Vatican, San Marino), only Turkey is part of 
a custom union with the EU since 1996.
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Nevertheless, the EU policy recently experienced an inﬂ exion. Th e 
multiplication of bilateral agreements by the US led the EU to fear that it 
was losing ground in its trade relations with dynamic economies in Asia and 
South America. Th is, with the frustration that some of the issues important 
for the EU (e.g. geographical indications, environment linked issue) were 
impossible to discuss satisfactorily in the multilateral arena has led the EU 
to consider alternatives to multilateralism. Several bilateral trade agreements 
have been signed in the 2000s. Several bilateral and regional negotiations, 
as well as discussions engaged by the Commission (i.e. without a  formal 
negotiating mandate from the Council) are also ongoing. Th e EU sees 
bilateral agreements as broad association with a cultural and cooperation 
dimension, opposing a  model of “deep integration” compared to the US 
“shallow integration”. 
Th e bilateral agreements of the EU include a  series of association agree-
ments with South Mediterranean countries, which were signed at the end of 
the 1990s or in the 2000s. Most of them followed pre-existing trade conces-
sions, most of the time non-reciprocal, that dated back from the independence 
of these countries from colonial powers in the 1950s and the 1960s. Th e situa-
tion is diﬀ erent for a new generation of bilateral agreements including South 
Africa, Chile and Mexico. In particular, the association agreement with Chile 
is presented as a  reference for future agreements. Not only does it include 
tariﬀ  concessions, investments, public procurement, intellectual property, 
competition policy provisions, but also a large dimension of trade facilitation, 
with custom procedures and SPS provisions. 
US trade policy
Th e United States has constantly pursued the multilateral deﬁ nition of trade 
rules. However, recent US administrations have been less shy than the EU in 
the parallel development of regional and bilateral agreements. Th e former US 
Trade Representative Zoellick has been clear on this topic since 2001, argu-
ing that bilateral agreements were not more than alternative to the limited 
progress in the multilateral area, but also good way to bring more actors 
to accept multilateral trade liberalization. Th e recent US administrations 
promoted the “multiple fronts” and “competition in liberalization” approach 
at a period when the EU was self imposing a moratorium on bilateral trade 
deals. As a result, the recent WTO review stresses the fact that the US has 
mostly liberalized its trade regime on a preferential basis since the previous 
review (WTO, 2008). Th e US was involved in a free trade agreement with 14 
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countries in early 2008, up from three at the start of the current administra-
tion in early 2001. Recently, however, the US Congress slowed down or even 
opposed attempts from the Bush administration to sign new bilateral deals.
If the US has been more active in bilateral agreements, it has also followed 
a rather similar approach to the EU one relative to developing countries. Th e 
policy towards least developed countries also led to impose zero duties to 
a large number of goods under speciﬁ c GSP provisions (although not as broad 
scoped as the EU Everything but arms initiative). Th e regular GSP grants tariﬀ  
concessions on a list of products that is more limited than the EU one, but the 
depth of the tariﬀ  concessions is greater, with all eligible products entering duty 
free. Unilateral concessions also reach particular regions, i.e. the Caribbean 
Basin, Andean countries, sub-Saharan Africa. In such cases, the tariﬀ s are 
zero but the list of products covered is much larger than under the GSP. As 
a general rule, US tariﬀ s are in general lower than the EU ones, at least in the 
agricultural sector. However, the US relies more than the EU on anti-dumping 
measures as a trade instrument.
Annex 1 provides a list of the major free trade agreements and tariﬀ  conces-
sions by the EU and the US. 
Trade 
European Union
Th e EU is the world’s leading exporter and the second-largest importer of 
goods. Th is is due a lot to Germany, who is now the largest exporter in the 
world, ahead of China. Th e EU is also the largest importing entity, and the EU27 
has a large trade deﬁ cit in 2007 (the overall trade deﬁ cit of EU27 with the rest 
of the world was 186 billion euros, which also happens to be roughly the trade 
deﬁ cit with China). Th e considerable trade surplus of Germany is matched by 
growing trade deﬁ cits in the UK, Spain, France and Greece. 
Imports from China have recently exceeded those from the US, traditionally 
the ﬁ rst source of EU imports. Th e US now accounts for 12 of EU imports 
(China for 16 and Russia 11) and for 21 of EU exports (Switzerland and 
Russia for 7 and China for 5). Th e trade balance with the US remains posi-
tive( 80 bn euros) while it has become strongly negative with Russia and China. 
Th e EU also remains the world’s leading exporter and importer of com-
mercial services. Th e UK accounts the largest share of EU service exports, 
followed by Germany and France.
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United States
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries are the largest 
outlets for US exports (22 of which go to Canada and 13 to Mexico). Th e EU 
is the second largest export market for US products. Canada, traditionally the 
largest US supplier (16 of US imports) has been overtaken by China in 2007. 
Th e trade deﬁ cit of the US exceeds 800 billion USD over the past 12 months. 
Th e EU (in particular the UK and Germany), is the largest outlet for US 
exports of services, amounting to more than half of the US exports, while 
Asia only represents one fourth and Latin America less than 12 percent. In 
terms of foreign direct investments, the EU is, for the US, both a source and 
a destination that far exceeds the rest of the world (in particular the UK and 
the Netherlands).
Trade ﬂ ows between the EU and the US are presented in Figure 1. Clearly, 
agricultural trade should be put in perspective with the large bilateral trade 
in industrial sectors: Th e sum of all US exports in the 24 statistical chapters 
corresponding to agricultural, food and ﬁ sheries products amounts to only 27 
percent of the US exports in one industrial sector (sector 83 in the Harmonized 
system, i.e. “nuclear reactors, boilers , machinery and mechanical appliances; 
parts thereof ”). Th e ﬁ gure is only 21 percent for the EU.
In the agricultural sector only (Figure 2), the main EU exports to the US 
are wine and spirits, by far. US agricultural exports to the EU are mainly 
fruits, including citrus and fruit juice, oilseeds products (cakes and feed-
stuﬀ s) and cereals.
Transatlantic agreements
Over the recent years, the transatlantic dialogue has brought little except 
some symbolic agreements and rearguard eﬀ orts in conﬂ ict resolution. 
Enhanced cooperation among regulators has not prevented bitter disputes 
from arising, and the transatlantic political conﬂ icts have burdened the trade 
relationship (see Andrews et al, 2006 for details). Nevertheless, the oﬃ  cial 
motto of the EU Commission is that “Transatlantic trade is at the heart 
of the EU’s bilateral relations, in particular with the aim of meeting global 
challenges”. Th e EU stated goal is to “encourage the elimination of non-tariﬀ  
barriers” with the US. Th e same kind of wording is used by the US Trade 
Representative. In practice, some progress has been made on regulatory 
issues. Recent bilateral agreements between the EU and the US in the trade/
market openness area include:
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 ■ Air transport agreement (2007), i.e. the one mentioned above which is seen 
as particularly frustrating by many Europeans because of its asymmetry.
 ■ Agreement on concessions in the schedules of central and eastern European 
countries that joined the European Union (2006), i.e. a  rather technical 
revision of the concessions in order to cope with the enlargement and the 
WTO framework.
 ■ Agreement on trade in wine (2006). It includes some trade facilitation 
provisions, including a mutual recognition of wine-making practices and 
the limitation of use of certain “semi-generic” terms to wines originating 
in the EU for the US market.⁷
 ■ Agreement on the method for calculating the duty on rice imports (2005).
 ■ Agreement on custom cooperation, focusing on the security of sea-
container and other shipments (2004)
 ■ Agreement on regulatory compliance of marine equipment, which provides 
the right to sell in the EU equipments ﬁ lling US requirements and vice 
versa (2004).
 ■ Agreement on sanitary measures to protect public and animal health in 
trade in live animals and animal products, including the progressive rec-
ognition of the equivalence of sanitary measures, the recognition of animal 
health status, the application of regionalization and the improvement of 
communication and cooperation (2003).
At the June 2005 US-EU Summit, the US administration and the EU Com-
mission issued the Roadmap for US-EU Regulatory Cooperation to provide 
a framework for cooperation on a range of horizontal and sectoral areas.
At the EU-US Summit on 30 April 2007, the EU and US signed the “Fra-
mework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration between the USA 
and the EU”. Th e goal is to foster cooperation and reduce trade and invest-
ment barriers through a multi-year work program in such areas as regulatory 
cooperation, intellectual property rights, investment, secure trade, ﬁ nancial 
markets, and innovation. Th is framework included the establishment of the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). Th e TEC brings together those Members 
of the European Commission and US Cabinet Members who carry the political 
responsibility for closer economic ties. It relies on input from Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue, the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue, and the Transatlantic 
7)  There are some limitations to the use of names such as Burgundy, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Claret, Haut, Sauterne, Hock, 
Madeira, Malaga, Marsala, Moselle, Port, Retsina, Rhine, Sauterne, Sherry, and Tokay in the US but with exceptions for those 
that were using this term before 2005. Because the agreement does not fully ban the use of EU appellations of origin in the US 
while allowing terms that were previously prohibited by the EU, the agreement is not particularly well perceived by EU producers.
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Legislators Dialogue that existed previously. Th e three dialogues include summit 
meetings on a regular basis. In particular the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue 
is the formal response of the European Parliament and the US Congress to the 
commitment in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, to enhanced parliamen-
tary ties between the European Union and the United States. 
Th e trade component of the Framework agreement is limited. It mainly 
refers to trade facilitation (standards, exchanges of information, control 
duplication avoidance) with a strong emphasis on security and safety issues 
(custom partnership against terrorism, electronic security, etc.) and on com-
mon intellectual property rights enforcement. Th e TEC was established to 
“help meeting economic partnership objectives and harmonize regulations”, in 
addition to important issues such as ﬁ nding a common answer to road safety 
and develop alternatives for animal testing of cosmetics. 
Th ese limited initiatives fall short of an ambitious free trade agreement as 
envisaged by former Commissioner Brittan years earlier. However, the fact 
that regulatory aspects are emphasized should not be seen as negative. In 
many cases, transatlantic dispute refer to non tariﬀ  issues. In addition, there 
are signs that an ambitious eﬀ ort on technical issues aiming at facilitating 
trade signiﬁ cantly boost trade ﬂ ows, compared to other agreements where this 
aspect has not been emphasized.⁸ In particular, given the obstacles to trade 
that are being created by safety/ counterterrorism oriented regulations that are 
creating signiﬁ cant barriers to transatlantic trade, more integrated inspection/
custom procedures are more than useful. One should also keep in mind that 
the ﬁ rst meeting of the TEC took place in November 2007, and even if the 
record does not look particularly impressive, it is a sign of an attempt by US 
and European authorities to minimize unnecessary regulatory divergences to 
facilitate transatlantic trade and investment.
The EU and US position regarding WTO issues
The lack of a common strategy
Th e US and the EU have considerable common interests regarding the WTO. 
Cooperation would have helped them pushing forward several strategic common 
issues. Th ere are areas where cooperation is actually pursued (e.g. the “behind the 
8)  This is a preliminary conclusion of the work by Bureau and Jean who compared EU bilateral agreements, in particular the 
EU-Chile one with ambitious trade facilitation provisions compared to the others. See Bureau and Jean (2008).
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scene” negotiations on non agricultural markets). However, it has not materialized 
in some important occasions where a joint opportunity was lost (e.g. defending 
the negotiation on “Singapore issues” during the 2003 Cancun meeting). 
Th ere is still lack of a  common approach in the Doha negotiation seems 
while cooperation might help pushing some issues of joint interests. Th is 
includes for example a common strategy on food security issues (cooperation 
on international stocks, on agricultural development strategies for developing 
countries, etc.) which would help stabilize the food market as well as smooth 
the tensions and conﬂ ict in agricultural negotiations. As it stands now, there is 
no coordination on the important issue of energy either, including bioenergy, 
while interactions with the agricultural markets would require a global approach.
Petty disputes with far reaching consequences
Th e EU has launched almost as many cases against the US under the WTO 
(i.e. 23 cases that led to arbitration) as it has launched against all other coun-
tries. Th e US has launched roughly the same number of cases against the EU 
if one includes cases against individual member states (see Box 1). 
Th e number of issues that were solved under the WTO framework without 
leading to a formal panel, or even at the preliminary consultation phase, shows 
that the multilateral system has provided a  satisfactory way to solve disagree-
ments. Th e threat of a WTO challenge also acted as a major driving force for 
cooperation over standards and regulatory issues.⁹. However, some of the EU-US 
disputes have under the WTO have had a far reaching symbolic value. Th e US 
challenge of the EU ban on hormone treated beef (DS26) has participated to 
turning the European public opinion against the WTO and multilateral rules. Th e 
psychological eﬀ ect has perhaps been as negative as the one of the former GATT 
ruling on tuna, which had led many environmental organizations, including 
major US ones such as the Sierra Club, to join the anti-globalization movement 
in their protests against the dispute settlement body (interestingly, the EU was 
among the parties against the US in the tuna dispute). On the other hand, the 
huge ﬁ nancial amount of retaliations allowed by the WTO against the US in the 
Foreign Sales Corporation case (DS108) has strengthened the feeling that WTO 
rules could infringe national sovereignty in the US Congress. Th e fact that the 
EU has refused to comply to the ruling of the Appellate Body in the hormones 
cases, has not helped the credibility of the WTO in the US, while the sanctions 
imposed have been largely used by the antiglobalization propaganda in the EU.
9)  See Bush and Reinhardt (2003). 
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Agricultural disagreements
In the Doha Round of negotiations, the positions of the EU and the US have 
been relatively consistent on non-agricultural goods. In the agricultural negotia-
tions, the game played by both negotiators has been complex. Both the EU and 
the US proposed concessions that made them righteous while making the other 
party appear as the “bad guy” to developing countries. Th e US stressed the need 
for further cuts in tariﬀ s, to prohibit export subsidies and to limit the number of 
as a way to single out the EU. Th e EU stressed the need to cut domestic support, 
in particular in areas such as cotton, to restrict in kind food aid and export credits. 
Even in the composition of domestic support, each party tried to push the propos-
als that were less constraining for its own farm policy and which were often the 
ones that were more constraining for the other one (de minimis support vs blue 
box, overall trade distorting support vs product speciﬁ c support ceilings, etc.). 
However, beyond this somewhat petty game, the global positions of the EU and 
US in the agricultural negotiations are much closer than they were a few years ago.
At the most recent meetings in August 2008, both the US and the EU had 
agreed that there would be signiﬁ cant cuts in tariﬀ s, subject to partial exclusions 
for sensitive products, and major reductions in the allowable level of trade-
distorting domestic support. Th e Doha Round agricultural diﬃ  culties now have 
more to do with the US and the EU on the one hand and transition countries on 
the other hand. However, the willingness of the US to conclude a ﬁ nal agreement 
in August is questionable. Had unrealistic demands from India not killed the 
negotiation, it is unclear whether the US would have accepted an agreement, in 
particular because of the sensitive issue of cotton. In addition the EU and US are 
divided on a few serious issues. Th ey include the diﬀ erent conceptions regarding 
genetically modiﬁ ed organisms (GMOs), as well as standards in general. Some 
of them correspond to genuine diﬀ erences in citizens’ concerns: GMOs are 
seen as a major potential hazard in Europe, while bacterial contamination is 
the number one focus of US consumers’ organizations working on food safety. 
Th e issue of the protection of geographical indications is also a serious source 
of divergence. Th e US is not ready to accept an extension of the protected 
denominations beyond wine and spirits. Th ey said any attempt to negotiate the 
issues would be a recipe for disaster. Th e EU makes a strong point in defending 
more protection on its indications. While the EU certainly overestimates the 
economic impacts of protected geographical denominations (in many cases the 
shift towards private brands would not be a considerable diﬃ  culty), the issue 
has now become a symbol of the one positive thing that could be retrieved from 
a WTO agreement.
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Box 1: WTO disputes (arbitrated)
DS108 – Tax treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” 
DS136 – Anti-dumping Act of 1916 
DS138 –  Imposition of countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products 
DS152 – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 
DS160 – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act 
DS165 – Import measures on certain products from the EC
DS166 – Deﬁ nitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat gluten from EC 
DS176 – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
DS186 – Section 337 of the Tariﬀ  Act of 1930 and amendments thereto 
DS200 – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and amendments thereto (“carousel”) 
DS212 – Countervailing measures concerning certain products from the EC 
DS213 –  Countervailing duties on certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel ﬂ at products from Germany 
DS214 –  Deﬁ nitive safeguard measures on imports of steel wire rod and circular welded quality line pipe 
(panel not yet composed)
DS217 – Continued dumping and subsidy oﬀ set Act of 2000 
DS225 – Anti-Dumping Duties on Seamless Pipe from Italy (panel not yet composed)
DS248 – Deﬁ nitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
DS262 – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on certain steel products 
DS294 – Laws, regulations and methodology for calculating dumping margins (‘zeroing’)
DS317 – Measures aﬀ ecting trade in large civil aircraft 
DS319 – Section 776 of the Tariﬀ  Act of 1930 
DS320 – Continued suspension of obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute 
DS350 – Continued existence and application of zeroing methodology
DS353 – Measures aﬀ ecting trade in large civil aircraft (second complaint) 
The EU brought seven other cases brought to the WTO have not led to the constitution of a panel, or the panel 
was suspended, or the parties agreed mutually on a solution. These are cases DS38- Cuban liberty and democratic 
solidarity act, DS39- Tariﬀ  increases on products from the european communities, DS63 Anti-dumping measures on 
imports of solid urea from the former German democratic republic, DS85- measures aﬀ ecting textiles and apparel 
products, DS88- Measure aﬀ ecting government procurement, DS100 – Measures aﬀ ecting imports of poultry 
products, DS118- Harbour maintenance tax, DS151- Measures aﬀ ecting textiles and apparel products (II).
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Cases launched by the US against the EU
DS26 – Measures aﬀ ecting meat and meat products (Hormones) 
DS27 – Import regime for bananas 
DS62 – Customs classiﬁ cation of certain computer equipments
DS174 –  Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuﬀ s 
DS223 – Tariﬀ -rate quota on corn gluten feed
DS260 – Provisional safeguards measures on imports of certain steel products 
DS291 – Measures aﬀ ecting the approval and marketing of biotech products (GMOs) 
DS315 – European Communities – Selected Customs Matters 
DS316 – Measures aﬀ ecting Trade in large civil aircraft 
DS375 – Tariﬀ  Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products 
The US also launched eight cases that were withdrawn after mutual agreement (DS13- Duties on imports of grain; 
DS115 – Measures aﬀ ecting the grant of copyright and neighbouring rights; DS124 Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights for motion pictures and television programs), and cases where no panel was launched or lapsed 
(DS16 Regime for the importation sale and distribution of bananas ; DS104 Measures aﬀ ecting the exportation of 
processed cheese; DS158 Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas II ; DS172 Measures Relating 
to the Development of a Flight Management System ; DS347 Measures aﬀ ecting trade in large civil aircraft II)
The US also launched cases against individual member state, including Belgium (DS 80, DS127, DS210), Denmark 
(DS83), France (DS131, DS132), Greece (DS125, DS129), Hungary (DS35), Ireland (DS68, DS82, DS130), Portugal (DS37), 
the UK (DS67), see www.wto.org for a description.
EU-US bilateral disagreements
Looking at the annual reports and websites in which the EU and the US 
gather information on their vision of “foreign trade barriers”, a  number of 
problems persist. Some of them are quite technical, and a bit out of proportion 
with the common geostrategic interests. Some others reﬂ ect more fundamen-
tal diﬀ erences in the governance or legal system, or diﬀ erent visions of what 
consumers’ protection should be.
Appendix 2 summarizes the diﬀ erent issues that are pointed out by 
both entities. Th e EU complains mainly about regulatory issues as well as 
unilateralism of US policies (and non compliance with multilateral rules). It 
is noteworthy that the EU directly targets many laws that were passed by the 
US Congress that restrict indirectly trade, but focus primarily on other issues, 
from cargo security to hurting the Cuban economy. SPS issues are high on 
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the list of EU complaints. So is intellectual property. Th ese are areas where, 
beyond technicalities, the regulatory system diﬀ ers.
EU Standards are also widely criticized by the US. Again, they often refer 
to legislation that has an indirect eﬀ ect on trade. For example, the trade 
distorting eﬀ ects of various EU Member state policies governing pharma-
ceuticals and health care products irritates the US because of the limitations 
for US companies (and the fact that by selling products at a  lower price in 
EU regulated markets, they make the US consumer pay for some of their 
ﬁ xed costs). Intellectual property rules are diﬀ erent and this triggers some 
criticisms on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁰ Th e accusation of subsidies in the 
aircraft sector are matched by similar accusations by the other party. Th e US 
Trade representative complains that US exports of commodities such as corn, 
beef, poultry, soybeans, pork, and rice are signiﬁ cantly restricted or excluded 
altogether due to restrictive EU nontariﬀ  barriers or regulatory approaches 
that often do not reﬂ ect science based decision making. 
It is noteworthy that the annual US report on foreign barriers to trade 
identiﬁ es very few barriers to US exports at the EU level, but many more 
obstacles to US exports at the Member state level. In some cases, the issues 
raised by the US Trade Representatives are also raised by EU institutions and 
refer more to the lack of European integration and the pursuit of national 
protectionist policies (also detrimental to other EU members) than to a coor-
dinated EU trade policy.
Recommendations
Th e trade relations between the EU and the US have no equivalent in the 
world. During the last decade a  common strategy existed on industry and 
services but noticeable obstacles remain in the ﬁ eld of agriculture. In aware-
ness of these facts we could formulate the following recommendations for the 
transatlantic market and WTO-related issues. 
WTO 
Both the European Union and the United States should aﬃ  rm and reiterate 
their commitment to the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations at the 
WTO. Given the interconnectedness of the global economy and the current 
worldwide economic downturn, a successful and timely conclusion of the Doha 
10)  Josling (2006), however, sees positive developments in the agricultural area, including that of geographical indications.
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start?
Round is more critical now than ever. Th e transatlantic partners should for-
mulate and articulate a common strategy to foster the trade openness agenda 
at the multilateral level in order to avoid a downward spiral of protectionist 
policies. Th e economic threat comes not only from WTO-inconsistent actions 
but from the considerable room for protectionist backsliding within existing 
multilateral commitments and disciplines. Th e latest research has shown that 
some 1 trillion in annual trade is potentially at stake, living on borrowed time 
in the gap between bound and applied tariﬀ  rates . Much of this “unsecured” 
trade is concentrated in sensitive and politically-connected industries such as 
the automotive and electronics sectors, where bailouts and other actions could 
easily trigger retaliatory responses from trading partners. Further delaying 
a Doha Round agreement will not only weaken the credibility of the WTO as 
an institution, but will preserve the considerable leeway of WTO Members 
to employ trade policies that are detrimental to the recovery of the global 
economy. Th e European Union and United States should make good use of 
the EU-US summit to prepare a common strategic approach to concluding 
the WTO negotiations in a timely fashion. 
Th e cumbersome decision-making process at the WTO needs to be addressed, 
and as major stakeholders in the world trading system the European Union and 
United States should lead the way on institutional reform at the WTO
Building block in multilateral negotiations 
In bilateral trade negotiations, the EU and the US should develop a coop-
erative framework consistent with the idea of a building block in multilateral 
negotiations. Even though there are many issues where bilateral dialogue and 
cooperation is useful, a transatlantic free trade agreement has been shown to 
be suboptimal for both entities compared to a multilateral agreement. 
In a situation in which multilateral trade negotiations are stalled, the EU and US 
could provide joint leadership on exploring alternative paths to trade liberalization 
within the realm of WTO negotiations, perhaps via ambitious tariﬀ  reductions 
for speciﬁ c industrial sectors in plurilateral agreements. Such plurilateral WTO 
agreements would allow the EU and the U.S. to make progress in areas of oﬀ ensive 
economic interests without a priori excluding other WTO Members which are 
not ready to make respective commitments at this point.
Among the ways to move jointly towards an “open regionalism”, the EU 
and US should work at making consistent their trade preferences with third 
countries. Similar rules for accessing the EU and US markets would help con-
sistency of regionalism and multilateralism. Particular eﬀ orts for harmonizing 
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trade preferences towards African countries and Latin American countries 
would serve joint interests. Indeed, this would contribute to a higher degree 
of development and stabilization.
A joint strategy for trade related security 
Th e EU and US should develop an integrated joint strategy on common 
externalities. Th is includes a joint strategy for trade related security (terrorism 
as well as pests and invasive species), but the current dialogue should be lead 
to more operational decisions. It should be extended to a common approach 
on global issues such as goods inspections but also epidemics prevention (e.g. 
avian ﬂ u) and the tackling of food security at a world level, for example by 
deﬁ ning a  joint approach to food stocks or stabilizing mechanisms for the 
world price of staple foods.
Standards 
Most EU-US trade disputes refer to standards. Th e transatlantic dialogue 
should (and to some extend does) target particularly the issue of technical 
barriers and standards. Both the EU and the US have a strategic interest to 
harmonize policies and regulations. Given the economic size of the EU and 
US and the importance of their foreign trade, common rules and regulations 
would set international standards.
Given the large diﬀ erences in the EU and US approaches on these issues and 
the huge costs of setting common standards, mutual recognition seems the 
only way forward. Th e various bodies in charge of the transatlantic dialogue 
dealing with technical issues need to be backed by a more obvious political 
willingness to make progress. Issues that show lack of progress in spite of being 
high in the TEC agenda (e.g. poultry standards) must be tackled upstream, i.e. 
by reinforcing the dialogue between safety authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic and by strengthening common research programs.
It is tempting to solve the diﬀ erences in EU and US approaches on stand-
ards by taking the case to the WTO, which is indeed the only body that is in 
the position of achieving practical decisions. However, both the EU and US 
should be cautious about the risk of stretching the WTO area of competence 
up to a dangerous point. Issues such as hormones, chemical substances or 
even animal welfare go well beyond trade. Tackling issues such as GMOs or 
carbon taxation through WTO litigation may bring responses but at the cost 
of the reject of the whole organization by citizens. Again, consensus building is 
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necessary. Public commissions including non partisan scientists which advise 
jointly the administrations of both parties in a  transparent way might help 
advocating convergence in the citizens’ concerns. Th is would be in line with 
some of the requests of the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue.
Negotiating transatlantic agreements on regulation and non-tariﬀ  barriers 
to trade on a bilateral level is both more legitimate and feasible. A forthcom-
ing European Commission study on the economic potential of eliminating 
regulatory barriers to trade with the United States should provide a good basis 
for focusing attention on the areas of greatest importance. A similar exercise 
should be contemplated on the American side, identifying economically 
relevant regulatory barriers to trade with the European Union. An approach 
similar to that employed by the European Union for the Trade and Investment 
Enhancement Agreement (TIEA) with Canada — i.e. identiﬁ cation sector-by-
sector and possibly even product-by-product of the most important issues to 
address — is worth considering as a possible model for a reasonably ambitious 
non-FTA agenda with the United States. Bilateral interaction could also build 
a  higher-proﬁ le Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to promote better-
quality regulatory dialogue and give more political guidance to regulators to 
anticipate or minimize problems before they grow into signiﬁ cant bones of 
contention. 
Building domestic support for trade
According to surveys of public opinion, free trade policies are being 
inhibited by a  public backlash on both sides of the Atlantic, one that is 
perhaps more severe in the United States but is also evident in a number of 
European countries. Trade policies need to be better prepared politically and 
more eﬀ ectively communicated on the domestic level on both sides of the 
Atlantic, particularly in times of economic diﬃ  culty when struggling workers 
and producers are resistant to the idea of more intense world competition. 
Public debate in both the United States and European Union would beneﬁ t 
from both a better articulation by policymakers of the beneﬁ ts of open trade 
to consumers and businesses and an improved use of existing policy instru-
ments to address public concerns  – e.g. US Trade Adjustment Assistance 
programs and the EU Globalization Adjustment Fund. In order to rebuild 
political support for more open trade, US and European policymakers will 
have to disperse opposition by means of public education eﬀ orts which place 
an emphasis on available instruments to deal with necessary adjustments of 
speciﬁ c sectors of the economy. 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
APPENDIX 1
EU bilateral and regional agreements 
with a tariﬀ  reduction component
Table A1: The EU Agreements including tariﬀ  concessions
Type of preferences Country
EU Custom Unions • San Marino; Vatican ; Andorra ; Feroe Islands, 
• Turkey*
EU Free Trade Agreements •  Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein under the Espace Economique Européen
• Trade agreement with Switzerland and Licthenstein
• Ceuta and Mellila
• Interim trade agreement with Croatia
















• South Africa 
• Chile
Other concessions •  GSP, including the Everything But Arms component for LDCs and GSP+ 
(mainly Central America and Andean countries).
• Cotonou agreement with ACP countries
• Overseas territories
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Table A2: US bilateral and regional agreements with a tariﬀ  reduction component
Type of preferences Country
US Free Trade Agreements • Australia
• Bahrain
•  Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA-DR) 












• GSP, including special provisions for LDCs
• ATPDEA with Andean countries
• CBERA with Caribbean countries
• AGOA with subSaharan African countries
• Palestinain authority
• Overseas territories
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Transatlantic Trade by HS2 sector, 2007, Mio Euros
Source:  Comext, Eurostat data
Billion Euros Trade
EU Exports to the US US Exports to the EU
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Transatlantic Agricultural Trade by HS2 sector, 2007, Mio Euros
Source:  Comext, Eurostat data
EU Exports to the US US Exports to the EU
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APPENDIX 2
A2.1. EU complaints about US trade barriers
Extraterritoriality and unilateralism
Th e EU sees several US laws which are not conform to international trade 
law as causing problems for EU companies. Th is is the case of the 1996 Helms 
Burton Act, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) as well as the the 1996 
“Blocking Statute” or the 2000 Iran Non-Proliferation Act, and to some extent 
the Patriot Act, that allows the US administration to apply its own sanctions 
to exports which are subject to EU Member State and EU export control 
regimes, beyond those agreed multilaterally. Th e 1974 Trade Act authorises 
the US Government to enforce US rights under any trade agreement in a way 
that is seen by the EU as based on exclusive US assessments and violating 
multilaterally agreed rules.
Several pieces of US legislation also provide scope for the business sector to 
call for unlilateral protectionism. Th e US industry can petition for the restric-
tion of imports from third countries on the grounds of national security even 
in the absence of compelling evidence (section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962), which makes this law used for pure protectionist purposes. Th e 
chemicals sector is aﬀ ected by import restrictions for certain drug precursor 
chemicals. Similarly, the Jones Act uses national security reasons to prohibit 
the use of foreign vessels. 
According to the EU, public procurement restrictions under the Buy 
America Act cover a signiﬁ cant proportion of public purchasing in the US, in 
particular in sectors such as those covered by the Department of Transporta-
tion. Th e Small Business Act also discriminates against foreign suppliers. Th e 
Berry amendment enlarges the mandatory US sourcing under the Defense 
Appropriations Act to components and materials that are not particularly 
strategic. Th is is seen as a particularly uncooperative approach from NATO 
member countries, in particularly the United Kingdom whose domestic 
defence market is particularly open to US suppliers.
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Foreign investment limitations 
Th e EU Commission complains that several US laws restrain forein invest-
ment or ownership of business. Th is is the case of the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act and subsequent legislation referring to the national 
security issues without a clear deﬁ nition of this terms, which is used quite 
extensively to limit investment and tradei n the shipping, energy and commu-
nications sectors. In the communication sector U.S. law enforcement agencies 
have imposed strict corporate governance requirements on companies seeking 
Federal Communications Commission that favour US companies. Th e EU also 
sees restrictions on the ownership of companies in the coastal and domestic 
shipping sector, in the oﬀ shore drilling sector and in the ﬁ shing sector (ﬁ sh-
ing vessel-owning entities must be at least 75 owned and controlled by U.S. 
citizens in order to receive a ﬁ shing permit), and in the attribution of licences 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
US standards and certiﬁ cation
Th e EU is sees the US unilateral measures regarding cargo safety¹¹ as setting 
out requirements such as standards for container security devices and/or smart 
box technology that have the potential to hamper the possibility for EU trade 
to compete fairly with their U.S. competitors and to excessively burden the 
EU export supply chain. Th e EU sees as a signiﬁ cant problem the low level of 
implementation and use of standards set by international standardisation bodies 
in the US. Th is combines with a number of complex US regulatory systems that 
represent a signiﬁ cant burden for EU companies.¹² EU companies also complain 
about regional strandards within the US, including those of regional and local 
authorities and those implemented by the private sector (standards for product 
safety imposed by insurance companies). In the food area, a number of states 
have banned the commercialisation and production of foie gras, in spite of the 
absence of legal status for such bans under international trade rules. Th ere are 
also diﬀ erences in standards and food safety requirements that are seen as trade 
obstacles, such as the standards for Grade-A milk products as well as provisions 
for organic products under the National Organic Program of 2001.¹³
11)  e.g. the 2002 Container Security Initiative, topped by the 2006 Safety and Accountability forEvery Port Act, the 2007 “9/11 
Commission Recommendations” and its objective to scan 100% of cargo by 2012.
12)  e.g. the burdensome US pharmaceutical approval system, the US Automobile labelling Act, the documentary and labelling 
requirement for textiles and restrictions regarding the distribution of wines and spirits.
13)  The EU and the US have entered into bilateral negotiations with a view to mutually recognising the equivalency of the organic 
production systems applied by each Party. However, the talks seem to be at a standstill since May 2004.
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Th e EU complains about the lack of recognition of EU origin by US customs 
that do not accept European certiﬁ cates of origin. Th e EU also complain about 
various pieces of border control, including import inspection fees, country 
of origin labelling, and mandatory certiﬁ cation of ‘high risk foods’. Th e US 
Merchandise Processing Fee is seen as an extra duty by EU exporters. Th e fact 
that imported wine is subject to the “gallonage tax” while most US producers 
are producers are eligible for a tax credit that oﬀ sets the consequences of such 
a tax, is also seen as a distortion of competition. Th e 2008 Farm Bill provisions 
regarding a  levy on dairy imports to ﬁ nance dairy promotion and research 
activities is also seen as a distortion of competition with signiﬁ cant potential 
consequences for EU exporters.
Th e EU also claims that various pieces of US legislation, restrict trade in 
seafood as foreign-built vessels are not eligible to receive a ﬁ shing licence.¹⁴ 
Other complains deal with the US rules of origin for textiles which aﬀ ect 
European exports of textiles containing cotton and wool, and the fact that 
agricultural commodities regulated under the Federal Marketing Orders are 
prohibited unless they are in compliance with particular characteristics set in 
the marketing order. 
SPS
Th e US is also accused of unilateralism in the veterinary area. Its own pro-
cedures regarding import control do not match those commonly agreed in the 
multilateral arena, i.e. the standards of the Oﬃ  ce International des Epizooties 
(spongiform encephalopathy). In addition, when the US follows international 
standards, the EU complain that the US uses complex and lengthy rulemaking 
procedures, taking for example several years longer than the re-acquaintance 
of an oﬃ  cial disease-free status under the global rules of the OIE. In the 
phytosanitary area, things are quite similar, given that the US requirements of 
pest risk analysis (on a genus by genus approach) can lead to several years, or 
even decades, of administrative approval even when other products with the 
same risks coming from the same production area are permitted. Horticulture 
products also face burdensome speciﬁ c approval procedures.
Th e Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, signed on 20 July 1999, provides 
a framework but the EU Commission complains that in practice this has led 
to little progress from the US administration. Th e Commission quotes the 
14)  In the fisheries sector, the EU still claims that the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, de facto bans exports of Spanish tuna 
but tthe EU has only recently ratified the Antigua Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, which is part of the conditions 
for trading tropical tuna in the US
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case of imports of molluscs as an example of the slow progress in regulatory 
cooperation, given that in spite of scientiﬁ c evidence, the lack of recognition 
of EU testing methods by the US de facto prevents European producers from 
exporting oysters and mussels to the US. Imports into the US of uncooked 
meat products (sausage, ham and bacon) have been subject to a long-standing 
prohibition. US import regulations were modiﬁ ed to permit the import of 
Parma ham, Serrano hams, Iberian hams, Iberian pork shoulders and Iberian 
pork loins. However, US still prohibits other types of uncooked meat products 
(e.g. San Daniele ham, German sausage, Ardennes ham).
US Subsidies
Th e various US agricultural subsidies have been criticized by the EU, which 
argue that its own eﬀ ort for fully decoupling farm support from production 
has not been matched by a similar eﬀ ort in the US since the 2002 farm bill 
that reverted some of the decoupling orientation of the 1997 FAIR act. Th e EU 
has launched consultations under the WTO against US subsidies for biodiesel 
through tax credits, which are seen to have contributed signiﬁ cantly to the 
huge growth of EU imports of biodiesel (a tenfold increase between 2006 and 
2007, US imports now accounting for 20 of the EU market share). 
In the area of aircrafts, the Boeing/Airbus battle has led the EU to take the 
case to the WTO, arguing that combined subsidies and tax breaks from the 
State of Wasthington, the State of Kansas, NASA and DoD amount to more 
than 20 billion dollars.
Intellectual property issues
Th e EU claims that the unilateral use of its own patent system by the US 
(while the rest of the world now follows a “ﬁ rst to ﬁ le” rule) creates problems 
for EU companies, especially considering the high U.S. litigation costs in pat-
ent matters. Th e US law is also particularly broad regarding the patentability 
of software and business methods, and the EU claims that US provisions 
concerning plant variety such as the Plant Patent Act seriously impede trade 
in breeding material for ornamental plants.
Th e EU Commission claims that despite losing a WTO case, the U.S. has not 
yet brought its Copyright Act into compliance with the WTO Agreement. In 
spite of the bilateral wine agreement, US producers continue to use (“misuse” 
according to the Commission) EU geographical indications on food and drink, 
and to consider a number of European wine names as ‘semi-generics’ (on the 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
other hand, the US complains that the 2006 Agreement did not provide for 
the automatic acceptance of new wine making practices and did not include 
a permanent solution for the use of traditional terms). 
Th e Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 prohibits the registration of 
a trademark that is identical to a trademark previously owned by a conﬁ scated 
Cuban entity, while being illegal under the WTO rules, as conﬁ rmed by the 
Appellate Body.
Services 
In its 2007 report on US Trade barriers, the EC Commission stresses 
many issues relative to services. In the telecommunication sector, EU ﬁ rms 
face restrictions to investment, lengthy proceedings, conditionality of market 
access and reciprocity-based procedures due to the Communication Act and 
subsequent legislation. Th e FCC policy led to exclude an entire digital televi-
sion European technology (DVB-T) from accessing the US market because of 
exclusivity given to a US standard. Further diﬃ  culties accessing the U.S. market 
are encountered by EU based satellitecommunications operators. While 
discriminatory issues surrounding the Sarbanes Oaxley Act are in the process 
of being solved, the EU ﬁ nancial sector accuses US laws of obstruction to its 
development in the US market in particular because of several regulations of 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission for foreign securities ﬁ rms that 
result in barriers for the establishment of branches or subsidiaries, as well as 
legislations regarding the treatment of EU global custodians. Th e EU Com-
mission also complains about several laws in the transportation sector. Th is 
includes the “national ﬂ ag” provisions in the airline industry, the subsidies to 
US airlines. It also includes the prohibition of foreign-built marine vessels from 
engaging in coastal trade, and the requirements that U.S. Government-owned 
or ﬁ nanced cargoes be shipped on US ﬂ agged ships. 
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A2.2. EU complaints about US trade barriers
Customs Administration
Th e US Trade representative complains that the EU does not administer its 
laws through a single customs administration, and that dealing with a separate 
agency responsible for the administration of EU customs law in each of the 
EU’s 27 Member States is costly for exporters. Th ere is no EU rule requiring the 
customs agency in one Member State to follow the decisions of the customs 
agency in another Member State with respect to materially identical issues, 
and the arbitration bodies (from Customs Code Committee to the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities are either ineﬀ ective or can take years 
before taking action.
Bananas
In June 2007, the United States ﬁ led another request for the establishment 
of a panel challenging the current EC banana regime. 
Phamaceuticals
Th e main issue for the US is that national social security systems control 
the price of medecines, so that this limit the innovation rent to pharmaceutical 
companies, in particular the US ones. In practice, these companies sell their 
products in EU markets at lower prices than in the US, so that the system works 
like if US consumers funded some of the ﬁ xed costs. In addition the US Trade 
representative mentions some burdensome approval procedures for new drugs 
in some member states.
Standards
US exporters of manufactured and agricultural products complain about EU 
regulatory measures that act as impediments to market access, citing inadequate 
transparency in the development and implementation of EU regulations, insuf-
ﬁ cient economic and scientiﬁ c analysis to support good regulatory decisions, 
and a lack of meaningful opportunity for non-EU stakeholders to provide input 
on draft EU regulations and standards as well as duplicative testing and product 
redesign. Examples that are pointed out include the “ unnecessary, redundant 
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health and safety assessments” that prevent US exports to the EU of poultry 
washed with anti-microbial treatments. Another sensitive issue is the de facto 
EU moratorium on approving genetically modiﬁ ed new products. Th e zero toler-
ance policy maintained by the EU make it diﬃ  cult for most US rice exporters to 
ship rice to the EU. Th e EU regulations on mandatory traceability and labeling 
for all biotechnology and downstream products are seen as a trade barrier by 
US exporters since the requirements are costly and require a  speciﬁ c supply 
chain, with a standardized system to maintain information about biotechnology 
products and to identify the operator by whom and to whom it was transferred 
for a period of 5 years from each transaction.
Th e US is particularly voiciferous regaring Member State prohibitions on 
products already approved by the EU for marketing within the EU. Austrian 
law bans most cultivation of genetically modiﬁ ed crops, closing the market for 
US biotech companies. France has inovked a safeguard clause for a particular 
type of genetically modiﬁ ed maize, that leads to serious disruption of imports 
from the US.Cyprus, Germany, Greece, also have national restrictions to 
genetically modiﬁ ed agricultural products, and the fact that new member 
states such as the Czech Republic and Romania have adopted the acquis com-
munautaire in this area has reduced the sales of US bioengineered materials 
in these countries.
US chemical companies are also worried (as much as the EU ones) about the 
new EU regulatory regime known as Registration, Evaluation, and Authoriza-
tion of Chemicals (REACH). 
Th e EU ban of beef produced with hormonal substances that promote , 
which has eﬀ ectively prohibited the export to the EU of beef from cattle raised 
in the United States, is seen particularly negatively by the US administration 
because it is the only formal case where a country WTO ruling, conﬁ rmed by 
the Appelate body and subsequent arbitration has not amended its legislation 
and preferred to face sanctions authorized by the WTO. Th ese sanctions (the 
US applies 100 percent duties on imports from the EU valued at 116.8 million) 
are themselves a bone of contention because the EU ﬁ nds that the way the US 
implements them (the carousel method) is itself in violation of WTO rules. 
Th e USTR reports that US exports of pet food are aﬀ ected by the 2004 EU 
regulation on animal by-products not ﬁ t for human consumption. 
Th e EU regulations set maximum limits on mycotoxins for a  variety of 
foodstuﬀ s, including cereals, fruit and nuts, that are lower than those set by 
the US authorities in some cases, especially for almonds, peanuts and wheat. 
As a result, U.S. almond shipments are sometimes rejected at EU ports because 
import controls have found excessive levels of aﬂ atoxin.
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Government procurement
Th e USTR report on foreign trade barriers does not ﬁ nd considerable obsta-
cles to the access of US suppliers to EU public markets, but raises a number 
of issues at the Member state level. Th ese issues mainly deal with the defense/
military sector. In a number of countries, transparency of public contracts and 
statistics is also questioned. 
Public subsidies
Th e US administration highlights the support provided to Airbus in the 
construction of aircraft, as well as member states support to Airbus suppliers 
(Belgium, France, Spain, UK) and public support to aircraft engine makers 
(UK). Subsidies for canned fruits, in particular in the peach industry, are also 
a concern for the USTR.
Intellectual property 
Th e US administration criticizes the EU patent system, and the fees associ-
ated with the ﬁ ling, issuance, and maintenance of a patent over its life far, that 
exceed those in the United States. However, as far as intellectual property is 
concnered, the US adminsitration mostly criticizes EU Member states legisla-
tions that are seen as lenient regarding the protection of intellectual property 
in the music and entertainment industry. Relatively minor intellectual property 
issues are also raised in the pharmatical sector in some Member states.
Th e EU Geographical indications are still a concern for the US administra-
tion in spite of the WTO dispute settlement and the bilateral agreement on 
wine. Such indications are seen by the USTR as a way to discriminate against 
imports and inconsistent with multilateral rules 
National legislation in the broadcasting sector, such as the French and Ital-
ian ones that imposes a quota of EU originating programs is widely cricitized 
by the US entertainment industry. 
In spite of progressive liberalization, the postal and telecommunication 
market is still not fully open to competition in several EU Member states. 
National regulations in the banking and ﬁ nancial services sector are also 
criticized by the USTR as discriminating against foreign investors. 
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
References
• Williams (2007). Trade Relations Between the US and the EU, Chapter 7, T. Hilgen ed, “Hard 
Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations”, Ashgate, Aldershot.
• Glenn (2008). “Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? Understanding public opinion since 
9/11”. The German Marshall Fund of the United States
• Chamorel (2007). “Anti-Europeanism and EUroskepticism in the United States”, in T. Hilgen ed, 
“Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations”, Ashgate, Aldershot.
• Andrews, Pollack, Shaﬀ er and Wallace eds(2006), The Future of Transtlantic Economic 
Relations: Continuity Amid Discord. RSCAS, European University Institute.
• Bush and Reinhardt (2003). Transatlantic Trade Conﬂ icts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. 
Working paper, Emory University, Dpt of Political Sciences.
• Hamilton and Quilnan (2007). The Translatelantic Economy 2006. Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Available at http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu
• WTO (2008) Trade Policy Review, United States. World Trade Organization.
• Josling (2006). “The Was on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transtlantic Trade Conﬂ ict, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57,3, 337-63.

Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
Energy Security
and Climate Change 
By Janusz Bugajski (CSIS) with contributions from Jiri Schneider
(Prague Security Studies Institute), Vladimir Socor (The Jamestown Foundation),
Stephen Boucher (European Climate Foundation), 
Keith Smith (CSIS) and William Siefken (CSIS)
Energy Security – Current State of Aﬀ airs
Energy security is a transatlantic concern that can only be improved with 
joint action. Th e issue is complex with multiple stakeholders; states alone 
are not the only actors. Within Europe, the fundamental priorities for energy 
security are the same, but the approach diﬀ ers within the continent. Western 
European member states have greater access to multiple sources of energy 
imports than do  the newer EU member states. Th erefore, energy security 
in Western Europe is more likely coupled with climate change, whereas in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) it overlaps with neighborhood policy and 
the need to diversify the sources of energy imports. Th e U.S., on the other 
hand, is primarily concerned with reducing dependence on oil imports and 
further developing renewable technologies. At the same time, Washington 
is concerned about the resurgence of Russia in Europe, its monopolization 
of energy imports and control of energy infrastructure in some member 
states, the implications for transatlantic security of Russia’s energy policies, 
and even its growing inﬂ uence on the energy decisions within the EU and in 
some member states.
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European long-term energy security is threatened by its increasing depend-
ence not only on Russian gas and oil supplies but also by the non-transparent 
commercial deals that are part of Russia’s energy trade.¹⁵ Th is pressure is felt 
especially in the CEE states that are closer in proximity to Russia and are more 
dependent on Russia’s energy supplies. With increasing European demand 
for energy, Russian companies have sought to monopolize supply routes 
and infrastructure leading west. Acting in their self-interest, many European 
countries have signed bilateral deals with Russian-state-owned companies, 
thus undermining comprehensive EU initiatives to diversify energy supplies, 
playing into Russia’s strategy to divide Europe and dominate its energy port-
folio through which growing political inﬂ uence can be exerted. Th e leading 
EU countries have refused to give the EU Commission the power to enforce 
a uniform policy. Nor has the EU compelled Russia to carry out its commit-
ments under the Energy Charter Treaty. Th e CEE states are feeling particularly 
squeezed as their dependence on oil and gas from Russia is on the rise while 
the EU has mandated that their nuclear power plants close.
To further complicate matters, Russian gas supplies are decreasing. It is 
predicted that in the next ﬁ ve years Russian energy supplies will plateau and will 
then face a shortfall. Russia’s output (including Central Asian resources) will not 
meet growing supply demands and commitments to European countries, its own 
internal market, Russian industrial customers, and emerging Far East consumers 
as Russia tries to diversify its customer base. As supplies decline, European states 
will increasingly compete with one another to secure energy. Th is trend is already 
visible in the EU’s lack of commitment to pan-European energy projects.
At the center of this debate is the EU-sponsored Nabucco pipeline project 
where the objective is to decrease European dependence on Russia by bring-
ing Caspian gas to Europe and bypassing Russia. To undermine the Nabucco 
project, Moscow launched the South Stream pipeline initiative and recruited 
several CEE and West European countries to sign contracts underscoring the 
unreliability and lack of commitment to Nabucco. South Stream was aimed 
at complementing the Nord Stream pipeline by further increasing Gazprom’s 
monopoly of the EU energy market. South Stream was given a  boost by 
Austria’s sale of half of its large gas trading center to Gazprom and by support 
by some high-ranking EU oﬃ  cials. In the oil sector, Russia has secured sup-
plies from Central Asian countries through various contracts initiated by the 
1)  Europe faces a growing dependence on Russian energy as North Sea oil production declines, and gas production will increase 
only marginally. Supplies of gas and oil are decreasing in both Europe and the United States, increasing their dependence 
on imports of oil from an increasingly small number of oil-producing countries. Further, there is an obvious link between 
oil usage and climate change.
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Rosneft company, whose aim is to become the leading provider to Europe. As 
Russia strikes deals with individual EU member states, the need for a common 
EU energy policy with solid commitments grows ever more urgent. 
Further, Russia has been creating monopolies within Europe’s energy sec-
tors. Russian companies have purchased and invested in various distribution 
facilities in CEE to create a monopoly over transit pipelines toward Europe. 
Th e overall strategy is succeeding, as Gazprom and Rosneft have acquired oil 
and gas producing and storage capabilities in several EU member states. In 
fact, many western companies in Europe are owned by Gazprom and serve 
as “Trojan horses” gaining access to European gas markets and eliminating 
competitors through various takeovers. By operating through European sub-
sidiaries, Russian gas and oil companies operate under the radar of EU judicial 
institutions and operate without constraint, while EU and U.S. companies 
face tough challenges and constant harassment in the Russian energy market. 
Th e EU lacks a reciprocal policy for dealing with Gazprom and Rosneft. As 
long as the Russian companies operate opaquely in Europe, they will be able 
to monopolize the energy markets of EU member states. In fact, the failure of 
the EU to enforce anti-trust and pro-competition rules in Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty leaves the monopolies of Transneft and Gazprom in an overly strong 
position in pricing oil and gas exports to EU member states.
Th e EU’s recent recognition of the need to spend additional money on energy 
connectors is laudable, but more of the funding should be used in those states 
of Central and Eastern Europe who have fewer import options than do those in 
Western Europe. Th is would increase energy security throughout the EU, and 
help counter disruptions in oil and gas shipments that are channeled through 
Russia’s monopoly exporters, even if the source is in Central Asia.
Both the U.S. and EU must ﬁ nd reliable partners for securing medium-to-
long term supplies. Further, the U.S. and EU will need to work in tandem to 
deal with companies or countries whose agendas are to gain control of the 
energy market through illegal and opaque transactions and to use this as 
leverage in foreign policy. A transatlantic approach would carry more weight 
than the U.S. or EU acting alone. Th e authors of this paper recommend the 
formation of a standing U.S.-EU body for energy security.
Impact of the Global Debate on Climate Change
Th e urgent debate on Europe’s energy security is a key component of the 
debate on climate change as tackling climate change eﬀ ectively can help to 
considerably allay energy security concerns. As Europe and the U.S. seek to 
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diversify energy sources, concerns are mounting not only about the shrinking 
supplies of fossil fuels, but about their impact on the global environment. Th e 
world’s leading economies produce about 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse 
gases (the U.S. and EU produce about 40 percent).¹⁶ Th ere is a growing fear 
among many developing nations that the more developed and richer states will 
place the burden to reduce emissions on poorer countries seeking to develop. 
Th is perception will worsen and exacerbate global tensions should the devel-
oped nations fail to play an eﬀ ective global role in reducing global warming.
Brussels has been leading eﬀ orts to enact groundbreaking EU-wide policies 
to reduce carbon emissions, foster energy eﬃ  ciency, and promote cleaner 
energy technologies. Washington has lagged behind these eﬀ orts despite the 
U.S. private sector’s lead in developing renewable technologies. Th ough the 
U.S. withdrew its signature from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change during 
President George W. Bush’s ﬁ rst term in oﬃ  ce, drawing sharp criticism from 
the EU, many positive activities have taken place. 
Toward the end of the Bush presidency the U.S. signaled a change in its 
position about global warming. In December 2007 Bush signed the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA), which included a  Renewable Fuels 
Mandate, raising the usage of renewable fuels by 500 percent by the year 
2022.¹⁷ In 2008, the U.S. put forward legislation that would stop the growth 
of U.S. greenhouse emissions by 2025. Additionally, the Bush administration 
initiated the Major Economies Meeting (MEM), involving regular discussions 
between the leading global greenhouse gas emitters (China, India, the G8, and 
the EU), as well as Mexico, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, and Brazil. Th e 
Obama Administration, which took oﬃ  ce in January 2009, has promised to 
invest heavily to develop renewable energy sources. More than USD 70 billion 
in renewable energy measures were signed into law in February 2009 as part 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Time will tell if the recent 
U.S. eﬀ orts will help or will fall short of what is urgently required. 
At the end of 2009 the United Nations Climate Change Conference will 
be held in Denmark where the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol will be 
negotiated.¹⁸ Th ere are great expectations that the Obama administration, the 
country that is the largest greenhouse gas emissions producer, will assume 
a leading role in climate change policies. Th e U.S. and the EU must work together 
16)  Leigh Phillips, “EU Lukewarm on Bush Climate Plan,” Eurobserver, April 18, 2008.
17)  Press Release, “Fact Sheet: Increasing Our Energy Security and Confronting Climate Change Through Investment in Renewable 
Technologies” The White House, 
18)  The Kyoto protocol was signed in 1997 in an effort to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. The treaty came into force in 2005. 
It has been ratified by 175 states. The U.S. has not been among the ratifiers.
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
to address climate change through joint policies, knowledge, and technologies 
and would beneﬁ t from preparing jointly for the negotiations in Copenhagen 
this year. EU-U.S. eﬀ orts can be a powerful force against global warming, while 
transatlantic disagreements will only provide other polluting nations such as 
China, India, Brazil, and Russia with justiﬁ cation for maintaining the status quo. 
In addition to joint policies and coordinated strategies in dealing with energy 
monopolies and transparency in the oil and gas sectors, collaborative eﬀ orts are 
needed in the area of sustainable and renewable energies.
Sustainable (Renewable) Energy Debate
While there is no single solution that can guarantee energy security, renew-
able energy resources have ﬁ ve major advantages: they are free (after initial 
investments and apart from maintenance costs); are available on a national 
basis; provide opportunity for investment and job creation; are sustainable; 
and they contribute zero pollution. According to the United Nations Envi-
ronmental Program (UNEP), new funding in the sustainable energy sector 
rose to over USD 148 billion in 2007, up 60 percent from 2006.¹⁹ Sustainable 
energy companies accounted for 19 percent of all new capital raised by the 
energy sector on global stock markets in 2007, ﬂ owing mostly into Europe 
and followed by the U.S. At the same time, investments in China, India, and 
Brazil grew from 12 percent in 2004 to 22 percent in 2007, representing an 
increase of 14 times in absolute terms from USD 1.8 billion to USD 28 billion.²⁰
Oil is the primary source of energy for air and sea transport, and a signiﬁ -
cant percentage of land transport, and oil and gas are fundamental for heating 
much of Europe. But electricity from renewable resources and nuclear energy 
can, over time, meet much of the energy demands from households, industry, 
commerce, public services, public transport, rail, and communications. In 
addition, substitution of electricity from non-oil and gas powered sources will 
signiﬁ cantly reduce the demand for hydrocarbons, prolonging their availability 
and lowering their cost. Less concern about future oil and gas supplies will 
also curtail speculation about these resources that some have argued drive 
prices to record highs.
Wind energy has attracted the greatest investment globally out of all non-
fossil fuel based technology.²¹ In Europe, wind capacity additions accounted 
for 40 percent of new power capacity in 2007; in the U.S. this ﬁ gure was 
19)  United Nations Environmental Programme, “Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment 2008.”
20)  Ibid.
21)  Ibid.
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30 percent. Also in 2007, solar energy attracted venture capital and private 
equity investment totaling USD 3.7 billion. Further, biomass and waste to 
energy technologies grew at a  rate of 432 last year. Venture capital and 
private equity investment in biofuels fell by almost one third in 2007 to USD 
2.1 billion due to high feedstock costs and falling ethanol prices. Investments 
have shifted to Brazil, India and China.²² Coal ﬁ red power plants remain 
a primary source of electricity and a major contributor to global warming, 
but developing clean coal and carbon capture technologies in addition to 
increased electricity production by carbon-free renewables will signiﬁ cantly 
reduce carbon emissions.
Contested Energy Sources
Within the energy security and climate change debate are two more con-
troversial energy sources that have received attention of late. Agro or biofuels 
have become the most publicized and controversial energy source. Th e U.S. 
has quintupled its production of ethanol (ethyl alcohol) over the past ten years. 
Th e EU has had similarly ambitious targets, adopting a Biofuels Directive in 
2003 for promoting biofuels and other renewable energies for use in transport 
and setting a target of 5.75 market share for biofuels for 2010. In the spring 
of 2007 the EU adopted a more ambitious renewable fuels target, advocating 
that each EU member state meet a 10 percent target for biofuel production 
out of transportation fuels by 2020.²³ Recently, however, the EU and several 
national governments have stated that the EU’s biofuels objective was overly 
optimistic and should be reduced. 
Although there is hope that agro or biofuels can help to reduce fossil fuel 
consumption and slow the warming of our planet, scientists and policymakers 
are learning that these harm the environment in the longer term. For example, 
to make up the damage from carbon emissions that are released into the 
atmosphere after clearing forests, wetlands, and ﬁ elds for biofuel production 
(corn, sugarcane, and soybean, for example), scientists estimate that it will take 
“more than 300 years of biodiesel use to ‘pay back’ the carbons” emitted by 
clearing peatlands for palm oil, 93 years for “clearing grasslands to grow corn 
for ethanol,” and 167 years for the deforestation for corn ethanol.²⁴ Further, 
the production of biofuels pits the wealthy industrialized world against poorer 
countries. Analysts predict that the race for biofuels will widen this divide. 
22)  Ibid.
23)  James Kanter, “EU Moves to Cut Back Target on Biofuels Use,” International Herald Tribune, July 7, 2008.
24)  Time Magazine [add FULL NOTE]
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Th e global food crisis in the spring of 2008 caused a rift between the U.S. 
and the EU where Brussels blamed the surge in world food prices on irrespon-
sible U.S. policies that redirect corn crops to support ethanol production. EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson wrote in the UK Guardian that “the 
race to grow maize for ethanol subsidies in the U.S. reduces the supply of 
food crops on world markets and drives up the cost of this important staple,” 
arguing that the EU has a  more responsible policy for developing biofuels. 
Th e biofuels crisis illustrated that joint U.S.-EU cooperation throughout the 
renewable energy sector, as well as in nuclear energy, is sorely needed. 
Nuclear power is another contested energy source. Some West European 
states oppose nuclear energy due to safety concerns and have made the closure 
of Soviet-era nuclear reactors part of the process for CEE states to join the EU. 
However, CEE states, squeezed by Russia for much of their energy supplies, 
would like to see nuclear energy revived within the EU. In April 2008, address-
ing the European Nuclear Assembly in Brussels, European Commissioner for 
Energy Andris Piebalgs stated that nuclear energy could address the global 
challenge of climate change and could also help ease Europe’s energy security 
crisis.²⁵ He also urged EU members to cooperate in ensuring safety and secu-
rity at nuclear installations and gain public support for the development of 
nuclear energy. Th e Commission launched three initiatives – the High Level 
Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, the European Nuclear 
Energy Forum, and the Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform. In 
May 2008 Prague hosted the European Nuclear Energy Forum where the CEE 
states advocated that nuclear energy be at the core of EU energy policy.²⁶ Th e 
U.S. should also enter this debate. As nuclear power is reexamined, coordi-
nated U.S.-EU eﬀ orts will produce better and safer policies, especially in the 
areas of nuclear proliferation and storage of nuclear waste.
Coordinated investments in renewables can create a  region-wide infra-
structure capable of integrating energy inputs from various sources at various 
times depending on local conditions (sunlight, wind, water, etc.). With a stable 
investment and marketing system, sustainable energy has the potential to 
signiﬁ cantly reduce dependence on foreign oil and gas suppliers, increase 
energy security, lower costs, and slow the current rise of “resource nationalism.” 
Th e potential of transatlantic cooperation in joint research and development 
in this area has not been fully utilized. It is unclear which EU institutions 
would be in charge of renewable/sustainable energy. Also unclear are what 
25)  Leigh Phillips, “Nuclear energy a solution to climate change, says Brussels,” Eurobserver, April 15, 2008.
26)  Chris Johnstone, “Central Europe Fuels Demands for European Nuclear Revival,” Agence France Presse, May 27, 2008.
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the ground rules will be. Th at said, the time is ripe for bold initiatives in both 
research and industrial cooperation in areas like next generation of nuclear, 
clean coal (carbon capture and storage/sequestration), smart solutions in 
demand management, energy savings, and energy eﬃ  cient housing.
Recommendations for both the United 
States and the European Union
 ■ Appoint a consultative standing body speciﬁ cally for transatlantic 
energy security. What is a threat to Europe now will be a threat to the U.S. 
very soon. Th ere is a danger of resource expansion of Gazprom, taking over 
gas ﬁ elds in the Western hemisphere. A U.S.-EU consultative mechanism 
must be created to address this joint threat. Th is means that the United 
States must appoint a  U.S. Special Representative for Energy to allow for 
more eﬀ ective U.S.-EU Cooperation. Because the issue of energy security falls 
across the jurisdictions of many U.S. departments, the U.S. should appoint an 
individual with the capacity to set new initiatives in motion. Th is individual 
would complement the important roles played by the U.S. president, U.S. 
secretary of state, and U.S. secretary of energy, in this area.²⁷ 
 ■ Diversify energy sources. Th e Nabucco project must be activated to 
transmit gas from Central Asia into Europe. Capital must be urgently 
raised, investors found, and supplies from the Caspian Basin countries 
secured, otherwise Russia will increase its monopsonistic and monopolistic 
position between Central Asia and Europe. Th e West must prepare for the 
day when Iranian natural gas can be added to the mix of other countries’ 
gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iraq. Th e EU should 
form a  consortium that can supply commercial contracts to these coun-
tries for supplying the Nabucco, buying gas at the border. Th e success in 
raising capital and attracting investors for diversiﬁ cation projects such as 
Nabucco depends mainly on the EU’s ability to provide incentives and loan 
guarantees and EU funds that would match the level of Russian support of 
the alternative project (South Stream). Building LNG terminals in Europe 
would increase capacity for non-Russian gas.
 ■ Improve eﬃ  ciency. Energy eﬃ  ciency is an essential component to solving 
simultaneously the energy security and climate change equations. Th e 
International Energy Agency estimates that Central Europe could save on 
its current energy consumption by 20 percent while Southeast Europe and 
27)  This point was raised by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski in a hearing of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 12, 2008.
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the Commonwealth of Independent States could save between 30 and 50 
percent.²⁸ Th e International Finance Corporation and the Global Environ-
mental Facility have guaranteed loans from local banks across the region for 
the installation of energy eﬃ  cient equipment.²⁹ Th ere is a lack of information 
in the region about energy saving technologies and the real cost of energy. In 
2005 the European Commission noted that a lack of information was perhaps 
the biggest obstacle to energy eﬃ  ciency in CEE.³⁰ European Parliament 
member Claude Turmes (Greens-EFA, Luxembourg) has put forward several 
proposals for reducing energy waste, including the renovation of buildings 
and public transport in CEE.³¹
 ■ Coordinate research eﬀ orts of renewable energy technologies. Sharing 
research saves money and time. A concerted and coordinated world eﬀ ort 
is required to develop recommendations for renewable energy, energy 
eﬃ  ciency, demand management, and advanced energy technologies in 
housing, transport, etc. 
 ■ Prioritize energy security as a key sector of the EU Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) and in complementary projects of U.S.-EU cooperation in 
the wider European neighborhood. Th e EU must be more active in its 
neighborhood policy in the areas of building energy connections/supply 
grids, by adding or enlarging energy infrastructure. Within the European 
Union, the EU should integrate the Baltic states into existing EU energy 
grids, ending the Baltic states’ exposure as an energy island. Th e U.S. can 
play a role in this process.
 ■ Obligate environmental assessment, transparency, and public discus-
sion. Th e North Stream and South Stream projects should only be able to 
start only once both have met the following prerequisites: fully transparency, 
a full assessment of the projects’ environmental impact, full disclosure of 
the implications for the EU’s competition policy, as well as a broader public 
discussion about the environmental impact. 
 ■ Support nuclear energy. Th e supply of nuclear energy will have a positive 
eﬀ ect on climate change and is not subject to political disruption. Th e U.S. 
and EU should support Lithuania’s proposal to keep its Ignalia nuclear 
power plant online to prevent the country’s increased dependence on 
Russian supplies.
28)  TOL, “Money Down the Drain,” Transitions Online, April 11, 2008.
29)  See TOL. Also, International Finance Corporation, at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/Content/Efficient_Energy_Finance 
(Accessed June 14, 2008).
30)  See TOL.
31)  European Report, “Renewable Energy: MEP Turmes Under Fire for Rejection of Biofuels,” June 2, 2008.
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Recommendations for the European Union
 ■ EU member states must cooperate in developing an eﬀ ective common 
policy that works to the beneﬁ t of all member states. As Russia strikes 
deals with individual EU member states, the need for a common EU energy 
policy with solid commitments grows ever more urgent. Th e authors of this 
paper recommend that an EU member state notify DG-COMP, DG-TREN, 
and the Energy Commissioner 30 days prior to signing an agreement 
with a  non-EU member country. Further, any non-EU member country 
operating in Europe must comply with European legislation in the areas of 
transparency, antitrust, and competition.
 ■ Enforce EU unbundling requirements to promote transparency and 
foster competition. Th e biggest challenge for the EU market is to protect 
liberalization from external monopolizing eﬀ orts. Th e biggest challenge for 
the European Commission is to ensure that EU member states adhere to 
EU legislation and transparency. Ownership unbundling as required by the 
EU will have a positive impact in the energy sector. As a result, there will 
be greater transparency in various deals between energy companies and 
gas prices will decline. Ownership unbundling has been pursued by a few 
EU members and proved successful in facilitating a move to competitive 
gas markets, marking a  major improvement on the previous system of 
vertically integrated utilities. It continues to be strongly resisted by certain 
companies and Russian subsidiaries in Europe because it will foster greater 
competition. All of Europe is vulnerable to undisclosed deals with Russian 
energy companies due to a prevalence of corruption in the energy sector. 
Th e EU should establish agencies to monitor all major energy agreements 
between EU members, foreign companies and national governments, and 
it should be more rigorous in enforcing existing anti-trust and competition 
policies. Further, countries that bid on EU companies on the market due to 
unbundling must be similarly open to purchase by EU companies. Th ere are 
rules, but they are violated. An EU member state must notify DG-TREN 
and the EU Energy Commissioner at least 30 days before signing an energy 
agreement with a non-EU member state. Companies should not be allowed 
to operate in the EU unless they meet the highest standards of transparency 
and accounting procedures.
 ■ Increase technical assistance in the energy ﬁ eld. Th e EU should provide 
technical assistance to Ukraine to meet goals in the energy ﬁ eld set by 
the International Energy Agency, World Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the EU itself. Th e EU can advise 
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Ukraine on drawing up open tenders inline with international standards 
and containing provisions for Stockholm arbitration n awarding exploration, 
development, and distribution rights. Th e European Union should fund and 
support twinning programs and open audits involving representatives from 
the above organizations working alongside Ukrainians in the energy and 
industry ministries, in the state oil and gas companies, in Ukrtransnafta and 
Naftogaz Ukrainy, and in the oversight committees in the Rada.
 ■ Support renewable resources. Th e Czech EU Presidency should support 
and obtain the approval of the Directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable resources.  
Th e proposed Directive aims to establish an overall binding target of a 20 
percent share of renewable energy sources in energy consumption and a 10 
percent binding minimum target for biofuels in transport to be achieved 
by each Member State, as well as binding national targets by 2020 in line 
with the overall EU target of 20 percent.
 ■ End subsidies of electricity and natural gas. Many governments along the 
EU’s eastern border heavily subsidize electricity and/or natural gas. Th ese 
low prices do not provide any additional monies for upgrading networks. 
Further, consumers do not understand the real price of energy and consume 
more as a result. 
Recommendations for the United States
 ■ Establish and implement a coherent national energy policy. Th e energy 
program advanced by U.S. President Obama to invest 150 billion over the 
next ten years needs to be implemented both to create a clean energy future 
and to create jobs. In developing its new programs and policies, the U.S. 
administration must take into account the convergence of energy security 
and climate change as factors of national security. Th e private sector cannot 
and will not make the necessary investments until the new national energy 
policies and priorities are established. 
 ■ Diversify energy sources. Both the U.S. and Europe need to diversify 
their energy sources. Th e U.S., although drawing on a more geographically 
diverse resource base than Europe, needs to develop renewable/sustainable 
energy resources to break its overwhelming dependence on carbon-based 
energy. Half of the electricity produced in the United States is generated 
by coal ﬁ red power plants. 
 ■ Develop an eﬀ ective equitable and predictable method of valuing 
carbon usage in the economy. Whether by mandate, “cap and trade” or 
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a carbon tax, greenhouse gas production will not be brought under eﬀ ective 
control until there is an economic factor/value that business and industry 
can use in making their investment and other ﬁ nancial calculations. 
 ■ Signiﬁ cantly increase the emphasis on energy eﬃ  ciency. Due to tra-
ditionally cheap energy, the U.S. is wasteful of energy by consumers and 
has lacked eﬀ ective incentives for energy eﬃ  cient products. Th e Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 established a variety of new national 
standards for lighting and equipment. New standards in construction, 
housing, and public transport should also be introduced to drive more 
eﬃ  cient energy utilization.
 ■ Improve transmission grids and implement the use of smart grid 
technology. Transmission grids in the U.S. will be unable to handle the 
increased energy demand in the near future. Grids are old, ineﬃ  cient, and 
unable to eﬀ ectively integrate energy from renewable energy resources. 
 ■ The U.S. Government, through tax incentives or subsidies, must 
support the research necessary for the development of two critical 
technologies – clean coal and more eﬃ  cient electric power storage. Th e 
U.S. has very signiﬁ cant coal resources and the development of clean coal 
technologies would make a major contribution to U.S. energy independ-
ence. Expanded use of renewable energy power to reduce dependence on 
hydrocarbons, particularly in transportation, cannot be optimized until 
much more eﬃ  cient batteries or some new method of storing electric power 
or other form of energy is developed.
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Democracy Assistance in 
a Transatlantic Perspective
By Anna Michalski (SIEPS) with contributions by John K. Glenn 
(GMFUS Washington), Michael Allen (NED), Thomas Melia (Freedom House), 
Pavol Demeš (GMFUS Bratislava) and Roel von Meijenfeldt 
(Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy)
The importance of democracy in 
contemporary discourse
Western thinkers have long held a conviction that democracy is essential 
for building stable and peaceful societies, with many holding it to be the 
most equitable and eﬃ  cient political model to allocate material wealth 
and ensure popular representation. Th is belief drove the reconstruction of 
western Europe after the Second World War and grew stronger during the 
1990s when the countries in central and eastern European freed themselves 
from Communist regimes, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the Cold 
War came to an end. In this period, democracy and the liberal market 
economy travelled triumphantly through the world as populations in some 
newly independent states stridently defended these principles as the surest 
means to achieve a higher standard of living and freedom to shape their own 
lives. In Eastern Europe, the USA served as a model of socio-economic and 
political renewal alongside western European countries which also acted 
as points of attraction and promoters of democracy. Consistent with the 
well-known writings of the Nobel Prize winner, Professor Amartya Sen, 
many people also believe that democracy, which allows men and women to 
live more freely than other systems, is intrinsically a good thing even apart 
from its instrumental value in facilitating other good.
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Th e end of the Cold War changed the ballgame of international relations as no 
longer one single over-arching strategic concern dominated global politics. Th is 
new situation coincided with a spectacular intensiﬁ cation of global economic 
and social interactions and communication and opened up the prospect of 
a renewed engagement where countries throughout the world became involved 
in the twin processes of democratization and economic modernization. At the 
end of the 20th century, democracy seemed to make great strides in most parts 
in the world as democratic government, the rule of law and good governance 
went hand in hand with economic and social transformation.
Th en, during the ﬁ rst decade of the new millennium, the place of democracy 
promotion in the western world’s foreign policy tool box changed as it became 
associated with measures to deal with failed states and the threat of terrorism. 
Th is change in character may have been the strongest on the politico-strategic 
level as NGOs and the development community at large continued work-
ing according to well-known principles linking freedom and democracy to 
improvements in populations’ well-being. However, democracy promotion 
as a guiding principle, particularly in the United States’ relations with third 
countries, was increasingly viewed with suspicion chieﬂ y because the aims 
were no longer seen as driven by universal values and a  benign trade-oﬀ  
between complementary interests, but rather by more narrow national security, 
energy or economic interests. In separate but concurrent events the backlash 
against democracy was further prompted by authoritarian regimes’ reaction 
to the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. 
Today, at a time when democracy appears to be backsliding³² and authoritar-
ian regimes in countries such as China constitute a real alternative to developing 
countries in their quest for economic growth and development without having 
to engage in risky democratic and social reforms, the EU and the United 
States have a  shared interest in redeeming the status of democracy promo-
tion. Democracy is part of American and European fundamental values and 
is a basic premise of their societies. It is also a fundamental principle in their 
foreign policies and an essential aspect of their relations with third countries. 
Both the EU and the United States stand to gain if democracy is reinstated as 
a concrete expression of fundamental universal values and as a requirement 
for a multilateral system of governance on the global level. 
Th e moment for intensiﬁ ed transatlantic cooperation seems propitious with 
the election of Barak Obama as president of the United States. Th e expectations 
18)  The January 2009 edition of Freedom in the World, the authoritative assessment of the state of civil liberties and political rights 
worldwide produced annually by the American NGO Freedom House, indicates for three years running now more countries 
have seen basic freedoms decline than improve. See http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=756
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in Europe on Obama, and his Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, are huge as both 
appear more open to multilateral cooperation and dialogue. Th ere is clearly 
a window of opportunity for both Americans and Europeans to advance shared 
principles and values on the international scene, as well as agreeing on a way 
forward on a host of diﬃ  cult foreign policy challenges.
The United States as a promoter of democracy
Democracy is a fundamental dimension of the American self-image touching 
as its does on the very essence of American nationhood. Democracy promotion 
therefore becomes a  natural ingredient in its relations to the outside world 
and given the country’s size and resources the United States has been a key 
player in several successful instances of democratization. Examples of successful 
democratization include for instance, Japan and West Germany after the Second 
World War and the low-key support to human rights activists and dissidents 
of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe countries during the Cold War. 
Th ere are other contrary examples, for instance Latin America during the 70s 
and 80s, where American involvement acting within the Cold War imperative 
belied its attachment to democratic principles and attracted strong criticism 
from the international community, as well as domestic American critics of 
these policies. However, one should not forget that, particularly after the end 
of the Cold War, the United States redeemed itself by turning against the likes 
of Pinochet, Marcos, and Suharto and in sponsoring democratic transitions in 
Central America.
An account of the American approach to democracy promotion cannot 
avoid focusing on the experience of the war in Iraq and the conduct of the 
simultaneous “war on terror” which has had such a fundamental impact on 
American foreign policy and its standing abroad. It has been argued that ‘the 
Bush administration’s identiﬁ cation of democracy building with the war in Iraq 
has discredited the concept both at home and abroad’ and that a ‘generation 
of work to build consensus at home and legitimacy abroad for US democracy 
promotion is in disarray’.³³ Others, however, argue that there is still a robust US 
consensus, at least among the political elites in both parties, on the principles 
and instruments of democratization as debates have primarily concerned 
policies and priorities.³⁴
33)  Thomas Carothers, Repairing Democracy Promotion, washingtonpost.com’s Think Tank Town, September 14, 2007. http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/publications
34)  Thomas O. Melia, The Democracy Bureaucracy; the Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion, (The Princeton Project 
on National Security) http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/democracy_bureaucracy.pdf
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Th e war on terrorism, chieﬂ y played out in Iraq and Afghanistan, epitomizes 
some of the greatest weaknesses and strengths of the American approach to 
democracy promotion:
The great appeal and force of attraction: Th e Bush administration made 
democracy a rallying cry for the war on terror and the redemption of failed 
states which harbour terrorists or tolerate them on their territory. At the 
start of American action in Afghanistan, the spread of democracy attracted 
a great deal of support both inside and outside the United States, whereas in 
the case of Iraq, democratisation was at ﬁ rst primarily articulated as a motive 
by a small number of neo-conservatives. Although large sections of American 
society supported the invasion in Iraq in its initial stages, because they were 
told that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, it soon became clear that 
popular support for this war petered out.
Domestically, popular support for forceful regime change came in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and 
the threat of future attacks on American soil, possibly involving weapons of 
mass destruction. Not long after 9/11, the Bush administration pointed to the 
dictatorship of Sadam Hussein as a  likely perpetrator and harbourer of ter-
rorists who presented a grave danger to the American public and launched an 
invasion of Iraq in order to liberate the Iraqi people and installing a democratic 
regime in an important Arab country. 
Th e Bush administration’s pursuit of a war in Iraq and its aim of extend-
ing democracy to the Arab region in the name of freedom sought to draw 
on a  deep-seated tenet in American society in support of the principle of 
democracy. Abroad, its status as the world’s uncontested superpower gave 
rise to expectations of the United States promoting American values on the 
world stage and taking action in order to enforce those values. However, the 
swiftness and eﬀ ectiveness with which the United States can act may also turn 
against it when the action taken lacks legitimacy or contradicts stated values 
and principles, especially when the action is mishandled due to incompetence 
or lack of planning Th is is what the Bush administration experienced: its 
actions in Iraq and in the war on terror appeared to breach American claims 
of righteousness and vitiated morally justiﬁ ed policies. It also convinced many 
that forceful regime change cannot go hand in hand with the promotion of 
democratic principles and human rights. Th e challenge for the United States 
is to redress its message of democracy and human rights as a universal value 
for all people. At home, the Obama administration must ﬁ ght against domestic 
forces that advocate isolationism and abroad it must re-legitimize its democ-
Transatlantic Relations 2009 – A Chance for a Fresh Start? 
racy promotion policies by doing away with the most egregious human rights 
violations (Guantanamo Bay, extra-territorial rendition, torture of prisoners 
of war and illegal tapping of its own citizens). Th e new administration may 
already have begun to make changes and it this context Barak Obama’s ﬁ rst 
decision as president of the United States to suspend the war-crime tribunals 
at Guantanamo is signiﬁ cant.
The dichotomy between a realist and normative foreign policy: Interests, of 
course, always play a role in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. However, 
in the area of democracy promotion, ambiguity as to the true nature of the 
intervening state’s interests is arguably more problematic than in other areas. 
Th e Bush administration’s stated interest in promoting democracy in the 
Middle East and beyond was to improve stability and governability of these 
countries in order to prevent ‘failed states’ becoming a breeding ground for ter-
rorism and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist 
networks such as al-Qaeda. Th is example underscores the delicate relationship 
between the articulation of democracy promotion policies based on universal 
values and the pursuit of foreign policy interests even though the two cannot 
be entirely dissociated. Between the two poles of realist and normative foreign 
policy lie many possible positions, but as the wars in Iraq and on terrorism 
illustrate, it is counterproductive for well-intentioned democracy promotion 
programmes if the international community believe the American administra-
tion’s real interests in Iraq and the surrounding region are other than those 
stated publicly. Democracy promotion relies as a policy on the sincerity of the 
promoter as to the intensions and interests behind the policy. Th e challenge 
for the United States is to change the perceived association between American 
military intervention and regime change with democracy promotion policies.
Political and ﬁ nancial resourcefulness and ability to take action: Th e 
United States is the world’s most resourceful foreign policy actor owing to its 
political and military strength, its budgetary resources and its cohesiveness 
as an actor including the powers vested in the oﬃ  ce of the president. In 2006, 
United States’ total overseas development aid amounted to 23.5 billion US; 
an amount that corresponds to roughly 0.16 per cent of GNI whereas the cor-
responding ﬁ gure for 2007 is slightly higher at 0.18 per cent.³⁵ Beyond ﬁ nancial 
resources, the USA acts as a powerful player in multilateral organizations, both 
35)  OECD, Aid at a Glance 2005-2006 and OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, published on 
www.oecd.org.
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through ﬁ nancial instruments and political initiatives, and is an inﬂ uential, 
if not the most inﬂ uential, player in global politics. On another level, the 
United States is the host to some of the most inﬂ uential NGOs in the area of 
democracy promotion which act worldwide to administer concrete projects 
and report on the state of democracy around the world as well as participants 
in the debate about the aims and objectives of democracy promotion. 
In order to harness the resources and inﬂ uence of the United States and 
direct them more explicitly towards national security, the then Secretary of 
State, Condolezza Rice, coined in 2006 the term Transformational Diplomacy. 
Under the auspices of a newly created post of director of foreign assistance, the 
eﬀ orts and ﬁ nancial resources of the State Department and USAID have been 
pooled together in order to improve performance and eﬀ ectiveness within 
seven strategic goals all geared towards enhancing democracy and develop-
ment worldwide. USAID and the State Department combined spent US 2.65 
billion in 2007 on the strategic goal Governing Justly and Democratically and 
an increase of 27 per cent was requested for the 2008 operations³⁶ although 
much of this spending can only very loosely be considered democracy promo-
tion funding. It is too early to evaluate the impact of this reform although 
concerns have been raised that the reform aims at gearing development 
assistance more directly towards foreign policy objectives.
With this kind of resourcefulness comes responsibility to adopt policies that 
are true to their stated aim and in keeping with the principles of democracy. 
Responsibility weighs heavier on the shoulder of the resourceful than on those 
lacking in resources but gives leverage and ability to take action. Th e challenge 
for the United States is to engage in a sincere manner with third countries, 
one that does not refrain from criticizing those that resort to doubtful demo-
cratic practices and human rights abuses even if they are considered strategic 
partners in the war on terror or control assets that are of strategic interest to 
the United States. It should also put more emphasis on multilateral fora where 
a positive engagement on behalf of the United States is of key importance to 
build an international consensus in favour of democracy.
The EU as a promoter of democracy
Th e EU is a  very diﬀ erent political actor from the United States. It has 
evolved from cooperation among six countries in western Europe centred 
around trade and agriculture to become a  highly institutionalized political 
36)  Information obtained on www.usaid.gov.
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body encompassing almost the whole of Europe. Th e importance of the EU 
in terms of geographical stretch and size of its economy warrants a place on 
the scene of global politics. Although, the EU’s international ambitions have 
grown considerably in recent years, now ranging from development to security, 
it is still considered an atypical foreign policy actor, principally because of its 
institutional and political structure built on consensus-building and collective 
government among the 27 member states. Th e EU is in the midst of a diﬃ  cult 
constitutional reform with the Lisbon Treaty which, if ratiﬁ ed despite the Irish 
‘no’ in a referendum in June 2008, opens up the possibility for the EU to adopt 
a more coherent and eﬀ ective foreign policy. Whether the EU is in the end 
endowed with more potent treaty-based competence in the area of foreign 
policy or not, it is no longer shy about projecting itself as a global player. Th e 
perception of the EU as a global actor has the support of European elite circles 
but it has still to prove its credentials both to European and foreign publics. 
It is also not clear in the area of democracy promotion whether the United 
States views the EU as more or less important than key European states with 
established institutions active in the ﬁ eld, such as the German political party 
foundations. An account of the EU’s eﬀ orts to promote democracy sheds light 
on its strengths and weaknesses as well as the challenges ahead.³⁷
A normative foreign policy: Th e EU has often been referred to as a normative 
foreign policy actor. Th is is a reﬂ ection of its raison d’être as well as its policies. 
Th e EU was set up in the aftermath of the 2nd World War to create a union 
among previously warring states to support their economic and social mod-
ernization and consolidate the still fragile state of democracy in West Europe 
in the shadow of the Cold War. Th e EU was conceived as a process with some 
clearly deﬁ ned objectives whereas its end-goal was deliberately ambiguous in 
order to let political integration among the member states evolve gradually. As 
a consequence, the EU has since its inception professed a number of values and 
principles that guide both the conditions of integration among member states 
as well as the aims of common policies. Democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law are founding principles of European integration and lie at the heart 
of the EU’s normative foreign policy. As a result of continuous constitutional 
reform and enlargement, these principles have been further elaborated. Th e 
Lisbon Treaty building on the treaties currently in force states unequivocally 
that the EU must build relations with third countries on the basis of its own 
values and founding principles, namely ‘democracy, the rule of law, the univer-
37)  Richard Youngs at FRIDE in Madrid, many articles and studies
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sality and indivisibility of human right and fundamental freedoms and respect 
for human dignity….’ and aﬃ  rms that the Union’s external relations objectives 
should ‘consolidate and support democracy, rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law’.³⁸
With these kinds of declarations of intent the EU has attracted criticism of 
enouncing lofty goals and principles but falling short of delivering eﬀ ective 
policies to enforce those principles, let alone take decisive action when these 
values and principles are violated. Th e EU has also been accused of inconsistency 
in its over-all policy direction pursuing policies with contradictory outcomes 
in recipient countries. Th e reasons for inconsistency are most often due to 
disagreement among member states and their attempts to protect domestic 
interests to the detriment of declared foreign policy aims. In fact much of the 
diﬃ  culty for the EU to forge common positions can be inferred from member 
states’ urge to pursue national realist interests than implementing actively their 
normative foreign policy goals agreed jointly under the EU banner. European 
countries’ relations to Russia is an example of this as well as some member states’ 
tribulations as regard free elections in countries such as Algeria and Egypt. 
Th e challenge for the EU therefore is on the one hand to build relations with 
third countries that are true to its own values and principles and consistently 
promote these abroad, and one the other, to conceive coherent foreign poli-
cies that are compatible with member states’ interests, domestic opposition 
or sectoral interests.
From stand-in policies to democracy promotion in its own right: Despite 
lacking a foreign policy commensurate with its economic weight, the EU has 
pursued a number of policies through which it been able to spread democracy 
quite successfully. Th e EU insists since 1995 on the inclusion of a  human 
rights clause in all bilateral association agreements it concludes with third 
countries and democracy and human rights are mainstreamed into all EU 
external policies and strategic documents. Th e EU is also an active player in 
multilateral organizations, particularly the UN where it supports actively the 
UN Human Rights Council, although the eﬃ  ciency of this forum and the EU’s 
leverage within it has been questioned due to the dominance by authoritarian 
regimes. Th e EU has also given its support to speciﬁ c projects such as the 
International Criminal Court, electoral monitoring and so on. Democracy, 
good governance and human rights are increasingly being emphasized within 
EU and its member states’ development policies and certain countries, such 
38)  Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty), art.21.
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as Sweden, have made democracy an overriding principle of its development 
policy. Newer democracies, from Portugal to Poland and the Czech Republic, 
also tend to be forward leaning in this regard.
Since 1994, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) is, despite some criticism regarding its eﬃ  ciency, the EU’s ﬂ agship 
programme on democracy promotion and human rights supporting the activi-
ties of civil society working for human rights and democracy in third countries 
as well as regional and international organizations. Th e budgetary resources 
of this project were 140 million in 2007.³⁹ Looking at over-all spending on 
development aid, the EU and its member states constitute the world’s largest 
donor as their combined budgets for development in 2006 made up 56 per cent 
of the development aid delivered by major industrial countries. In 2007, the 
EU15 spent roughly 0.45 per cent of their GNI on overseas development aid.⁴⁰ 
Th e EU’s eﬀ orts in promoting democracy are however the most eﬀ ective in 
the context of accession of new member states. For European states aspiring 
to become members of the EU, democratic governance and institutions were 
previously a requirement taken for granted. In view of the newly democratized 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe’s wish for membership in the early 
90s, the EU toughened the conditions for opening accession negotiations by 
referring explicitly to the adherence to the values and principles of the EU 
treaties and by imposing speciﬁ c criteria on the aspiring countries. In the area 
of democracy, the Copenhagen criteria speciﬁ ed that in order to be eligible for 
membership, a country must have achieved ‘stability of institutions guarantee-
ing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities’.⁴¹ Th e criteria for democracy, along with requirements in other 
ﬁ elds, became a yardstick for assessing candidate countries’ democratization 
process and helped to anchor these countries’ transformation process within 
a  larger framework buttressed by sticks and carrots to keep candidates on 
the path of reform. Th e enlargement process provided a  strong element of 
conditionality as the Central and Eastern European countries’ membership 
was conditional on the candidates’ fulﬁ lment of the criteria. Th ese criteria are 
now applied in the accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia as well as 
in any other future enlargement negotiation.
Th e success of enlargement as an instrument of democratization was 
emulated in the policy towards the countries neighbouring the enlarged EU to 
the east and south. Th e neighbourhood policy is built on bilateral association 
39)  European Commission, Furthering Democracy and Human Rights across the Globe, OPEC, Luxemburg, 2007
40)  OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, published on www.oecd.org
41)  European Council, Conclusions, Copenhagen, June 1993
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agreements between the EU and neighbouring countries (15 countries plus the 
occupied Palestinian territory) with the aim of corresponding to individual 
countries’ interests and level of ambition in terms of integration with the EU. 
Th e agreements attempt to set up privileged partnerships building on a shared 
commitment to common values, including democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law and good governance. In the same vein, the EU is seeking bilateral 
association agreements, the so-called European Partnership Agreements, with 
75 African, Caribbean and Paciﬁ c countries, based on shared values and norms, 
including democracy, good governance, human rights as well as in other 
regional association agreements with third countries such as the Mercosur 
and the Andean Community. 
However, in terms of conditionality the EU does not have the same leverage 
in association agreements as in the enlargement process. Both the neighbour-
hood policy and other association agreements have been criticized for not 
being ‘hard’ enough to deliver on their objectives, nor ﬂ exible enough to take 
into account the partner countries real needs and aspirations. It is unquestion-
ably so that the motivation to conform to EU’s values and principles is less 
when membership is not at stake and as long has the EU has not agreed that 
membership is the goal of an association, member states may resort to bilateral 
relations potentially reﬂ ecting conﬂ icting national interests. 
It would be in the EU’s interest to capitalize on the leverage of conditionality 
in contractual contexts other than enlargement in order to persuade third 
countries to adopt democratic principles, human rights and good governance. 
Moreover, the EU cannot enlarge inﬁ nitely lest its attractiveness would be lost 
and therefore the EU as a foreign policy actor needs to reﬁ ne conditionality as 
a foreign policy instrument, not as a condition for membership.
Coherence, cohesiveness and political leadership: Th e EU has been char-
acterized as an economic giant but a political dwarf. It has been criticized 
for incoherence in its policy stances, over-compartmentalization of policies, 
indecisiveness in times of political crisis and for not speaking with one voice. 
Much of this criticism can be explained by the fact that the EU foreign and 
security policy has to be decided consensually among its 27 members and 
implemented through complex constructions involving EU institutions and 
national diplomatic services and security and military structures. In many 
instances, such as development policy, member states retain their national 
prerogatives as EU competence in this area is complementary to the national 
competence. Th e ﬁ nancing of EU external policy initiatives is also dependent 
on both the EU budget and national budgets again adding to the impres-
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sion of fragmentation. Th is situation is detrimental for over-all coherence, 
particularly in the pursuit of value-based principles such as democracy 
which require perseverance and long-term commitment. Attempts have 
been made to anchor more ﬁ rmly EU values such as democracy and human 
rights to speciﬁ c policies and strategic policy documents. Th e Consensus on 
Development of 2005 emphasizes that ‘EU partnership and dialogue with 
third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, 
the rule of law, solidarity and justice’.⁴² Th e European Security Strategy of 
2003 aﬃ  rms that well-governed democratic states are ‘the best protection 
for our societies’ and the spread of ‘good governance, supporting social and 
political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the 
rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening 
the international order’.⁴³
Th e Lisbon Treaty makes a number of institutional changes which aim at 
improving the ability of the EU to act globally. Th e most signiﬁ cant are the 
creation of the oﬃ  ce of High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the European External Action Service providing the 
HR with autonomous resources in terms of expertise and personnel. Th is 
development has worried the European development community which 
sees it as a means of conceiving a more interest-driven foreign policy to the 
detriment of the value-based normative nature of EU external action. In its 
view, democracy promotion risks becoming just another tool of the traditional 
realist foreign policy, and the EU, and in extension those who implement its 
projects, would lose creditability in the process when seeking to promote 
universal values in the global arena. Th e challenge for the EU is to ensure that, 
if the Lisbon Treaty is ratiﬁ ed, an enhanced capacity to conceive coherent and 
eﬀ ective external relations policies and pursue its interests globally do  not 
imply that it does no longer seek to promote even-handedly its values and 
principles, particularly democracy and human rights.
In addition to the evolution in institutional reform of the formal EU foreign 
policy instruments, new European initiatives have been taken through the 
foundation of the European Partnership for Democracy (EDP) to enhance the 
role of European NGOs in providing democracy assistance in partnering with 
their American NGO counterparts.
42)  Council of European Union, The European Consensus, Doc. No. 14820/05, Brussels, 22 November 2005.
43)  Council of European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
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Transatlantic co-operation in democracy 
promotion: current state of aﬀ airs
Despite sharing similar value-based foundations and normative principles, 
cooperation between the EU and the USA in the area of democracy has in 
recent times been neither systematic nor recurrent. Th is state of aﬀ airs can 
be explained by a number of factors, such as the understanding of democracy 
promotion in a policy context; the approach to receiving countries; and the 
methods used and the articulation of democracy promotion vis-à-vis other 
policy objectives.
Th e United States has in the past been criticized for being an explicit 
promoter of democracy, adopting a rhetorically charged democracy strategy 
that too often emphasizes confrontational stances, centres directly on foreign 
rulers or speciﬁ c causes and highlights visible manifestations or symbols of 
democracy, such as elections. On the other hand, the U.S. puts more money 
and people into democracy promotion eﬀ orts worldwide than does the EU 
and, in virtually all cases, there is no military action involved. However looking 
beyond the conspicuous cases of Iraq and Afghanistan the diﬀ erence between 
US and EU approaches to democracy promotion should not be overstated. For 
instance, both the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Barcelona Process 
stress non-confrontational partnership-based approaches with Arab regimes, 
and disproportionately favour economic assistance over aid to civil society. 
Th e most visible American democracy promotion measures are connected 
to high-level presidential initiatives that often take place outside the exist-
ing channels and structures of US democracy assistance and multilateral 
organizations. Receiving countries have sometimes experienced US democracy 
promotion as too intrusive to the detriment of constructive dialogue and 
long-standing involvement although it should not be forgotten the diﬃ  culty in 
ﬁ nding the appropriate balance between maintaining good intergovernmental 
relations while assisting indigenous liberal/democratic forces. Th e US is on 
the other hand a  more decisive actor when it comes to applying coercive 
instruments, for instance sanctions but also military, and therefore wields the 
power of persuasion with much more credibility, both positive and punitive, 
than the EU. In addition, its clear-cut rhetoric and distinct recipient makes it 
more eﬀ ective in terms of the communicative impact. 
Th e EU on the other hand has prioritized low-key, long-term dialogue and 
most of the time of a less confrontational character than the American. Th e EU 
has often refrained from the American rhetoric under the Bush administration 
regarding it as counterproductive. Although both recognize the link between 
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peace and democracy, the EU has focused its eﬀ orts on socio-economic 
development, the rule of law and good governance. In addition, in view of the 
EU being an institutional actor itself, it places a much greater emphasis on 
building structures and processes with the aim of achieving a densely-knitted 
web of cooperation in the medium-to-long term. Th e EU engagement with 
the African Union is one example of this. 
On the political level both parties emphasize the beneﬁ ts of stepping up 
cooperation and EU-US summit declarations have recurrently stated their 
shared commitment to promotion of peace human rights and democracy. 
In the context of the multi-polar world that has emerged in recent years in 
which democracy seems to be experiencing a backlash, there seems to be an 
obvious interest for the EU and the United States to increase their coopera-
tion in multilateral fora, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African States (OAS). 
Recommendations
Th e US-EU summit in Washington in the spring 2009 comes at an interest-
ing point in time as a new president of the USA has taken oﬃ  ce and the EU is 
to have a new European Parliament and European Commission by the autumn 
2009. Th e arrival of new administrations in the US and the EU provide an 
opportunity to address common issues and re-launch fruitful transatlantic 
cooperation. In the area of democracy promotion, the working group would 
like to suggest the following recommendations
To the USA
 ■ Redeem the legitimacy of US democracy promotion policies and dissociate 
them from the policies of ‘failed states’ and forceful regime change;
 ■ Engage in a vigorous, open and transparent manner in multilateral organi-
zations and with third countries. 
 ■ Formulate and communicate foreign policy aims in a  way that does not 
undermine the intrinsic values and norms of democracy.
To the EU
 ■ Build on the positive experience of enlargement of the EU to promote 
democracy, human rights and good governance to the countries neighbour-
ing on the EU;
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 ■ Give democracy promotion a more pronounced place in the EU external 
relations by strengthening democracy policy instruments and resources, 
including the instruments oﬀ ered by the EU NGO democracy support 
agencies. Work on shaping democracy conditionality into a proper instru-
ment that works beyond enlargement;
 ■ Prioritize among normative principles and values, such as democracy and 
human rights, and EU external interests in a transparent and just fashion. 
To the USA and the EU
 ■ Recognize the interest of cooperation in the area of democracy promotion 
and the value of a coherent message on behalf of the USA and the EU on 
the global level;
 ■ Adopt a coherent policy of democracy promotion towards undemocratic 
states, refrain from competition on strategic resources or interests which 
will undo democracy promotion policies;
 ■ Recognizing the urgent need of third countries for economic and social 
development which constitutes an essential factor in the democratization 
process, not least in the current context of deep global economic recession.




By Věra Řiháčková (EUROPEUM) with contributions by John Glenn (GMF),
Nathalie Tocci (IAI), Stephen Larrabee (RAND), Christian Lequesne 
(Sciences Po/CERI) and Ilona Teleki (CSIS)
Th e EU neighbourhood is a  strategic area both for the EU and the U.S. 
with the EU following additional interests in the ﬁ eld of migration manage-
ment or its future enlargement; their agenda is primarily security-driven and 
securitized. Th e EU is facing several tensions at the moment. First, the EU is 
becoming increasingly aware of the urgent need to speak with one voice on 
the international scene. However, even with the Lisbon Treaty in force there 
is no guarantee that the EU members will have a single view but merely one 
place that may articulate the lack of consensus. Th e divergent positions of the 
EU member states on speciﬁ c issues create enormous problems, particularly in 
relations with Russia. Second, there are competing discourses within the EU on 
the future arrangements of its relations with neighbour countries and on EU 
enlargement. Th ird, EU is balancing the multilateral approach embodied in the 
enlargement policy and partly ENP (EU as a normative power, projecting its 
norms, rules and ideas) including the newly established Union for the Mediter-
ranean and Eastern Partnership, which is losing its incentive and appeal, with 
the customized approach and bilateral agreements, preferences and interests. 
In the last years, the US has been largely focused on the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, as part of its global war on terror. It has adopted a diﬀ erentiated 
approach towards the countries of the European neighbourhood, pursuing 
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a series of disparate policies toward individual states and several regions (the 
Balkans, Middle East). It tried to give these policies coherence, but generally 
came to the conclusion that the countries of region were too diﬀ erent to have 
an overarching approach. Th e selective bilateral approach was based mostly 
on prioritizing security and counterterrorism issues. 
Should minimal transatlantic cooperation prevail, both the EU and U.S. 
would strive to secure relations with some important countries, especially for 
alternate routes for energy imports to Europe. Th ey would be avoiding clashes 
with local, non-democratic regimes, searching for ad hoc supporters with the 
EU continuing not to want to put its image at risk. Th e competing interests 
and structures would allow the target countries to ‘cherry-pick’ from U.S. 
and EU-generated initiatives. More ambitious cooperation and coordination 
could aim at addressing a wider agenda. Th e goals of both the U.S. and EU are 
complementary, but often minimally coordinated. With the new U.S. admin-
istration under the leadership of President Obama the strategic cooperation 
of the EU and U.S. in the European neighbourhood should be given a fresh 
boost. However, priorities of the U.S. foreign policy shifted; after president’s 
speech in Prague (April 2009) on denuclearization, the U.S. interest in the 
EU neighborhood, particularly in its Eastern part, seems to be losing drive, 
especially in consequence of an eﬀ ort to improve U.S. relations with Russia. 
Possible points of convergence 
 ■ Energy security. Th ere is a  joint interest in securing the ﬂ ow of energy 
resources to Europe, at least to Turkey (competing pipeline projects). Th e 
U.S. is mostly interested in transport capacities and securing the routes 
(but also in fair and consistent treatment of foreign investors in the Rus-
sian market) and the EU, as a consumer, (some member states are 100 
dependent on Russian imports) is interested in reaching a complex deal 
with Russia, allowing for transposition of its regulatory framework on the 
Russian energy market and Russian companies. Unfortunately, there is no 
consensus within Europe on the issue of energy security. 
 ■ Self-sustaining stability in the Balkans in the long run. Both the U.S. and 
EU have prioritized self-sustainable democracies in the Western Balkans 
with the responsibility for this region shifting towards the EU.
 ■ Need for a Black Sea Region strategic concept. Both the U.S. and EU 
agree that the region has become a new strategic frontier for the transat-
lantic partnership and Russia with a future of Ukraine as a key issue, and 
Turkey as an essential regional player.
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 ■ A need to ease Russian pressure on EU neighbouring states. Th ere is 
a basic agreement between the U.S. and some EU member states that Rus-
sian pressure on EU neighboring states must be eased and that those states 
that wish to integrate into Euroatlantic structures should be permitted to 
do so. However, EU member states diﬀ er widely on the speed of integration 
of EU neighboring states into Euroatlantic institutions, and the current 
major interest of the U.S. is to improve relations with Russia. 
 ■ The objective to spread democracy. Th ere are similarities on the ground 
in terms of assets and liabilities, however, both EU and U.S. discourses 
have experienced gradual erosion and remake in interactions with the 
actual policy takers with the clear democratization objective being muﬄ  ed. 
Simultaneously, Russia’s patronizing attitude and support provided to non-
democratic forces in the Eastern neighbourhood is growing. 
Possible points of divergence
 ■ NATO Enlargement. Th e future of NATO and its role in European and 
transatlantic security.
 ■ Conceptual views on the EU integration and enlargement. Some EU 
member states – mainly France and Germany – have been resentful of the 
U.S. push for continued EU enlargement considering the widening of the 
Union will diminish the EU’s ability to participate as a key actor in a multi-
polar world. Th e U.S. belief has been that EU membership is the sole best 
catalyst for democratic reform and that the European project has no set 
boundaries as a precondition of such a role. 
 ■ Policy towards Russia. Th is is not least because of diverging positions of 
the EU member states. Under the George W. Bush administration the U.S. 
engaged Russia for stability, security, and counterterrorism eﬀ orts, whereas 
EU engagement has been directed primarily toward energy security and 
some issues of world diplomacy. Th e EU has not been successful so far in 
linking the internal and external aspects of the energy policy and relations 
with Russia into one strategy; the ethos for a single policy towards Russia 
is waning in the EU. U.S. policy towards Russia changed with the Obama 
administration; it needs Russia in order to tackle successfully its major 
foreign policy priorities, i.e. denuclearization, Iran and Afghanistan. 
 ■ Recognition of Kosovo. Not all of the EU member states have recognized 
Kosovo for various reasons; the problem is rather intra-EU than across the 
Atlantic. Th e U.S. would like to see a single European policy of recognition 
for Kosovo. 
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The main challenges
Black Sea Region, relations with Russia 
and the future of Ukraine
Th e Black Sea region is of enormous strategic importance both to the 
EU and the U.S., however, there is no eﬀ ective EU-U.S. coordination in the 
region (sometimes rather a  coordinated absence of eﬀ ective policy). Th e 
U.S. prioritizes democratic reform in addition to security ties; it utilizes 
its strength in security issues to develop bilateral relations. Also the U.S. 
approach to democracy promotion is rather selective and tends to prioritize 
strategic, security oriented concerns (the EU follows more stability oriented 
goals). When engaging, the U.S. is rather focusing on the support of (liberal) 
opposition actors against incumbent regimes (whereas the EU is adopting 
a  more politically ‘neutral’ approach to political changes but promoting 
a  more comprehensive process of political change; being so minimal and 
loose in its commitment EU’s results have been less visible so far). Th e EU 
and its member states, despite the crucial importance of the region energy 
security–wise, stick to the ENP tools and democracy promotion discourse 
but in fact there is lack of EU strategic vision towards the region. Th e project 
of Eastern Partnership has a potential to strengthen mutual relations in dif-
ferent important areas but due to the lack of articulated support of the big 
EU member states cannot ﬁ ll in the strategic considerations gap. Th e issue of 
the frozen conﬂ icts gained enormous importance after the crisis in Georgia. 
Th e existing peacekeeping and negotiating formats proved dysfunctional 
with Russia using the UN and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping mandates to legitimize its military build-up in 
the region. Russia utilizes every U.S. or EU move to legitimize its own actions 
and its moves have shown its determination to stymie the Euro-Atlantic aspi-
rations of the countries in the region. Ukraine’s future is of key importance to 
the region and the possible Russian aspirations vis-à-vis Crimea is yet another 
geostrategic challenge for the transatlantic partners. Similarly, the important 
role of Azerbaijan in constructing an alternative energy route to Europe 
(East-West corridor) had been missed by the EU and U.S. for some time. Th e 
Nabucco project, desired by the Europeans as an alternative energy route and 
supported by the U.S., was guaranteed a ﬁ nancial commitment within the 
European recovery plan adopted during the regular Spring 2009 European 
Council, under the Czech EU Presidency. However, its materialization is 
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still uncertain due to the Turkish bargaining position. Many in the region 
look at building their alliances and future prospects primarily through the 
lenses of relations with Russia (impact of the Georgia crisis on the political 
developments in Ukraine or Azerbaijan population); a  coordinated policy 
should take this seriously into account.
Western Balkans 
EU Enlargement policy has been for a  long time the EU’s principal 
democratization strategy  – a  powerful tool, able to deliver real change. 
However, besides Croatia, Macedonia, and possibly Serbia, further enlarge-
ment is unlikely in the mid-term perspective (despite the 2003 Th essaloniki 
declaration commitment). Public concern within the EU member states over 
the EU’s ability to absorb new members did not remove the carrot of EU 
entry, which had enticed and pushed each candidate to conduct appropriate 
reforms, but has rather made the carrot more elusive in the Western Balkans 
now. Th e reforms and stability of the Western Balkans are increasingly seen as 
a European issue, with the U.S. encouraging that the EU takes the lead. Much 
of the EU’s future success in the Western Balkans now hinges on making 
sure that EULEX is successful in Kosovo (despite its inauspicious start and 
delays in emplacing the mission). Despite the fact the EU and U.S. share the 
same long term goals in the region and the U.S. has acknowledged the EU 
enlargement as a credible tool to achieve its own goals in the region, a further 
coordinated eﬀ ort is needed in order to tackle the situation in Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia.
Turkey
Both the U.S. and EU are losing Turkey. Popular and political support for 
the U.S. and EU has dropped signiﬁ cantly in Turkey over time. Turkey is 
becoming an assertive regional power, which despite its declared aspiration 
to join the EU is increasingly following a multi-vectoral foreign policy. Th e 
ultimate strategic goals of the transatlantic partners are convergent. Turkey 
is crucial in terms of energy security both for the EU and the U.S. in terms 
of its capacity to bring Caspian oil and gas to world and European markets. 
Likewise, it plays the key role to many regional issues of crucial interest to 
both transatlantic partners – Middle East, the Caucasus, Iran or the Balkans. 
But the approach to Turkey has been diverging for some time. While the 
U.S. sees Turkey primarily from a  strategic perspective and exclusively as 
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a foreign policy issue, and as such tends to be less concerned with the details 
of Turkey’s domestic political situation, the EU’s approach is more complex 
given the candidate status of the country for EU membership. For the EU 
the context of Turkish EU accession is also a domestic politics issue and thus 
the importance of Turkey’s domestic situation is exponentially higher. Th e 
U.S. wants to anchor Turkey to the West for strategic reasons and therefore 
favours Turkey’s EU membership, lobbying the EU governments on the issue. 
At the same time, the accession of Turkey to the EU is being de-coupled 
from the Western Balkans as a ‘special case’. Some EU governments, notably 
France, Germany and Austria are questioning any prospect of Turkish EU 
membership. A triangular setting of the relationships should be re-thinked 
and re-balanced by the transatlantic partners in a way of what can be done 
together. A consistent pressure needs to be developed in order for Turkey to 
deliver on lacking political freedoms and to keep the reform pace, with the 
U.S. rather lobbying Ankara, not some of the EU capitals, on the accession 
issue. Th e EU needs to keep the accession negotiations going and not to lose 
their dynamics, despite the failure to solve the Cyprus issue. Th e voices that 
put the ultimate goal of EU accession in question should be stopped, as they 
contrary to the spirit of the accession negotiation framework. 
Recommendations
On the basis of this assessment, the following recommendations are made:
 ■ Th e EU and U.S. should reiterate their commitment to upholding and 
strengthening the transatlantic alliance. Th e Euro-Atlantic area remains 
a space of shared values despite the turmoil and challenges arising on the 
international scene. Th ere is no need for fully shared views on strategic 
challenges, but there is a need for political willingness to share the solutions 
and complement each others’ assets.
 ■ No ‘Russia ﬁ rst’ policy. If deals are made with Russia ﬁ rst, there is not much 
that can be oﬀ ered to the countries in the EU Eastern neighbourhood seek-
ing stable democracies and Euro-Atlantic integration. Th e key determinant 
of EU and U.S. relations with the neighbours should be the latter’s perform-
ance and not Russia (neither in a positive nor a negative sense). On the other 
hand, the EU and U.S. should not deepen engagement with the neighbours 
just because Russia doesn’t want this, and thus exacerbating great power 
politics in the region, which harm not only EU/U.S.-Russia relations but 
also the domestic and international relations of the neighbours themselves.
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 ■ A set of democratic standards should continue to be a driving goal in the 
European neighbourhood otherwise the credibility and legitimacy of the 
transatlantic partners (in Bosnia and elsewhere) is damaged. Democrati-
zation in the neighbouring countries’ societies should be entrenched by 
targeting the civil society (and at EU side, better channelling the ﬁ nancial 
assistance), while keeping the political focus on countries’ development. 
 ■ Strengthen EU and NATO communication. Th e existing structural obsta-
cles could be by-passed using informal initiatives in order to improve 
dialogue. Turkey must play a key role in this communication. 
 ■ Improve communication between the U.S. and EU. Better coordination 
requires an improvement of the communication channels and emergency 
lines between the transatlantic partners. Structured communication with 
the EU representatives, especially with the new top EU ﬁ gures (i.e. per-
manent President of the European Council, EU High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy) and emerging European External Action 
Service should be implemented, which will also require better coordination 
mechanisms within the EU itself. 
 ■ EU’s ENP should be revised due to its insuﬃ  cient transformative poten-
tial. ENP is not working well as a political label and neither the Eastern 
Partnership nor the Union for Mediterranean seem to improve the 
situation. Th e EU is failing to oﬀ er attractive short-term incentives. Th e 
prevailing answer to the question how to improve EU’s performance is 
further diﬀ erentiation among the countries and further borrowing from 
the enlargement policy toolbox.
 ■ For several reasons, EU Enlargement policy has been losing appeal and 
eﬃ  ciency vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries for some time. Without 
the incentive of enlargement, the EU needs to combine a  values-based 
approach with other realistic incentives to stimulate good governance and 
democratisation in its neighbourhood. 

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About the Institute
MISSION
The EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy is a non-proﬁ t, non-partisan, 
and independent institute. It focuses on the issues of European integration 
and its impact on the transformation of political, economic, and legal milieu 
in the Czech Republic. EUROPEUM strives to contribute to the long-lasting 
development of democracy, security, stability, freedom, and solidarity 
across Europe. EUROPEUM formulates opinions and oﬀ ers alternatives to 
internal reforms in the Czech Republic with a view of ensuring its full-ﬂ edged 
membership and respected position in the European Union.
CORE ACTIVITIES
Research Programmes 
■ The Future EU Programme focuses on the analysis and recommendations 
for Czech positions towards EU reform and its future function, as well as 
key EU policies. Th e main areas of research include EU institutional issues, 
the issue of the Constitutional Treaty, and future EU enlargement including 
countries such as Turkey, the Western Balkans, or Ukraine.
■ The Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Programme covers the 
future development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), plus analysis and recommenda-
tions for the EU and the Czech Republic in this respect. Special attention is paid 
to the relationship between the EU and the USA as key transatlantic partners.
■ The Economic and Social Programme analyses economic and social issues 
mostly connected with the membership of the Czech Republic in the EU, such 
as the adoption of the Euro, the Lisbon agenda, and the future of the EU regional 
and cohesion policies. Special attention is devoted to the future of the EU budget, 
especially in regard to the upcoming mid-term budgetary review in 2008/2009 
and a healthy check of the expenses on common agricultural policy. 
■ The Freedom, Security, and Justice Programme covers this relatively new, 
nevertheless dynamically developing EU policy. It focuses on speciﬁ c issues 
included in this policy, such as the European Arrest Warrant, new European 
initiatives in the ﬁ eld of the ﬁ ght against terrorism, co-operation of intelligence 
services within the EU, immigration and asylum policies, issues of visa policies 
towards third countries, or the consular co-operation among EU member states. 
Publications
Th e recent publications of the Institute include: 
 
■ Not Your Grandfathers’ Eastern Bloc; The EU New Member States 
as Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union (2009)
Th e publication is a  product of the Open Society Institute  – Soﬁ a within the 
European Policies Initiative (EuPI, www.eupi.eu). Th e project has been imple-
mented in close partnership with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Th e report is based on in-depth country reports from the ten New Member States.
■ David Král, Věra Řiháčková, Tomáš Weiss, Views on 
American Foreign Policy – The Atlanticism of Political 
Parties in Central and Eastern Europe (2008) 
Th e publication focuses at the foreign policy agenda, orientation and behavior 
of political parties in six Central and Eastern European countries. Th e authors 
are assessing the position of major political parties vis-à-vis the United States 
on the issues that became somehow contentious in a  wider international 
context, where the US policy diverged from that of the other international 
actors, notably some EU member states
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■ TGAE – Think Global – Act European – The Contribution of European Think-
Tanks to the French, Czech, and Swedish Trio Presidencies of the EU (2008)
Th e publication edited by Notre Europe and the Fondation pour l’Innovation 
Politique, both leading French think-tanks, contains a series of contributions 
from a limited number of dynamic European think tanks for the purpose of 
formulating concrete recommendations on major issues of concern to the 
French, Czech, and Swedish Presidencies. 
■ The European Parliament: Towards Parliamentary 
Democracy in the European Union? (2008)
Th e proceedings from the conference “Th e European Parliament – Towards 
Parliamentary Democracy in the European Union?” organized by Europeum 
in November 2007.
■ Democracy’s New Champions – European Democracy 
Assistance After EU Enlargement (2008)
Th e publication is an output of international research project co-ordinated by 
PASOS – Policy Association for an Open Society. 
Publications and policy papers available to download at: www.europeum.org
Projects
Th e projects are developed and run by the Institute or implemented in coop-
eration with other partners (For full information on running and completed 
projects please see: http://www.europeum.org/disp_projects.php?lang=en)
Research
 ■ Transatlantic Policy Forum (TAPF)
Th e project focuses at enhancing Transatlantic debate concerning the key areas 
of interest to Transatlantic policy community by bringing together scholars 
and experts from both the US and the EU and delivering speciﬁ c, policy-
oriented recommendations on these issues to policy makers on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Th e experts participating on the project form a Transatlantic Task 
Force, which is sub-divided in four diﬀ erent working groups created around 
the following topics: 1. Energy security and climate change, 2. Transatlantic 
market and WTO issues, including trade in agricultural products, 3. Democ-
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racy assistance and promotion worldwide and 4. EU  – US co-operation in 
the EU neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus). Th e 
project is funded by EC Delegation in Washington D.C. and the Government 
of the Czech Republic. 
 ■ Annual Operating Grant 2009
Th e Annual Operating Grant for the year 2009 was awarded to Europeum by 
the EACEA, DG Education and Culture of the European Commission within 
the Europe for Citizens Programme. Th e operating grant allows for research 
and publication of policy papers on issues not covered by other projects. 
■ Think Global-Act European (TGAE) – The Contribution of European 
Think Tanks to the Spanish, Belgium and Hungarian Presidencies
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy is actively involved in the interna-
tional network project “Th ink Global-Act European”. Under the leadership of 
Notre Europe, the project mobilizes a  limited number of dynamic European 
think tanks for the purpose of formulating concrete recommendations on major 
issues of concern to the Spanish, Belgium and Hungarian EU Presidencies. 
■ Regulation of Lobbying as a Right Direction to More 
Transparent and Corruption-Free Legislative Process
In many countries of Western Europe as well as in the USA political lobby-
ing is regulated in details or at least partly regulated by law. In many other 
countries of Central and Easter Europe such legislation has been adopted (e.g. 
Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania); not in the Czech Republic. Th e ways how to 
regulate a political lobbying diﬀ er from one country to another one depending 
on political traditions and culture but there is one common aspect – a will 
to regulate and control the processes which signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence the whole 
legislative process and decision making in general. Th e project is funded by 
Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe.
■ The Eastern Partnership in the context of the 
EU Enlargement Policy and V4 agenda
Th e project is implemented by  the Kosciuszko Institute  from Krakow in 
a partnership with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy and the Centre 
for EU Enlargement Studies  in Budapest. It aims to conclude in an interna-
tional publication on Polish (while holding the Presidency in the Visegrad 
Group – V4  – 07. 2008–06. 2009), Czech (while holding the Presidency of 
the EU 01-06.2009) and Hungarian (as a  current V4 President) eﬀ orts in 
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the Eastern Partnership inauguration as well as presenting future objectives 
of the Polish Presidency in 2011 in the matter of the EU Enlargement Policy 
and cooperation within the Eastern Partnership. Th e project is co-ﬁ nanced 
by the Visegrad Fund. 
Democracy Assistance / Transfer of knowledge
After completion of the integration of the Czech Republic to the EU, 
EUROPEUM has decided to use the knowledge generated during the Czech 
transformation process and the EU accession process and transfer it to the 
countries in the EU neighbourhood. So far Europeum has implemented 
democracy assistance projects in Belarus (for leaders of democratic 
opposition and independent civic society groups), Ukraine, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo (for journalists, NGO leaders and 
local government representatives). The projects are funded by Human 
Rights and Transformation Policy Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic and by OSI East-East: Partnership without 
Borders Programme.
Education
In September 2007, a new contest was launched called EuropaSecura, focus-
ing on security issues, the EU, and NATO (www.EuropaSecura.cz). Th e third, 
this time international, round of the competition is to be launched in January 
2010. 
In the summer 2009, EUROPEUM organised its 7th year of an international 
European Summer School, which gathered 35 students from more than 20 
diﬀ erent countries the previous year.
E-Educated is the project that faces the special need of teachers, trainers, 
lecturers and other staﬀ  working in education. Especially for this group of 
professionals it is extremely important to have access to long life learning. 
Th e aim of the project is to design and oﬀ er to target group a product – on 
line course on EU topics which is easily accessible to all of them, which is 
modern, challenging, European, giving them opportunities to improve not only 
academic knowledge but also other skills, e.g. digital skills, language skills. Th e 
project consortium includes 7 partners; it has been ﬁ nanced by the European 
Commission (Grundtwig program).
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Roundtables, Conferences, and Seminars
EUROPEUM organizes a number of seminars, conferences, workshops, and 
other public events. For the calendar of events please see:
http://www.europeum.org/disp_events.php?lang=en
Training Activities
EUROPEUM organises both general and specialised courses on the EU for 
diﬀ erent organisations – public administration, the Czech National Bank, the 
Government Oﬃ  ce, NGOs, and companies. 
Membership in International Networks
EUROPEUM is a member of the core steering group of the European Policy 
Institutes Network (EPIN), together with the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, the Royal Institute Elcano in Madrid, the Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) in Stockholm, the Centre for 
European Reform in London, and Notre Europe in Paris. For further informa-
tion please see: www.epin.org
EUROPEUM is also a member of the Policy Association for an Open Society 
(PASOS), whose secretariat is based in Prague and which gathers public 
policy centres together from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
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